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SUMMARY
The new product development (NPD) process has been long conceptualized
as an intense information processing task, yet several questions about the role of
information in shaping NPD decisions remain open. For instance, the persistent rep-
resentation of NPD decisions as a single decision-maker outcome in existing theory; it
limits our understanding of decisions that involve multiple and heterogeneous organi-
zational stakeholders (persons or units), and it appears distant from the managerial
realities. This dissertation focuses on managerial decisions where information acquisi-
tion, ownership and interpretation exhibit heterogeneity. The first essay (Chapter 2)
examines the role of informational asymmetries (e.g., varying degrees of uncertainty)
that competing firms face when investing in R&D. The study underlines the strong
path dependency that informational spillovers cause to R&D decisions. The second
essay (Chapter 3) reveals the detrimental effects of interpretive diversity (i.e., dif-
ferent people may interpret differently the same information) on project termination
decisions. Interestingly, the detrimental impact of such interpretive diversity is higher
when the project progress information is deemed to be, on average, reliable by the
team members. The third essay (Chapter 4) examines how consumers’ information
regarding future market conditions can affect a firm’s strategy on striking a balance
between its primary and secondary markets. The analysis shows that, in the presence
of such information, seemingly competing companies (e.g., an Original Equipment
Manufacturer and a third-party entrant) could develop synergies that benefit both of
them.
xii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Information economics has had a tremendous impact on economic theory and policy.
As Stiglitz (2002, p.461) highlights: “even a small amount of information imperfection
could have a profound effect on the nature of the market equilibrium”. To date,
the literature on new product development provides us with a good understanding
regarding the different sources of uncertainty (e.g., technical or market) and potential
sources of information that could mitigate such risks (e.g., testing and prototypes,
focus groups, lead users). In the majority of these studies, however, the analysis
implicitly assumes a single-decision maker setting. For instance, in models of optimal
project termination times, the decision is based on a single objective function. Yet, in
reality, such decisions are taken by cross-functional team whose members rarely have
the same perception regarding the project progress. Such information asymmetries
are emerging as a very promising field in NPD (Sosa et al. 2004, Mihm et al. 2003). In
addition, very few studies have examined how information asymmetries across firms
affect their R&D search strategies. This dissertation focuses on managerial decisions
where information acquisition, ownership and interpretation exhibit heterogeneity.
The first essay, presented in Chapter 2, examines the role of informational asym-
metries (e.g. varying degrees of uncertainty) that competing firms face when investing
in R&D. Such informational asymmetries are generated in collaborative R&D environ-
ments where knowledge disseminates across the various member firms. Consider the
case of the Georgia Electronic Design Center (GEDC), a leading university research
center at Georgia Tech. A major objective of the center has been to showcase existing
technological developments generated from recent research projects. Through those
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exhibition fairs, formally called industry review, firms gain a better understanding of
the underlying technological potential of different scientific domains. Thus, although
the pioneering firm faces a considerable amount of uncertainty, follower firms (poten-
tially competitors) obtain additional information and therefore could make a more
informed decision about their future investments.
Such information is critical for the member firms because it is often used to direct
their future R&D investments. According to our field study, senior R&D executives
and research scientists attend presentations and prototype exhibitions that facilitate
the identification of areas for future investments. Benefiting from this information
though is not straightforward. R&D managers who observe past outcomes realized
by a rival’s R&D projects need to address the following question: should future
R&D focus on the domain already explored by rivals or should it pursue unexplored
scientific domains?
The study presented in Chapter 2 develops a model that views R&D as a process
of iterative exploration trials for new technological improvements that may emerge
from the same or different scientific domains. Firms compete within similar market
segments and therefore they need to account for strategic interactions when assessing
the direction of their R&D efforts. Our analysis shows that the R&D search choices
are strongly path dependent, and that future decisions rely on a threshold policy.
Major technological breakthroughs prompt search within the same scientific domain,
a herding-like behavior. Yet, moderately significant improvements (i.e. the case in
most of the projects in mature fields of engineering) may direct firms to explore new
areas. The study further explores the properties of the threshold policy with respect to
the structure of the technological landscape and the parameters of commercialization.
A limited ability to infer the remaining potential of a scientific domain from past
outcomes prompts firms to diversify their R&D efforts. At the same time, an increased
ability to learn from different scientific domains due to strong similarities in their
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underlying knowledge base renders diversification preferable.
The third Chapter looks at information asymmetries within a new product de-
velopment team. Consider one of the most challenging decisions that NPD teams
are faced with: the decision on whether to continue or terminate an underperforming
project. A vast literature has examined the rich mathematical properties of optimal
stopping problems (typically formulated as dynamic programming models) as well
as the role of different types of uncertainty (market payoff, technical performance,
budget variability). While those studies have enriched our understanding about the
structure of the problem, it is still remains hard to implement them in practice. While
there are many reasons as to why a theoretical model could not be applied to practice,
in the case of optimal termination decisions, a fundamental one seems to be the mere
fact that different people may have a very different understanding of what constitutes
negative information. Numerous case studies have shown that the same information
(e.g., the most recent market research report) is interpreted entirely differently by
different team members (e.g., an engineer versus a marketer).
The study presented in Chapter 3 develops a theoretical model to understand
how such an interpretive diversity affects project termination decisions. The study
builds a model around the concept of information fidelity, i.e. the degree of accu-
racy that the decision-maker assigns to the new information. We account for the
potential interpretive diversity across team members by allowing each team member
to assign his/her own fidelity on the incoming information. Then, I examine the
stopping behavior of different team structures (e.g., light-weight versus heavy-weight
project manager team). Our analysis reveals the complex role of diversity. Depend-
ing on the underlying project uncertainty, diversity might either become a source of
conservatism, causing the team to stop projects earlier than necessary, or a source
of escalation, leading to costly delays in project termination decisions. Thus, the
existence of distinct “thought worlds” within an organization gives rise to systematic
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biases, even when the decision-makers are perfectly rational. Our results are robust
across different team hierarchical structures, and they are magnified in the presence
of social conformity. Interestingly, seemingly opposing managerial strategies, namely
the diversification of the team composition and the pressure to conform to a target,
may complement each other in amplifying escalation phenomena.
Chapter 4 takes an entirely different perspective on the information structure
by focusing on the information that consumers have regarding a firm’s future strat-
egy. The study was motivated by discussions with managers from a global supplier
of refurbished Information Technology (IT) equipment (e.g., servers, networking, IP
telephony). The profitability, and often the viability, of such companies are strongly
affected by the policies imposed by the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)
such as IBM, Sun, and HP. One would expect that such OEMs would have sim-
ilar strategies on how they balance their primary markets (i.e., markets for their
new products) and secondary markets (i.e., markets where refurbished equipment is
traded). In practice, however, we observe radically different strategies. Some OEMs
are actively supporting the existence of IT refurbishers while others are, even more
actively, trying to eliminate them. The theoretical model studies the drivers behind
those diametrically opposite strategies. One of the key findings is that consumers’
awareness of the potential resale value has significant implications for the OEM’s
strategy. Such strategic information is deemed highly critical. In fact, there exist a
large number of industry analyst firms who specialize in forecasting the resale value
of IT equipment and who offer comprehensive cost/benefit analyses over the life cycle
of the IT equipment.
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CHAPTER II
THE ROLE OF INFORMATIONAL SPILLOVERS ON
COMPETITIVE R&D SEARCH
2.1 Introduction
Few topics have received as much attention, from academics and practitioners alike,
as the management of innovation. Although early studies center on issues of timing
(for a review see Reinganum 1989), more recent studies argue that assimilating new
information and, more importantly, interpreting it correctly, plays a key role on the
success of innovation efforts.1
Early on, economists identify knowledge spillovers as a critical determinant of
R&D investments (Arrow 1962). More recently, Romer (1990) characterizes such
spillovers as a central driver of economic growth. Several empirical studies (Griliches
1979, 1992, Jaffe 1986) demonstrate the existence and beneficial role of such infor-
mation dissemination and cross-pollination mechanisms, while others examine how
they shape the incentives to innovate (for a review see Veugelers 1998). However, the
majority of these studies focuses on only one dimension of innovative activity: the
total amount of resources invested in R&D (i.e., the R&D intensity). As a result, we
know very little about the operational implications of informational spillovers on the
direction of R&D efforts.
Motivating example: the Georgia Electronic Design Center (GEDC)
The following example describes a mechanism through which informational spillovers
are generated and illustrates their importance in shaping future R&D decisions. The
1DeBondt (1997) highlights the relevance: “The challenge may not always be to be among the first
to produce the new information, but may instead be how to recognize, obtain, employ and complement
the relevant innovative information.” (DeBondt (1997), p.2)
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Georgia Electronic Design Center (GEDC) was established by the State of Geor-
gia and the Georgia Institute of Technology in 2002 to develop and test advanced
new technologies that enhance the performance of microelectronics devices, such as
Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS). Research is conducted across several
technological domains of specialization, such as Wireless Sensors, Cognitive Radio,
Agile Optical/Photonic, Multi-Gigabit Wireless, and has led to several break-through
technologies.2
Like most university research centers of this type, GEDC draws the largest amount
of funding from close collaborations with industry partners. Member companies in-
clude prominent high-tech industry players, such as Intel, AMD, Microsoft, Samsung,
Nokia, etc. Companies typically initiate Directed Research (DR) projects that involve
a respectable amount of investment. These projects rest upon exclusive licensing and
detailed legal contracts that determine the ownership of the intellectual property (IP)
(Thursby and Thursby 2003).
An event of particular interest for our study is the GEDC industry review. During
this biannual event, member companies are invited to view the progress of the center
across the different scientific domains. Senior R&D executives and research scientists
attend presentations and prototype exhibitions that present findings from recent DR
projects. Thus, although the sponsor firm holds the IP rights of the specific technology
developed, other members of GEDC can still observe the technology and interpret it as
a signal for the potential of a scientific domain. In fact, those prototype exhibitions
can be very influential for the member firms since most of the new DR initiatives
emerge from the discussions that take place during the industry review.
The GEDC’s modus operandi is not unique. In fact, the majority of university
2A GEDC team recently established a new world record for the highest data rate transmitted
wirelessly at 60GHz.
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research centers seems to operate under similar “business models” for technology de-
velopment and transfer. As Corey (1997) points out “[consortium] members may
choose from the consortium’s bundle of product offerings those that meet their par-
ticular needs. They have the option of allocating their annual fees to particular R&D
areas and forgoing participation in others” (Corey 1997, p.85).
The GEDC example highlights a robust feature of modern R&D strategies. Firms
seem to hold a steady presence in several university research centers, to achieve a
two-fold objective: i) To mitigate the significant risks and expenditures associated
with research through collaborative or targeted funding efforts; and (ii) To ensure
access to state-of-the-art technological trends when planning their future R&D ef-
forts. An extensive literature in economics studies collaborative R&D efforts driven
by cost-sharing reasons (e.g., R&D consortia) where firms agree to split the total cost
and share the benefits. Much less is understood though for indirect forms of collabo-
rative structures, which are based on information sharing and learning mechanisms.
For instance, in GEDC, member firms develop individual projects and thus there is
no direct benefit due to cost sharing. Yet, the industry review allows firms to ob-
serve their rivals’ findings, which, in turn, allows for more informed future decisions.3
Clearly, one of the most challenging managerial tasks is how to correctly interpret
and act upon observing these past findings.
The focus of this paper is the critical decision that senior R&D management faces
concerning the direction of search: Should an investment be made to domains already
explored by rival firms or towards completely new avenues? In making this decision, a
firm needs to balance two opposing forces. The first is the so-called “neighborhood ef-
fect”. In his seminal study, Jaffe (1986) demonstrates the existence of R&D spillovers
3Cohen and Levinthal (1994) characterize such channels as “windows on new technologies” that
allow companies to better assess the potential of recent scientific developments. University research
centers are only one instance of such channels. Others include practitioner and academic conferences,
or the turnover of R&D labor where fresh university graduates disseminate knowledge.
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by showing that firm-level R&D productivity is positively associated with the R&D
investment of “technological neighbors” (Jaffe 1986, p.986). That is, firms experience
higher returns on R&D investments when they undertake projects technologically
similar to their rivals’. On the other hand, Furman et al. (2006) point out that
competition might discourage follow-up investments in the same scientific domains
since the pioneering firm might have already seized the most profitable opportunities
from the field (the so-called “fish out the pool” effect).
We approach the above question by developing a two-stage game of two competing
firms that sequentially decide where to direct their investments for future technolog-
ical developments. Investing in a scientific domain leads to technology improvements
which translate to a competitive advantage in the market. We account for the inher-
ent uncertainty of R&D by modeling the realization of a technology improvement as a
random draw from a probability distribution that describes the technological poten-
tial of a scientific domain. Such a realization also provides an imperfect signal about
the future potential of the particular domain. It may also be informative about the
potential of related scientific domains.4 Once firms observe the realization, they can
refine their understanding about each scientific domain, and make a more-informed
decision regarding their future investments.
Our results suggest that a firm’s optimal R&D search strategy exhibits a threshold
policy. Depending on the realized technology improvement, the firm chooses to pursue
search within an unexplored scientific domain (exploration strategy), to follow-up on
the competitor’s path (exploitation strategy), or to forego R&D search altogether.
The technological distance between the alternative domains moderates the shape and
order in which these strategies become preferred across the past technology realization
spectrum.
4The concept of “related domains” is formalized in our model setup section and it corresponds
to Jaffe’s (1986) technological distance.
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Once we outline the general conditions that determine the optimal search strat-
egy, we focus on the most insightful case where a threshold between exploration and
exploitation exists. For past outcomes above a technological improvement threshold,
a firm benefits from exploiting the same scientific domain. For lower outcomes, ex-
ploration of alternative domains renders higher expected benefits. We show that this
threshold value always lies strictly above the a priori expected potential of the ex-
plored scientific domain. Thus, a firm may divert its R&D efforts towards exploration
even when the past findings led to significant (i.e., better than average) improvement.
The result is robust even when the different domains are mutually exclusive options
(i.e., a low outcome in one domain indicates a higher likelihood for a high outcome
in the other).
We study the properties of the above threshold with respect to the technological
distance (Jaffe 1986) of the scientific domains and the informational value of past
outcomes. As the scientific domains become less distant (i.e., the distributions of
their technological potentials exhibit higher correlation), a firm learns more about
alternative domains from prior R&D efforts, and exploration of a new domain becomes
preferable. In contrast, as past outcomes become more informative of the explored
domain, they allow for faster learning, and exploitation of the same domain is more
promising. Note that both higher correlation and higher precision render past findings
more informative for a firm; yet, their impact on the direction of the search effort is
diametrically opposite, highlighting the managerial value of identifying the different
sources of learning.
The competitive dynamics also play a critical role on the R&D search path. Fiercer
market competition prompts exploration of alternative domains, driving diversifica-
tion upstream at the R&D stage. With respect to the firm’s incentives to innovate,
we show that the potential of a follow-up exploitation by rival firms diminishes the
search incentives (i.e., firms only invest for sufficiently low search costs). However,
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competition intensity may have a non-monotonic impact on these incentives. A firm
may invest under a very competitive environment, but forego investment in a milder
one. Our analysis also reveals the dual role of learning from past outcomes by showing
that more informative outcomes may not always be more beneficial to the firm. In
contrast, in light of a moderate past outcome, a firm is better off when this outcome
carries limited information about the potential of the domain.
Our study contributes to the extant literature along three dimensions. First, we
outline a comprehensive mechanism to describe the realization of R&D spillovers at
an operational level. The past literature predominantly conceptualizes them as a
fixed and costless benefit. We take an operational perspective and we conceptualize
the effect of R&D spillovers as the actionable strategy implications due to information
generated from other firms’ efforts. Second, our approach illustrates the strong path
dependency of the R&D spillover effects. The commonly held view of a fixed effect
might be accurate at the overall economy level, but it does not translate into straight-
forward effects at the senior R&D management level. The insight is important since
it highlights the need to provide managers with a deeper understanding regarding
the role of specific parameters (e.g., the different sources of learning). Finally, we
add further insights on the new product development literature, as the latter focuses
extensively on a single firm’s decisions. We analyze a competitive setting and we
outline contingency actions regarding the direction of search among rival firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the related
literature in Section 2, we present our key model assumptions (Section 3). Section
4 describes the optimal search strategy contingent on the past realized technology
improvements. In Section 5, we discuss the a priori (i.e., before the realization of
the technology improvement) incentives to innovate and a member firm’s average
profitability when both rivals are equally likely to initiate R&D search. Finally,
Section 6 concludes by providing practical implications of our work.
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2.2 Literature Review
Our research question draws upon three streams of literature. We begin by briefly
presenting the literature on R&D spillovers. The central question is how the incentives
to invest in innovation vary due to spillover effects. Next we summarize the rather few
papers that focus on the R&D path decision by accounting for the different options
that firms have when pursuing R&D initiatives. Finally, we discuss recent work on
new product development (NPD) that highlights the role of imperfect learning during
the experimentation stage.
Arrow (1962) pioneered the idea that a firm’s incentives to innovate decrease
when knowledge generated by its innovation efforts gets involuntarily transmitted
to competitors. In another early study, Schmookler (1966) articulated that a firm’s
technological progress may not solely be the outcome of its own research efforts but
also of other firms’ research results. Since then, economists expressed a great interest
in understanding the impact of such knowledge diffusions, a concept known as R&D
spillovers (Griliches 1979,1992, Jaffe 1986).
The first normative treatment of R&D spillovers dates back to Ruff (1969). He
considers an oligopoly setting where the “effective” research effort per firm (Xi) is a
weighted sum of the its own effort (xi) and the effort carried out by its rivals (xj):
Xi = xi+nβxj, where n is the number of firms and β is an exogenously set parameter
that represents the impact of spillovers. In his words: “β is the transmission coefficient
and measures the ease with which research results are transmitted among firms.” (Ruff
1969, p.402) He concludes that the incentives to innovate decrease for higher spillover
levels.
Two of the most influential studies in the R&D spillovers literature come from
Katz (1986) and d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Their novelty lies in recogniz-
ing that firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or non-cooperative type. Instead,
they argue that firms may cooperate during an initial stage (i.e., cost reduction process
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innovation efforts), and compete in a subsequent stage (i.e., capacity competition).
Their analysis highlights that the effectiveness of any collaborative structure depends
on the spillover parameter: Low values of β prompt non-cooperative behaviors and
higher amounts of R&D investments because firms view each other as fierce competi-
tors. As β increases cooperative efforts become more profitable since they allow firms
to exploit the involuntary transmitted knowledge. Since then, a remarkably exten-
sive literature has extended the d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) framework by
examining the firms’ incentives to innovate under different collaborative structures.
Surveys on this literature are provided by DeBondt (1997) and Veugelers (1998).
We depart from the standard approach in the past literature in three ways. First,
instead of modeling R&D spillovers as an exogenous cost reduction process we fo-
cus on a fundamental driver for the creation of R&D spillovers: The dissemination
of knowledge through specialized labs, university research centers, scientific publi-
cations, conference presentations, and consortia meetings. Thus, the benefits from
spillovers arise endogenously through the dissemination of new information generated
by prior R&D efforts.5 Second, we allow firms to pursue diverse scientific domains
rather than examining the R&D intensity for a single one. By doing so, we develop
an understanding about the evolution of the equilibrium search path. Third, we rec-
ognize that the highly uncertain nature of R&D calls for a stochastic, instead of a
deterministic formulation of the R&D spillover effect. We therefore, incorporate a
concise conceptualization of the impact of past research on the search process.
The second stream of work that pertains to our work focuses on the direction in-
stead of the intensity of the R&D search. In a pioneering paper Dasgupta and Stiglitz
(1980) argue that firms need to decide both on their R&D spending as well as the
direction of their efforts. They capture the latter by enabling firms to pursue projects
5To our knowledge, the only other paper that used this novel approach is Cohen and Levinthal
(1994) who study the incentives of a firm to build its absorptive capacity in the context of uncertainty
and competition.
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with different risk profiles. In their formulation, market power increases in the cost
advantage over rivals, therefore, competitive markets encourage firms to undertake
risky R&D projects. Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (1986) also examine whether
firms choose to invest in similar (i.e., highly correlated) or diverse R&D projects.
They find that firms benefit from diverse projects since the reward from innovation
is higher as the likelihood of the rival succeeding is lower. On the other hand, Das-
gupta and Maskin (1987) recognize that diversification is costly, and for that reason,
firms have an incentive to deviate from the socially optimal diversity by choosing
excessively correlated projects. Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) echo the previous
observation by showing that competition prevents the firms from exploring different
sets of “boxes” (alternatives). Cardon and Sasaki (1998) drop the “winner-take-all”
assumption implied in previous R&D search models. They show that firms invest in
the same research project (“cluster”) when the project outcomes are highly correlated
but decide to follow a different path (“separate”) when the project outcomes are less
or negatively correlated with each other. Finally, Cabral (2003) considers an infinite-
period R&D race where firms choose between low- and high-variance strategies. He
shows that the firm’s optimal choice is to pursue safe R&D projects when ahead in
the race and risky ones when lagging behind.
Our study differs from this stream in two important aspects. First, no prior
work addresses the role of the informational spillovers that emerge from past research
efforts. We focus on how those spillovers affect the R&D search path. Second, we
demonstrate the strong path dependency of the phenomenon. With the exception of
Cabral, past research has considered only simultaneous games, and as a result it is
focused on static R&D search models.
Finally, our research touches upon a central question of the NPD literature: The
role of learning during the experimentation search process. Weitzman (1979) sparked
a voluminous literature on the optimal search problem. In the context of NPD,
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testing and experimentation grant a better understanding of the design space. Thus,
the designers converge to a concept when the benefits from further exploration do not
outweigh the costs associated with it (Clark and Fujimoto 1989, Thomke 1998, 2003).
Loch et. al (2001) compare the two basic approaches of experimentation, sequential
versus parallel. They characterize the conditions under which it is optimal to pursue
one or the other and they recognize that the sequential approach bears the fruit of
learning. Erat and Kavadias (2008) examine the role of the design space structure
on learning and on the optimal number of experimentation stages. They recognize
that different design configurations may share common features and therefore exhibit
correlated performances. We build on this literature by conceptualizing spillovers
as the knowledge generated upon completion of a research endeavor. We extend
this literature by examining how learning from past outcomes affects the optimal
strategy of a rival firm rather than the strategy of the firm that originally initiated
the experimentation process.
2.3 Model Setup
Consider two firms that contemplate the same set of scientific domains and future
applications associated with them. As in our case study, this could happen due to a
close collaboration with a research center. An investment to a specific domain yields
some technological improvement that could subsequently improve the firm’s product
performance and profitability. As we discussed earlier, industry events like the one
organized by the GEDC allow senior R&D managers and engineers to observe past
technology improvements from domains that rival firms already explored. At that
point, a critical decision needs to be taken: Should a member firm direct R&D effort
on an already explored domain, or invest in alternative unexplored ones.
The main goal of this paper is to understand how the R&D search path of rival
firms evolves contingent on past outcomes. To that end, we assume that firms search
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the scientific landscape sequentially, rather than simultaneously. By doing so, we
focus on the role of informational spillovers since the latter are generated through
past findings. Prior literature on technology diffusion has identified various reasons
(e.g, firm’s size, existing capital, past experience with related technologies, extend of
diversification) as to why some firms may choose to experiment with a technological
domain earlier than others (for a review see Hoppe 2002 and the references therein).
We envision the following sequence of events. Initially (i.e., in the first-period) firm
A (hereafter the leader) pursues search within a scientific domain. The search leads
to a technology improvement, owned by the leader, which in turn, translates to better
product performance and a competitive advantage. Through the information channel,
firm B (hereafter the follower) can observe the technology improvement achieved by
the leader and use the outcome as an indication of the potential that the particular
domain exhibits. In the second period, the follower decides whether to invest in
the same scientific domain (hereafter called the explored), an alternative domain
(hereafter called the unexplored), or to not invest at all. Firms are profit-maximizers,
and therefore, their decisions reflect their assessment of which scientific domain yields
higher technology improvement. If the follower pursues R&D, he obtains a technology
improvement, otherwise he competes with the leader with his current technology.
The above sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1. Next, we describe how the
informational spillovers are realized and the nature of market competition between
the firms.
Technological Potential and Informational Spillovers
Unexplored scientific domains exhibit high uncertainty regarding their potential for
realizing technology improvements that are commercially viable. In that light, we
assume that the potential for technological improvement (hereafter technological po-
tential) of each scientific domain can be represented by a normally distributed random
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Figure 1: Sequence of Events.
variable. Then, a technology improvement realized from a search in a scientific do-
main is a draw from this distribution. The normal distribution allows us to separate
the expected potential (mean value) from the uncertainty (standard deviation) of
the technological potential, while it enables Bayesian updating in a mathematically
tractable fashion. Moreover, the assumption of a continuous distribution can bet-
ter approximate the reality of “invent arounds” that take place when a follower firm
conducts research within the same scientific domain as the leader. Thus, although a
specific improvement cannot be replicated by other rival firms (IP protection), it may
be still possible to achieve further improvement by investing in that domain. Similar
assumptions regarding the underlying probability distribution of projects with uncer-
tain performance can be found in March (1991) and Cohen and Levinthal (1994).
We consider a scientific landscape that comprises multiple scientific domains to
reflect the potentially different technological alternatives that firms can pursue to im-
prove product performance. For example, in the case of GEDC some efforts explored
the use of thin film materials for imprinting and creating very light Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) tags, while others looked into imprinting a specialized type of
conducting ink on normal paper. For ease of exposition we assume that two such
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scientific domains are relevant to the firms’ technological needs. A parameter of par-
ticular interest in the R&D spillovers literature is the technological distance between
two scientific domains (Griliches 1979, Jaffe 1986). This concept aims to capture
the degree to which knowledge from one field is transferable to the other. We proxy
this concept by allowing the probability distributions of the two scientific domains
to be correlated. For instance, in the RFID example, despite the major differences
with respect to the materials that the two alternatives exhibit, they still rely on the
same wave propagation electromagnetic principles. Therefore, findings from one al-
ternative could improve the understanding for the other. Finally, we assume that
the two scientific domains have the same a priori technological potential (i.e., same
probability distribution function) which is common knowledge among the firms. This
assumption, albeit restrictive, allows us to isolate the effect of informational spillovers
on the direction of search from other exogenous factors such as potential asymmetries
between the two scientific fields.
In summary of our previous discussion, let μ1 and σ1 denote the a priori mean
and standard deviation, respectively, of the two technological potential distributions.
Let T1 denote the technological potential of the first scientific area. We assume that
T1 is normally distributed T1 ∼ N(μ1, σ21). Let tA be the outcome of the leader’s
R&D search that the follower observes upon completion of the leader’s project. We
assume that tA is a noisy signal of the underlying distribution of T1 such that tA =
T1 +  where  represents the noise term that is independent of T1 and normally
distributed  ∼ N(0, σ2). Let θ0 denote the correlation between the distributions of
the two scientific domains. The following two Lemmas describe how the underlying
probability distribution of each scientific domain evolves contingent on the realization
of the leader’s project.
Lemma 1 The posterior distribution for the technological potential of the explored
domain is normal N(μ′1, σ
′2
1 ) with μ
′
1 = ktA + (1− k)μ1 and σ′1 =
√
σ21σ
2
σ21+σ
2 where
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k =
σ21
σ21+σ
2 .
Proof All proofs are provided in the technical appendix A for ease of readability.
An important element of our model is the variance σ2 of the noise term. It reflects
the extent to which the leader’s R&D outcome, tA, is informative of the underlying
distribution function of the scientific domain potential. In fact, the posterior mean of
the technological potential distribution is a weighted average of the realized outcome,
tA, and the prior expectation μ1. The weights depend on the noise-to-signal ratio
(NSR) in an intuitive fashion. When the variance of the noise term, σ2 tends to
zero (or respectively its precision tends to infinity), the signal’s weight k tends to one
and shifts the ex-post potential of the scientific domain to a small neighborhood of
values around tA. In contrast, high values of σ
2, render k almost zero, thus the search
outcome does not reduce significantly the uncertainty associated with the specific
domain.
From a managerial standpoint, the variance σ2 reflects the fact that the technolog-
ical potential of a scientific domain is not exhausted based on a single research trial.
Literature in technology management and industrial dynamics (see Schilling (2002)
for an overview) shows that novel technologies start off with very high performance
uncertainty, and as our understanding increases the potential improvement reduces
(decreasing returns on the R&D investment). In similar vein, Gino and Pisano (2005)
use the term “information regime” to describe the relationship between research effort
and the rate of uncertainty resolution over the development cycle. They distinguish
between information rich technologies, in which experimentation generates a signifi-
cant amount of high quality (predictive) information early in the development process,
and information poor technologies, in which information accumulates slowly. Simi-
larly, in our model, a high variance σ2 represents an information poor experimentation
process (low learning rate) while as σ2 decreases, more knowledge is accumulated from
a single trial and we shift to information rich regimes (high learning rate).
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Lemma 2 The posterior distribution for the technological potential of the unexplored
domain is normal N(μ2, σ
2
2) with μ2 = μ1 +
σ1√
σ21+σ
2
θ(tA − μ1) and σ2 = σ1
√
1− θ2.
Lemma 2 illustrates the role of correlation between the different scientific domains,
and thus, the extent to which the outcome of a search effort in one field translates
to reliable indications about the other. For example, the updated mean value μ2 is
higher than the prior mean μ1 when the outcome is above the prior mean and the
distributions are positively correlated with each other. On the contrary, for negatively
correlated distributions, the updated mean is lower than the prior mean. Moreover,
the magnitude of this impact depends on the precision of the signal. In particular,
the absolute distance |μ2 − μ1| from the prior mean monotonically increases in the
signal’s precision, reflecting the higher informational value of a precise signal.
Figure 2: Scientific Domains as seen by the Leader (first period) and the Follower
(second period).
Market Competition
A technology improvement allows a firm to charge a price premium for its end-
product. Such premium may emerge from new product features (e.g., built-in wire-
less capabilities for laptops or lighter materials). Our assumption captures two fea-
tures that we have systematically observed in our motivating GEDC case study: (i)
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higher underlying technologies translate into higher performance along a competi-
tive dimension, and (ii) a milder form of competition - as opposed to the traditional
“winner-takes-all” - where technology superiority implies better performance, but not
monopoly profits. Similar demand models have often been used in the extant litera-
ture (Levinthal and Purohit 1989, Padmanabhan and Png 1997, Plambeck and Taylor
2005).
Let A be the current market size, c the per unit production cost and e the degree of
competition between the two firms’ products (hereafter competition intensity). Also,
let q1A and q1B be the respective first-period capacity decisions for each firm. These
capacity decisions represent the end-product sales under a market clearing mecha-
nism, and they allow us to consider the fact that the participating firms also account
for pricing considerations when competing. Thus, in the first period period the cor-
responding prices are: p1A = A+ btA− q1A− eq1B and p1B = A− eq1A− q1B. These
equations capture the technological advantage of the leader in the first period. In
the second period, the leader competes with his existing technology improvement, tA,
while the follower has the option to pursue search either in the explored or the unex-
plored domain. Let tB denote the technology outcome resulting from the follower’s
R&D effort. Contingent on this realized performance, the second-period prices will
be p2A = A + btA − q2A − eq2B and p2B = A + btB − eq2A − q2B with corresponding
profits Π2A(q2A, q2B) = (p2A − c) q2A and Π2B (q2A, q2B) = (p2B − c) q2B.
2.4 The Path Dependent Nature of Search under Spillovers
In this section we characterize the follower’s search strategy contingent on past R&D
outcomes (i.e., the technological improvement generated by the leader’s search). Re-
call that the leader’s outcome, tA, is a noisy signal of the underlying potential for both
the explored and the unexplored scientific domain. Let ΠE2B(tA) and Π
U
2B(tA) denote
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the follower’s second-period expected profits from searching in the explored and un-
explored scientific domain, respectively. That is, ΠE2B(tA) = E[Π2B(μ
′
1, σ
′
1 | tA)] and
ΠU2B(tA) = E[Π2B(μ2, σ2 | tA)]. Lemmas 3 and 4 describe how those profit functions
change as a function of the technology improvement achieved by the leader.
Lemma 3 ΠE2B(tA) increases in tA.
The follower’s expected profits from the explored scientific domain always increase
in the past outcome tA. Interestingly, this is true despite the fact that a higher tA
expands the market share of the leader and shrinks the market for the follower since
their products are substitutes. The result stems from the informational value of tA
regarding the potential of the explored scientific domain. A higher tA increases the
mean of the posterior distribution (μ′1), to reflect the higher average potential of
the explored domain. Moreover, the variance (σ′21 ) decreases to reflect the partial
resolution of uncertainty as the knowledge associated with the domains grows. As
a result, the higher potential is more likely to be achieved. Therefore, although a
higher tA gives the leader a greater technological leap upfront, it also increases the
chances of the follower outperforming him in the future.
Lemma 4 highlights the critical role of the technological distance θo on the effect of
past technology improvements on the expected profitability of the unexplored domain.
Lemma 4 There is a unique θ˜o > 0 such that: for θo > θ˜o, Π
U
2B(tA) increases in tA
while for θo < θ˜o, it decreases in tA.
Unlike the case described in Lemma 3, now the trade-off between a less competitive
rival (lower tA) and a signal of high underlying potential (higher tA) depends on θo.
It is natural to expect, that when θo < 0 the expected profitability from search in the
unexplored domain decreases in tA : not only the leader becomes more competitive
but also it signals a very low posterior mean for the distribution of the unexplored
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domain. The effect of tA on the leader’s competitive advantage (competition effect)
also dominates the effect on the higher posterior distribution for for positive but
rather low values of θo (informational effect). As a result, Π
U
2B(tA) decreases in tA
for 0 < θo < θ˜o. On the contrary, for highly correlated domains (i.e., θo > θ˜o) the
informational value of a high tA as a signal of a high underlying potential outweighs
the competition effect, making ΠU2B(tA) an increasing function of tA.
Recall that the follower has the choice to search either within the explored domain
with expected profits ΠE2B(tA), the unexplored domain with expected profits Π
U
2B(tA),
or forego any search effort and receive profits ΠN2B(tA). Search in a scientific domain
comes at a cost K. In line with prior research in the R&D experimentation process
(Cardon and Sasaki 1998, Cabral 2003, Loch et. al 2001, Erat and Kavadias 2008),
we assume that domains have equal search costs in order to isolate the effect of
remaining potential from other exogenous factors such as asymmetric costs. Therefore
the follower’s problem can be formulated as max{ΠE2B(tA)−K,ΠU2B(tA)−K,ΠN2B(tA)}.
Theorems 1 and 2 characterize the follower’s optimal R&D search strategy con-
tingent on the past outcome tA and the search cost K for negatively and positively
correlated domains, respectively.
Theorem 1 When the domains are negatively correlated with each other (i.e., θo <
0), for every tuplet (tA, K) there exist t˜U(K) values t˜U(K) and t˜E(K) such that the
optimal R&D search strategy is:
• to search the explored scientific domain when tA ∈ (t˜E(K),∞)
• to search the unexplored scientific domain when tA ∈ (0, t˜U(K))
• to perform no search in all other cases.
The values t˜U(K) and t˜E(K) are monotonic in K and there exist KE such that
for K ≤ KE , t˜U(K) = t˜E(K).
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Figure 3: Optimal R&D Search Strategy for negatively (left) and positively (right)
correlated domains.
According to Theorem 1, when the search cost is low K ≤ KE even the least
promising R&D option dominates the option of not searching. On the contrary, when
the search cost is high (K > KE), the follower undertakes search only when the past
outcome is very high (tA > t˜E(K)), in which case he searches in the explored domain,
or when the past outcome is very low (tA < t˜U(K)), in which case he searches in
the unexplored domain. Intuitively, the follower invests only when there is a clear
indication on which scientific domain projects the highest potential. For intermediate
outcomes, the inconclusive information renders investment in technology improve-
ments a non-profitable avenue and the follower competes with his current technology.
Theorem 2 When the domains are positively correlated with each other (i.e., θo >
0), for every tuplet (tA, K) there exist values t˜U(K) and t˜E(K) such that the optimal
R&D search strategy is:
• to search the explored scientific domain when tA ∈ (t˜E(K),∞)
• to search the unexplored scientific domain when tA ∈ (t˜U(K), t˜E(K))
• to perform no search in all other cases.
The values t˜U(K) and t˜E(K) are defined such that i) t˜U(K) = 0 for K ≤ KU , ii)
t˜U(K) = t˜E(K) for K ≥ KE .
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When the search cost is low (K ≤ KU), the follower always benefits from search,
either in the unexplored or the explored domain, regardless of the realized outcome.
At the opposite end, for high search cost (K ≥ KE), the unexplored domain is out
of consideration as it is regarded too risky. Similarly to Theorem 1, the follower
searches only when there is a very clear indication (tA > t˜E(K)), but unlike Theorem
1 the follower only searches in the domain from which this indication is coming from
(i.e., the explored domain). Finally, for intermediate search costs (KU < K < KE),
the follower’s strategy balances expected rewards (higher mean of the explored) with
remaining potential (higher variance of the unexplored). Adjacent technological do-
mains exhibit similar posterior trends regarding their potential for technology im-
provements. Thus, the expected profitability of both domains increases in the past
outcome tA. Yet, the impact of a marginal increase of tA on the expected profitabil-
ity of the explored domain is higher than that of the unexplored domain since the
effect on the latter is mitigated by the correlation θo. As a result, while intermediate
outcomes may prompt the follower to search the unexplored domain, there is always
a threshold above which he would rather search in the explored one. Intuitively,
in light of a very high past outcome (tA > t˜E) uncertainty is undesirable since the
follower wants to ensure that his realized outcome will be close to the leader’s. On
the contrary, for lower outcomes (t˜U(K) < tA < t˜E) higher uncertainty is desirable
because it allows for a higher upside potential. For even, lower outcomes tA < t˜U(K)
neither of the domains exhibit sufficient potential for undertaking search.
Note that for both the case of negatively and positively correlated domains, t˜E
denotes the threshold value such that for outcomes above t˜E the follower abandons
the unexplored domain and decides to search in the explored one. In the following
paragraphs we further analyze the properties of this threshold with respect to our
key model parameters. As described previously, there are two additional thresholds
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t˜U(K) and t˜E(K). We focus on the properties of t˜E for two reasons. First, the fo-
cus of our paper is to examine the circumstances under which the follower builds
upon the leader’s domain versus exploring alternative ones. This trade-off between
between exploitation (search in explored domain) and exploration (search in unex-
plored domain) is captured by the threshold t˜E. Second, the thresholds t˜U(K) and
t˜E(K) exhibit non-monotonic properties that depend on the realization of tA. Those
properties (available by the authors) are omitted in the interested of brevity.
Proposition 1 The threshold value t˜E is strictly higher than the prior expected value
μ1.
According to proposition 1, despite a good past outcome (i.e., above the prior
expectation) the follower might choose to abandon the explored domain and instead
search in the unexplored one. What makes this result particularly puzzling is the
fact that it holds for even negatively correlated domains. For instance, consider two
negatively correlated domains and an outcome tA in the area μ1 < tA < t˜E. Under this
scenario the explored scientific area has a higher posterior improvement expectation
(μ′1 > μ1), while the unexplored area exhibits a lower expected potential (μ2 < μ1).
Nonetheless, the follower’s optimal policy is to search in the unexplored one.
The result stems from the indirect effect of the posterior variances. Recall that
the posterior variance represents the remaining uncertainty regarding the potential
of a specific domain for technology improvements. The information acquired through
the past R&D finding decreases the posterior variance for both domains. The de-
crease, however, is larger for the explored domain since the effect on the unexplored
is mitigated by the correlation θo. For “average” realized outcomes, near the mean
μ1, such an uncertainty resolution is undesirable because it essentially diminishes the
remaining potential of the explored domain. On the other hand, the unexplored do-
main appears to be more promising exactly because the milder uncertainty resolution
allows for a higher “upside potential”. Figure 4 illustrates the phenomenon.
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Figure 4: The impact of higher remaining potential on follower’s optimal strategy.
Proposition 2 The threshold value t˜E increases in the correlation θo.
Proposition 2 states that the smaller the technological distance (i.e., higher θo),
the higher the threshold t˜E. Therefore, the follower becomes less likely to draw from
the explored domain. Note that θo has no impact on the posterior distribution of
the already explored domain, it only affects the distribution of the unexplored. First
consider the case of negatively correlated domains so that a high tA affects negatively
the potential of the unexplored domain. As θo increases the realized outcome tA not
only conveys less negative information (μ2 increases) but also the upside potential
increases (higher variance σ22). Thus, the unexplored domain becomes more attrac-
tive to the follower. In the case of positively correlated domains a high tA affects
positively the posterior mean μ2. Thus, as θo increases, tA becomes more informative
and μ2 increases. As a result, despite the decreasing variance σ
2
2, the expected prof-
itability of the unexplored domain increases in θo. Essentially, knowledge becomes
more reliable (March 1991) and the follower, ceteris paribus, is more likely to search
in the unexplored domain.
This result is counter to the analysis of Cardon and Sasaki (1998) who find that
firms become more likely to search in the same domain (clustering) as the correlation
across different domains increases. The difference stems from the different role that
26
the correlation plays in each model. In Cardon and Sasaki firms search simultaneously
and the benefit from clustering is the potential preemption of the rival. When the
correlation is high, the likelihood of successful preemption is high, and the incentives
to preempt the rival through clustering is higher. We focus on informational spillovers,
where correlation reflects higher informational value regarding the distribution of the
alternative domain.
Proposition 3 The threshold value t˜E increases in the competition intensity e.
As the degree of competition increases, the follower requires a higher technological
improvement to overcome the leader’s advantage. Put differently, fiercer competition
makes exploration a more promising strategy. Intuitively, as competition intensity
increases a given technology improvement achieved by the leader becomes more detri-
mental to the follower’s profitability. Thus, the need to outperform the leader becomes
even more significant, leading the follower to adopt a more risk-taking strategy. This
finding is consistent with March (1991) who argues that firms should increase their
exploration efforts in industries with high degrees of competition.
Proposition 4 The threshold value t˜E increases in the standard deviation of the
noise σ.
Proposition 4 reveals the effect of a noisy informational signal on the follower’s
optimal R&D search strategy. It states that as the signal becomes less noisy (lower
σ), the follower becomes more likely to search in the already explored domain. In-
tuitively, as σ decreases, the realized outcome tA becomes more informative for both
the explored and the unexplored scientific domain. Yet, the effect is more profound
in the explored domain since the effect in the unexplored is mitigated by the corre-
lation θo. From a managerial standpoint, our result suggests that high learning rates
(low σ) encourage exploitation strategies whereas low learning rates (high σ) promote
exploration strategies.
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Proposition 5 When θo < 0, there exist tσ and tσ such that for tσ < tA < tσ the
follower’s second-period expected profits increase in σ and decrease elsewhere. When
θo > 0, there exists tσ such that for tA < tσ the follower’s second-period expected
profits increase in σ while for tA > tσ they decrease in σ.
Figure 5: Impact of noise on follower’s expected profits.
Proposition 5 allows us to explore the role of learning rate on the follower’s prof-
itability. One would expect that faster learning rates (less noisy signals) always
benefit the follower. Yet, as Figure 5 illustrates, there are cases where the follower
is better off in an environment of a slower learning rate (higher noise levels). The
direction of the impact, whether positive or negative, depends on the past outcome
tA and the correlation θo between the domains. In the case of negatively correlated
domains, the follower benefits from fast learning rates only when the leader’s R&D
outcome prove sufficient underlying potential (tA > tσ) or turn out fruitless (tA < tσ
). That is, when there is a clear indication as to which scientific area is the most
promising. Otherwise, the follower prefers a slower learning rate which corresponds
to slower depletion rates, and thus, to a significant remaining upside potential. These
contingencies differ under positively correlated domains. In that case, the follower
knows that high learning rates indicate future outcomes closer to the leader’s output.
Therefore, a high tA makes faster learning desirable (“if the leader succeeded, I will
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too”). On the contrary, a rather low tA makes slower learning desirable (“even if the
leader failed, there are still chances that I can make it”).
Proposition 5 bears managerial significance because it highlights the strong path
dependency of R&D spillovers. Typically, the Economics literature considered spillovers
as a deterministic effect where firms enjoy a fixed fraction of the competitor’s R&D
investment. Yet, in reality, findings from past R&D efforts not only provide informa-
tion about the state of the world but also they determine future performance. We
provide intuition regarding the joint effect of past R&D outcomes and the rate of
uncertainty resolution on firms’ performance.
2.5 Uncertainty Resolution and Innovation Incentives
So far, we focused our analysis on the follower’s R&D search strategy. In this section
we look at the phenomenon from two different angles. First, we study the role of
informational spillovers on the incentives of the leader to initiate R&D search. We
find that the potential of a follow-up investment by a rival firm renders any up-
front investment less likely. Interestingly though, competition intensity has a non-
monotonic effect on the cost threshold. In other words, higher competition intensity
might prompt the leader to invest while a milder competitive environment would
discourage innovation activity.
Second, we study how the average profitability of a firm changes by the presence
of informational spillovers. The notion of average profitability aims to reflect a situa-
tion often encountered in GEDC and similar research centers: Requests for research
projects arrive asynchronously, and firms exhibit little or no control over leading or
following in a specific scientific domain. At the outset, we assume that nature draws
the leader, and we compute the a priori expected profits (i.e., the profits before any
search outcome is realized) as the average of the leader’s and follower’s profits. The
analysis reveals two interesting insights. Regarding the role of the correlation, we find
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that a member firm is better off when the scientific landscape exhibits high diversity
(i.e. scientific domains are negatively correlated). We also show that the learning
rate about a scientific domain has a non-monotonic effect on the average profitability.
2.5.1 The leader’s incentives
Let E[Π1A] and E[Π2A] denote the leader’s first and second-period profits, respec-
tively. Apparently, there is a KL
.
= E[Π1A] + E[Π2A] such that for K < KL, the
leader decides to search while for K ≥ KL, the cost is too high and no research ac-
tivity is undertaken. Define KML to be the corresponding threshold value given that
the follower does not invest in technology improvements.
Proposition 6 The potential of a rival firm investing in technology improvements
reduces the incentives of the leader to invest in a scientific domain. In particular, the
set of search cost values for which the leader initiates investment becomes narrower:
KL ≤ KML . Yet, competition intensity e has a non-monotonic impact on the threshold
KL.
Proposition 6 states that projects that would be profitable in a setting where only
the leader would invest (i.e. projects with KL < K < K
M
L ) are considered too costly
when both firms are likely to invest. It is worth noticing, though, that the impact
of competition intensity may have a non-monotonic impact on the leader’s incentives
to innovate. Figure 6 plots the expected profits of the leader (ΠA) and the follower
(ΠB) when both firms invest in technology improvements, and also the leader’s profits
when the follower chooses to not invest (ΠAB′).
As we see in Figure 6 for e > eo the follower’s expected profits lie below the search
cost K. Thus, for e > eo the leader anticipates that the follower will not pursue
search in any domain, and therefore she will hold a greater competitive advantage
in the market. As a result, the leader’s expected profits jump up at e = eo and
consequently the critical threshold value for which KL = E[Π1A]+E[Π2A] jumps up as
30
Figure 6: Total Expected Profits for A = 300, c = 1, b = 0.9, μ1 = 100, σ1 = 30, σ =
20, θo = −0.5.
well. Essentially, a fiercer end-product competition acts as a preemption mechanism
against the follower who is forced to drop out from the R&D race, while allowing the
leader to stay and exploit the benefits of the research efforts.
2.5.2 Firm’s average expected profitability
In this section we study the average expected profitability of a firm with respect to the
technological distance θo and the noise term σ
2. We calculate the average expected
profits under the assumption that each firm has an equal chance of being the leader,
i.e., E[Π] = 1
2
(E[ΠA] + E[ΠB]) where E[ΠA] and E[ΠB] denote the sum of first- and
second-period profits for the leader and the follower, respectively. As described earlier,
the follower’s optimal R&D search strategy is contingent on the past search outcomes
tA. As a result, the leader’s profit function is a sum of integrations over truncated
normal distributions, which renders further analytical derivations intractable. Instead
we conduct an extensive numerical analysis through which we derive two insightful
observations.
Observation 1: A member firm’s average expected profits decrease in θo.
Observation 1 states that, all else being equal, firms prefer a scientific landscape
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with maximum diversification (i.e., θo = −1). A more diversified scientific land-
scape, increases the expected profitability since it provides firms with more flexibility
in choosing where to allocate their future R&D budgets. More precisely, it is the
follower’s profitability that decreases monotonically in θo while the leader’s monoton-
ically increases in θo. Yet, the effect of θo is stronger in the former case and that is
why we observe the average profitability decreasing in θo.
Observation 2: The average expected profitability exhibits a u-shaped relationship
with respect to the learning rate σ.
Figure 7: Impact of σ on average expected profitability for A = 500, c = 1, b =
0.7, μ1 = 160, σ1 = 40, θo = {−0.6, 0.3, 0.6}, e = 0.4.
Observation 2 highlights the dual effect of σ in the critical trade-off between
uncertainty resolution and remaining potential. As we can see in Figure 7, for low θo,
the scientific area is more diversified, and information coming from past outcomes can
be very valuable since it points to the domain with the highest potential. As a result,
the average profitability decreases in the noisiness of the environment. Conversely,
for high θo, the two domains exhibit close behaviors regarding their potential. Hence,
a more precise signal does not add much informational value but it rather narrows
the possibility of radical subsequent improvements. Finally, for intermediate values
of correlation the impact is non-monotonic. Higher precision (lower σ) increases the
profitability only for relatively precise signals (left side of the curve). On the other
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hand, when the signal is rather vague (high σ) regarding the potential of each domain
(right side of the curve) the higher precision reduces the remaining potential without
significantly affecting the informational content.
2.6 Conclusions
Our study provides a theoretical framework for R&D search strategies in the context
of today’s innovation practices where collaborative R&D efforts allow the dissemi-
nation of the generated knowledge among rival firms. Drawing upon a case study
within a leading university research center, we develop a model to analyze one of the
key decisions that R&D managers from participant companies are faced with: To
undertake R&D projects in scientific domains already explored by rivals, or to direct
their R&D efforts towards unexplored domains. While the model structure is mo-
tivated by the specific case, the implications are more general. Scientific knowledge
generated from past research efforts can be disseminated through various channels,
such as academic conferences, industry trade-shows, or industrial consortia. Eco-
nomic theory has already accounted for the fact that knowledge generated through
company specific R&D efforts spills over to the rest of the industry (Arrow 1962).
Still, to our knowledge, very few papers have drawn operational implications from
such informational spillovers on the direction of R&D search.
The main contribution of this article is to underline the strong path dependency
that informational spillovers cause to R&D decisions. Prior work has conceptualized
R&D spillovers as direct benefits (e.g., immediate cost reductions) that realize in
a deterministic way. While this approach is necessary for developing an intuition
about the effects of spillovers on the overall economy, it provides few insights to
R&D managers who strive to develop contingency plans and decide on the direction
of their future efforts. Our case points to the dynamics stemming from the highly
uncertain nature of any R&D effort. Our analysis reveals that the benefits from such
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knowledge dissemination channels are not straightforward. Management benefits only
when delineating carefully crafted alternative plans that depend on the realization of
prior R&D search outcomes.
We develop managerial insights along the following dimensions. First, we charac-
terize the optimal R&D search direction contingent on: i) The technological landscape
faced by the firms; and ii) The actual realized technological improvements. The op-
timal choice exhibits a threshold policy. If past outcomes are beyond a technological
improvement threshold, then a firm benefits from exploiting the same scientific do-
main. If not, exploration of alternative domains may render higher benefits, or firms
may choose to forego R&D investment. Once we focus on the interesting setting where
a threshold between exploration and exploitation exists, we find that the threshold
exhibits a striking property: It is optimal to abandon the previously searched do-
main even for realized improvements that exceeded the a priori expected technology
improvement. The result stems from the critical trade-off between the a posteriori
expected potential improvement and the posterior upside for the potential improve-
ment (tail of the technological potential distribution). The former is higher for the
previously explored domain, but the latter is higher for the unexplored.
Second, we find that, ceteris paribus, highly correlated scientific domains make
exploration more promising. At the same time, learning through a more precise signal,
prompts for exploitation. From a managerial standpoint, both higher correlation and
higher precision allow the follower to assimilate more information from past efforts; yet
they prompt different actions. Thus, disentangling the different sources of learning
is particularly useful for R&D managers. Third, our study illustrates the role of
competition intensity on both the prior and posterior R&D search strategies. Fiercer
competition, shifts the ex-post contingency threshold higher, suggesting exploration.
In addition, a priori, the threat of the follow-up exploitation by a rival firm reduces the
incentives to initiate R&D search. Yet, the relationship between innovation incentives
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and competition intensity is non-monotonic. Under some circumstances, the leader
may initiate search for a fiercer industry environment, but not for a milder one.
Lastly, our analysis also reveals the dual role of learning (uncertainty resolution).
One would expect that a follower firm is always better off when past outcomes are as
informative as possible (maximum learning). Our results, though, point to the down-
side of such a high precision: it narrows the upside remaining potential of the dis-
tribution, making the follower more likely to realize an improvement only marginally
higher than previous improvements. Thus, a higher learning rate may set a tighter
upper bound on technology improvements and, consequently, on future profitability.
Our model takes a first step toward enriching the research on informational spillovers
by incorporating the operational aspects of the R&D experimentation process. To
develop a qualitative understanding of such a complex phenomenon, we rely on spe-
cific assumptions about: i) the structure of the scientific landscape (e.g., technological
potential normally distributed, a priori symmetric distributions, equal search costs);
ii) the nature of competition among the firms (i.e., linear demand functions); and iii)
perfect observability of the technology improvement by the follower. Our assump-
tions aim to capture the first-order effects of informational spillovers, that is, the
basic mechanism of knowledge dissemination. In practice, there may exist second-
order effects that relate to additional gaming considerations, e.g., the leader might
want to signal a distorted outcome to reduce the informational value of past findings,
and direct the follower to suboptimal choices. We deem these issues outside the scope
of the present model, and we plan to pursue them in future research endeavors. At
the same time, we believe that our results could translate into testable hypotheses
regarding the direction of the R&D search path. Future empirical research could
verify the theoretical results and provide additional insights on the phenomenon.
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CHAPTER III
IS DIVERSITY (UN)BIASED? CROSS-FUNCTIONAL
TEAMS AND PROJECT TERMINATION DECISIONS
3.1 Introduction
There is a limited number of factors that management can take for granted during new
product development (NPD) projects. A rather frequent one is that NPD projects
may result in failures, despite the significant amount of resources invested in them. It
is true that innovation entails unavoidable risk and failure is lurking around the corner
in every risky endeavor. Nonetheless, uncertainty alone does not explain the striking
budget overruns or the excessive overtime associated with several NPD projects (Staw
and Ross 1987, Wheelwright and Clark 1992).
Examples from a variety of industries abound. Boulding et al. (1997) quotes
the case of NeXT desktop computers, while Royer (2001) analyzes the Selecta Vision
videodisk player introduced by RCA. Both studies highlight a common denominator:
despite the strong negative evidence available to the project team, both initiatives
resulted in tremendous budget overruns (over $200M and $580M, respectively), and
they tied up valuable resources for almost 15 years before shutting down. In a follow-
up study, Royer (2003) presents two additional case studies at the industry-leading
companies Essilor International and Lafarge Group. Again, both firms invested mil-
lions of euros in innovation projects which eventually they had to abandon. What
makes those cases memorable is not the failure itself, since they were all risky R&D
projects. The striking coincidence they share is that the project teams kept pur-
suing the initially set objectives, despite strong evidence there was no turnaround.
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Prior research has long coined a term for such phenomena: escalation of commit-
ment situations. First described by Staw (1976), escalation of commitment refers
to “the tendency to invest additional resources in an apparently losing proposition”
(www.businessdictionary.com). Since then, a number of psychologists, organizational
theorists and economists have explored the determinants of such phenomena (see
Staw and Ross 1989, Brockner 1992 for excellent reviews).
Among the various reasons cited for such a systematic persistence, a prominent
one is the seeming inability of NPD teams to reach a common understanding on what
constitutes negative information, and more, importantly, to act upon it1. Although
previous research (Staw and Ross 1989, March 1994, Gibbons 2003) establishes that
the inability to act upon new information is often driven by sociological, psychological,
or organizational forces that lie within the group decision process, our understanding
on how the existence of diverse perspectives affects escalation is rather limited. Thus,
we seek to answer the following research question: Is a team with diverse perspectives
more, less, or equally prone to escalation2 phenomena, compared to a team with
homogeneous perspectives?
We focus on the team diversity with respect to the interpretation of new infor-
mation, given the strikingly consistent finding among the research on escalation phe-
nomena that individuals systematically underestimate feedback that indicates failure
(Staw and Ross 1989, Russo and Schoemaker (1989), Boulding et al. 1997, Royer
2001). To capture the critical role of such information biasing, we build our model
around the concept of information fidelity (Loch et al. 2001), which refers to the
degree of accuracy that the decision-maker assigns to the new information. Prior
research in organization theory (Dougherty 1992) and psychology (Carpendale and
1It is impressive that in the practitioner lingo, project termination has found expression in strong
language content, such as “pulling the plug”, “killing the project”, or “shutting down the project”,
indicating the perceived difficulty.
2For space preservation, we will be using the terms “escalation” and “escalation of commitment”
interchangeably.
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Chandler 1996) uses the term interpretive diversity to refer to the fact that two indi-
viduals exposed to precisely the same stimulus may interpret it in quite different, but
equally plausible, ways. Given the cross-functional nature of modern NPD teams,
we posit that team members may interpret the same information differently due to
different organizational roles and cultures (Griffin and Hauser 1996 and the references
therein). We proxy the existence of such interpretive diversity by allowing team mem-
bers to assign different degrees of fidelity to the new information. In other words,
individuals may “read” too much or too little in the new information.
We build our analysis gradually. We start off with the assumption that all team
members analyze new information through the same interpretive scheme. This is
our baseline case of a homogeneous team and it serves as a benchmark for our sub-
sequent analysis. We establish the existence of a unique threshold with respect to
the members’ belief about the project success likelihood. Continuation is optimal
as long as the current belief lies above the threshold value. Then, we show that the
threshold decreases in the information fidelity. Thus, the team members exhibit more
risk-taking behavior in the face of more-accurate information.
We relax the assumption of homogeneity and allow the team members to differ
with respect to the fidelity they assign to the new information. In this setting, which
is referred to as the diverse team, we conduct a detailed numerical experiment that
compares the termination decisions of the diverse and the homogeneous teams. Our
goal is to assess whether interpretive diversity results in “pulling the plug” earlier or
later. Our results reveal that the answer depends on the underlying project uncer-
tainty. In particular, for highly uncertain projects, diversity drives systematic earlier
termination. At the opposite end, for less-risky projects, diversity leads to consistent
escalation patterns.
Our results are robust across different team structures (Clark and Wheelwright
1992) and in the presence of social conformity (Asch 1951). The former accounts for
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the influence that certain members of the team may have on shaping the beliefs of
their peers. The latter represents the change in a member’s belief that happens based
on past collective outcomes (Jones 1984). We show that the presence of a dominant
team member (e.g., a heavyweight project manager) amplifies the effect of diversity.
Similarly, social conformity amplifies escalation, but the magnitude of its impact
depends on the project environment. Thus, we complement previous studies that
stress the critical role of project team structures on the overall product development
performance (Ancona 1990, 1992; Brown and Eisenhardt 1995), and we establish a
rigorous link between those structures and the likelihood of observing escalation.
Our findings bear managerial significance because they identify robust patterns
of escalation in NPD teams. So far, the joint effects of interpretive diversity and
team structure on project metrics have been dealt mainly on a case-by-case observa-
tional level. Through our normative study, we quantify specific trade-offs and study
the underlying mechanisms of escalation patterns. We depart from prior work that
attributes escalation to psychological (e.g., sunk cost fallacy) or organizational is-
sues (e.g., misalignment of incentives) by illustrating how the existence of distinct
thought worlds within an organization gives rise to systematic biases in termination
decisions, even when the decision-makers are perfectly rational. Such decision biases
may emerge directly through the team interpretive diversity, and indirectly through
the presence of peer pressure (social conformity). The complex interplay between
these two seemingly opposing forces justifies, at a basic level, the difficulty in the
decision to kill a bad project.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In §2, we summarize key
findings from the relevant literature. We describe our key assumptions and model
formulation in §3. §4 presents the structural properties of the termination decisions,
with respect to the information fidelity, while §5 examines the effects of dispersion
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under different team structures. Finally, §6 concludes with a discussion of the man-
agerial implications.
3.2 Literature Review
There are three strands of literature that pertain to our study. The first one discusses
the escalation of commitment situations. The second one addresses the impact of
various types of team diversity on the performance of a collective task. We particularly
focus on studies that examine diverse new product development teams. Finally, we
briefly review the literature on the properties of optimal project termination decisions.
3.2.1 Escalation of commitment
Since Staw’s (1976) initial study, researchers have shown that the tendency to pursue
a deteriorating course of action is not merely coincidental. In a series of studies, Staw
and Ross (1987, 1989) identify the drivers of escalation phenomena. They catego-
rize them to project-specific (e.g., high closing costs), psychological (e.g. sunk cost
fallacy), sociological (e.g., external justification), and organizational (e.g. incentive
misalignment with company objectives3) reasons.
In an extensive experimental study, Boulding et al. (1997) find a strong resistance
to terminate existing projects combined with a consistent behavior of distorting nega-
tive information. Schmidt and Calantone (1998, 2002) find significant support for the
reluctance of project teams to terminate a deteriorating project, and they point out
that this reluctance is more pronounced for major innovation initiatives. Royer (2001,
2002, 2003) highlights the emergence and persistence of a collective belief not only
among specific development groups, but also across entire organizations. Recently,
Biyalogorsky et al. (2006) argue that biased prior beliefs have a profound impact on
maintaining escalation phenomena, while involvement with initial project decisions is
3In several instances, managers are rewarded solely on the outcome and never for process success
(Kerr 1975, Loch and Tapper 2002).
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found to be less detrimental. We contribute to the literature by pointing to a very
specific information-related bias that may lead to escalations: the diverse interpretive
schemes through which new product development teams internalize new information
regarding successful commercialization.
3.2.2 Team diversity and structure
The literature on team diversity is extensive (Williams and O’Reilly 1998, Mannix
and Neale 2005, van Knippenberg and Schippers 2007). The central question in
this stream is how differences among group members affect group processes and the
overall performance. The diversity research has largely been divided in two rather
contradictory research paradigms: the information/decision-making perspective, and
the social categorization one (Cavarretta 2007). The former dates back to the seminal
work on heterogeneity in small groups conducted by Hoffman (1959). Hoffman argues
that diverse groups of individuals are expected to have a broader range of knowledge
and expertise, and, thus, achieve higher performance. A number of empirical studies
support this argument by showing that the expression of alternative perspectives can
lead to novel insights and solutions (Nemeth 1986, Gruenfeld et al. 1996). At the
other end of the spectrum, according to the social categorization perspective, diversity
creates social divisions (Pfeffer 1983) which, in turn, create poor social integration
and cohesion, which result in negative group outcomes (O’Reilly et al. 1989). As a
result of those contradictory perspectives, a unidirectional effect of the team diversity
on performance has yet to be reached. Instead, scholars have shifted their efforts
on studying the link between diversity and performance in specific contexts. We
adopt such an approach by studying the effect of interpretive diversity on a specific
performance metric, namely the ability to terminate projects.
In the context of NPD, the critical role of cross-functional teams is indisputable
(Wheelwright and Clark 1992, Griffin and Hauser 1996, and references therein). Yet,
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effectively managing such teams poses considerable challenges. Allen (1977) points
out the existence of significant barriers to effective communication within R&D or-
ganizations. Ancona and Caldwell (1992) focus on what intra-organization commu-
nication patterns determine product success. Sosa et al. (2004) examine how the
architectural design interfaces map onto communication patterns in complex devel-
opment efforts. They identify significant misalignments between planned team in-
teractions and the actual organizational communication. Griffin and Hauser (1996)
summarize a number of functional differences within an organization regarding the
departmental structure, tolerance for ambiguity, preference for projects, etc. Gupta &
Wilemon (1998) and Souder (1988) point out the reality of diverse perspectives among
R&D engineers and marketing analysts (e.g., R&D staff attributes less emphasis to
new market information compared to their marketing colleagues). Ancona and Can-
dwell (1990) stress the importance of conflicting views during the development phase,
and highlight that cross-functional teams struggle between opposing objectives. In a
study that inspired our model development, Dougherty (1992) discusses the impact
of “interpretive schemes” in project decisions. She argues that such schemes may
turn into “interpretive barriers,” and she finds that departmental thought worlds may
selectively filter parts of the new information, overestimating or underestimating spe-
cific aspects of the incoming information. She concludes that “innovators must [...]
develop collaborative mechanisms that deal directly with the interpretive as well as
structural barriers to collective action” (Dougherty, 1992, p.195).
The above studies suggest that diversity can have significant implications on the
performance of an NPD team. In line with the extant literature, we adopt two impor-
tant observations for our study: i) Project team members may interpret new informa-
tion about the project progress with different degrees of fidelity; and ii) Project team
members may exhibit communication patterns that reflect different degrees of cross-
influence. Both of these properties are central in our effort to analyze how escalation
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patterns emerge.
3.2.3 Optimal Stopping
Decision theory has long considered the problem of optimally terminating an ac-
tion based on gradual information resolution, due to its interesting mathematical
structure and its numerous applications (see Chow et al. 1971 for a relevant discus-
sion). Roberts and Weitzman (1981) conduct one of the first studies with an R&D
focus. They conceptualize an R&D project as a sequence of costly stages, with un-
certain payoffs that are realized only upon the project completion. At each stage,
the decision-maker selects whether to continue or terminate the project based on the
available information. Within the numerous models that adopt similar premises, the
ones more relevant to our study are Jensen (1982) and McCardle (1985). They both
study the problem of adopting a new technology with uncertain potential, which is
gradually resolved through a Bayesian updating scheme. Jensen (1982) derives the op-
timal adoption/rejection rule contingent on the current belief, while McCardle (1985)
allows the firm to spend additional resources, in order to improve the understanding
of the technology. More recently, Huchzermeier and Loch (2001) develop a stochastic
dynamic program to assess the option value of managerial flexibility (e.g. ability to
abandon a project). They show that projects with more uncertain market outcomes
increase the value of managerial flexibility. Unfortunately, their results are not gen-
eralizable for other sources of uncertainty (e.g. technical, scheduling), as attested
by Santiago and Vakili (2005). They show that the joint effects of uncertainty and
time-to-market on the optimal continuation thresholds are not monotonic, but they
yield complex mathematic structures. A similar structure in our setting prevents the
closed-form determination of the optimal stopping times.
Our key departure from the above literature is that we relax the assumption of
the single decision-maker. Instead, we admit to the fact that project decisions are
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usually the outcome of a group meeting. Moreover, those individuals may interpret
the incoming information through their own interpretive schemes. Our results suggest
that this interpretive diversity leads to systematic biases which cannot be directly
extrapolated from previous single decision-maker frameworks.
3.3 Model Setup
Consider an NPD project that requires t = 1, 2, ..., T stages for completion. Upon the
project kick-off meeting, each of the i = 1, 2, ...,M project team members holds an a
priori belief about the potential success of the project, say Prob(x0 = S; t = T, i) = pi,T ,
where x0 is the final state of the project. Project success is synonymous to successful
commercialization of the product developed during the T stages, and x0 realizes at
the last stage. Upon successful commercialization, the project reward is V0, which is
constant and known to the project team.
During the project execution, team members receive information on the venture
progress, and commercialization uncertainty is gradually resolved. For example, as
additional lab experiments or focus groups are conducted, the team obtains a more-
accurate picture about the probability of success. The information realizes through a
coarse two-level signal ξt that represents “good news” or “bad news” (i.e., ξt = {s, f}).
Thus, we view it as “on track” development versus performance deterioration from the
planned progress. This information structure is similar to Loch et al. (2001). Given
that NPD projects are inherently uncertain, it is extremely hard to have precise
knowledge about their success. The dual representation of the information content
is extendable to multiple levels, at the cost of additional complexity without the
benefit of further insights. Such information briefings take place during the milestone
meetings. At the end of every stage t, the project team summarizes the new project
progress information.
Once the milestone meeting takes place, the decision-making process is as follows.
44
First, in light of the new information, each team member updates her belief regarding
the probability of success. With updated beliefs, the members enter the meeting and
participate in extensive discussions and argumentation. Depending on the cross-
influence structure of the team, members may adjust their beliefs to accommodate
the opinions of their peers. Once the team members finalize their beliefs, i.e., further
discussions have no impact, each member forms her final opinion for continuation or
termination of the project.
Continuation implies a costly investment, ct, for at least one more stage. We
assume ct = c for all t stages, in line with the extant literature (Huchzermeier and
Loch 2001, Thomke and Bell 2001, Dahan and Mendelson 2001, Erat and Kavadias
2008), and in order to isolate the information assimilation effect. Finally, the overall
decision follows a majority rule. The latter is our proxy for the collective belief. In
other words, the project continues if, after all the previous steps, the majority of the
team members insist it is valuable. In the following paragraphs, we describe each
building block of our model setup in further detail.
3.3.1 Assimilating New Information
Drawing upon the insights of Gupta andWilemon (1988), Souder (1988), and Dougherty
(1992), we posit that each team member may evaluate the project progress differently:
upon receiving the new information, she internalizes it through her own “filters” (e.g.,
past experience, functional role within the organization, different cultural perspectives
and mental models4). From a modeling perspective, we represent the interpretive dif-
ferences through the fidelity qi that the member i attributes to the information. In
other words, qi indicates the extent to which member i considers the information as
a reliable representation of the actual project situation. Equation (1) describes the
4“Departmental thought worlds partition the information and insights. Each has a distinct
system of meaning which colors its interpretation of the same information, selectively filters
technology-market issues, and produces a qualitatively different understanding of product inno-
vation”(Dougherty 1992, p. 195).
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ex-post member i’s belief about the successful project commercialization. Thus, at
stage t, the member i with prior belief pi,t+1 and fidelity qi revises her belief as follows:
pi,t(pi,t+1, qi, ξt) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
qipi,t+1
qipi,t+1+(1−qj)(1−pi,t+1) , if ξt = s
(1−qi)pi,t+1
(1−qi)pi,t+1+qi(1−pi,t+1) , if ξt = f
(1)
3.3.2 Social Influence
With revised beliefs pi,t(pi,t+1, qi, ξt), the members participate in the milestone project
meeting where opinions regarding the project success are exchanged. Those discus-
sions give rise to peer influences. Such forces of influence offer a surrogate metric for
the internal team structure, i.e., communication patterns and hierarchy. We formal-
ize those interactions as follows. Let pt = (p1,t, p2,t, ..., pM,t)
T be the vector of beliefs
prior to the milestone meeting. We model the discussion by the changes recorded
in an interior vector at,κ such that at,1 = pt and at,κ+1 = Tat,κ where κ indicates
the number of iterative discussions that take place; T is a matrix that summarizes
the cross-influences among the team members. Social network theory discusses the
implications of this matrix representation, which is often referred to as structure or
weight matrix (French 1956, Leenders 2002). In line with that stream of research,
row i represents the relative importance that member i attributes to peers’ opinions.
Formally, T = [wij] with
∑
j=1,...,M wij = 1, implies that team member i attributes
weight wij to team member j’s belief. The different specifications of T represent
various team structures. With respect to the iterative nature of the discussion, we
posit that the internal meeting discussions will cease once a fixed point is reached
(Lam, 2002), i.e. there exists k˜ such that at,κ˜ = Tat,κ˜−15.
5Mihm et al. (2003) and Lam (2002) discuss properties of convergence to a fixed point. We
assume here that T adheres to stability properties, that is, we assume away degenerate cases.
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3.3.3 Team Decision
Once the discussion ends, members make their proposals regarding the project con-
tinuation. They individually assess the project potential by “solving” a stochastic
dynamic program with state variable their belief about the likelihood of successful
project commercialization. The latter is the outcome of the meeting described above
(i.e., pi,t(= pi,t,κ˜)). More formally, the value function recursion for the i
th member is:
Vi,t(pi,t; qi) = max{−c + Vi,t−1(pi,t−1; qi)P (ξt−1 = s) + Vi,t−1(pi,t−1; qi)P (ξt−1 = f), 0}
(2)
The above dynamic equation rests upon an important assumption concerning the
knowledge available to each member. We assume that each member extrapolates the
likelihood of success by using her qi value, but she is not aware of the distribution of
the qj (j =i) values. The assumption is reasonable given our interpretation of qi: a
hardwired interpretive scheme that the member has built over multiple different and
not necessarily traceable experiences. An alternative justification for our assumption
comes from Madarasz (2008) and the notion that individuals tend to project their
information biases on others. In our setting, this translates to member i inherently
assuming that qj=qi for every j =i. In summary, in the dynamic program, members
consider only their potential updates given the information progress signals, and they
can not factor in potential future influences from their peers.
Based on (2), member i proposes continuation or abandonment at the project
team meeting. More formally, if we let Di,t(pi,t, qi) = {0, 1} be member i’s proposal
at the stage t:
Di,t(pi,t; qi) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0, if Vi,t(pt, qi) ≤ 0
1, if Vi,t(pt, qi) > 0
(3)
The overall decision follows a majority rule. Termination results from an aggregation
of the individual proposals with equal weights:
47
Dt(pt) =
1
M
M∑
j=1
Di,t(pi,t, qi) (4)
If Dt(pt) > 0.5, the team pursues the project further the project. Our majority rule
assumption is a formal representation of a fair setting. After all interactions, if most
members are in favor of continuation, we posit that it is a fair outcome to pursue the
project further. Note that the potential authority-related influences manifest earlier
in the decision process through the influence matrix T. For example, during the
discussions, dominant members shape the beliefs of their peers.
3.4 Results and Analysis
In this section, we analyze the project team termination decision in a sequential
manner. First, in §4.1, we analyze a situation where all team members have the
same “interpretive scheme”, that is, they assign the same degree of fidelity to new
information concerning the project progress. Under this premise, qi = q for every
i and, thus, the structure of the influence matrix does not affect team behavior.
Then, in §4.2, we proceed with the more realistic setting where team members exhibit
interpretive diversity, and, moreover, where peer influence affects members’ beliefs.
We examine three distinct influence structures: a decision committee with negligible
interactions (i.e., T = I, where I is the unity matrix); a heavyweight project manager
structure (Wheelwright and Clark 1992), where w1j = 1 for every j; and a lightweight
project manager structure (wij =
1
M
where M is the team size). We recognize that
those three structures represent limiting cases6, but they allow us to highlight the
directional effects of interpretive diversity. Finally, in §4.3, we incorporate social
conformity effects, where non-majority members may adapt their beliefs (pi,t) to align
with the majority.
6Our results are insensitive to slight deviations from these structures, e.g. a heavyweight team
with w1j = 1− δ and wij = δ (i = 1) for a small δ.
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3.4.1 Homogenous team perspectives
Our benchmark case assumes that team members interpret information in exactly
the same way. We can envision such homogeneity in “autonomous” or “tiger” teams
structures that are characterized by strong cultural ties (Wheelwright and Clark
1992). Prior literature claims that such teams are essential for the development
of breakthrough new technologies (Christensen 1997) because they are set outside
the organizational boundaries in an effort to reset their culture without roadblocks
from the current organizational structures7. Drawing on this argument, we posit
that some teams develop their own culture, and they establish a (significantly more)
homogeneous interpretive scheme among the team members.
Within our modeling context, such a team structure coincides with the situation of
a single decision-maker (qi = q for all i). Also, we assume that all team members share
the same initial belief about the likelihood of the project success, i.e pi,T = pT for all
i. This assumption ensures the avoidance of any initialization bias, and allows us to
isolate the effects of interpretive diversity. It also implies that all beliefs stay the same
pi,t = pt. We derive analytically the structural properties of the optimal termination
policy with respect to our key parameters. Proposition 1 formally states that the
team decides based on a threshold policy, i.e. the members suggest termination only
if their belief about the project successful commercialization lies below a critical value.
Then, in Proposition 2, we describe how those termination thresholds depend on the
timing of the information, i.e., the current stage t. Finally, Proposition 3 discusses
the role of the “interpretive scheme” q on determining those threshold values.
Proposition 1 At stage t, the team members suggest project termination if and only
if their common belief about the project successful completion pt lies below a threshold
7Especially in large organizations, the existing “routines” may inhibit the pursuit of radical
innovations. To avoid such deadlocks, organizational theorists advocate the establishment of inde-
pendent, autonomous teams as a countermeasure (Russo and Schoemaker 1989).
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value. Thus, there exists p˜t,q such that Dt = 0 if and only if pi,t ≤ p˜t,q
Proof: All proofs are in the Appendix B.
Proposition 1 is a straightforward result in optimal stopping problems. Yet, it con-
firms that the interpretive diversity has a direct effect on the project continuation
decision.
Proposition 2 The optimal termination thresholds p˜t,q are increasing in t.
Proposition 2 bears managerial relevance. The greater the timely distance from
the project completion, the higher the team members’ beliefs shall be to support con-
tinuation. The insight stems from the fact that with more remaining stages, higher
costs lie ahead, and, therefore, team members prefer only “sure” investments. How-
ever, one could adopt an alternative perspective. There is an inherent link between
escalation situations and high initial beliefs (Royer 2003). If not for such beliefs,
large-scale projects would rarely initiate.
Proposition 3 The optimal termination thresholds p˜t,q are decreasing in q.
Proposition 3 analyzes the termination decision with respect to the interpretive
schemes q. Low values of q describe situations where the team members perceive
progress information as unreliable and uncertain; naturally, they hedge against the
information uncertainty through higher thresholds, i.e., they react more conserva-
tively.
We should underline here that while Proposition 3 describes the impact of q on
the termination thresholds, it cannot provide insights on the actual termination time.
For example, higher thresholds (associated with low q values) do not necessarily
imply an earlier project termination. The reason for that is the direct impact that q
has on how the belief for success evolves over time. Higher values of q define lower
thresholds, but also drive more drastic changes when updating the current belief,
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which may result in hitting those critical thresholds earlier. On the other hand,
while low q values correspond to higher thresholds, they also correspond to very mild
changes in the belief. Put differently, new information is viewed as unreliable and
it is overlooked. Due to this interplay between threshold values and impact of the
updating scheme on the current belief, closed-form calculation of the termination time
becomes intractable8. In order to shed light on the relationship between the project
duration and the information fidelity, we rely on an extensive numerical analysis.
Figure 8 presents the average project duration (from 500 realizations for each q level)
as a function of q for two different levels of the initial belief.
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Figure 8: Average project duration for T = 20, V = 100, 000, c = 1
Consistent with Proposition 3, for very low values of information fidelity, the opti-
mal thresholds are set so high that the initial belief is too low to initiate the project.
As q increases, the threshold decreases and, for a low enough value, project initia-
tion is desirable. Interestingly, the optimal policy switches to the other end of the
spectrum, prompting full project completion. For this range of q values, progress in-
formation is largely ignored, and “bad news” mildly affects the current belief. We can
readily extrapolate from Figure 8 the direct relationship between information fidelity
8The underlying mathematical reasons for that echo the intractability challenges outlined by
Santiago and Vakili (2005) regarding the shape of the interim value function (Santiago and Vakili
2005, p. 121).
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and escalation. If managers assign low q values to negative information, despite its
true reliability (Boulding et al. 1997), the project termination is suboptimally post-
poned. Note also that the range of values for which completion is sure increases
under a higher initial belief (Royer 2003). For higher q values, the occurrence of
negative information drives a drastic decrease in the members’ beliefs, and leads to
faster termination decisions. Thus, contingent on the initiation of the project, the
average project duration is a non-increasing function of information fidelity. Apart
from the curve monotonicity result, it is interesting to note its shape: the inverse
S-curve graph indicates that the impact of q is not homogenous across the different
fidelity levels. The pattern is consistent for a wide range of the parameters T , V , c,
and pT
9.
3.4.2 Diverse team perspectives
In this section, we introduce interpretive diversity: team members assign different fi-
delity to progress information. We refer to such a team as the diverse team. Common
practice dictates that successful NPD teams must include individual members with
different functional roles in the organization. Drawing upon research in organiza-
tion theory (Dougherty 1992), it is reasonable to assume that these individuals may
interpret the project progress information differently. For example, engineers may
emphasize strict quantitative criteria, as opposed to intangible/qualitative metrics
used in consumer semi-structured interviews (Griffin and Hauser 1996). At the same
time, marketing executives may downplay technical information as “simply a matter
of putting in the effort”10. These biases tend to be systematic, and they reflect the
conflicting priorities and objectives of individuals within an organization. Diverse
perspectives may also emerge due to an alternative reason. Potentially, different
9For very low pT values, (	 0) the left part of the curve becomes steeper, approaching a linear
form, while for very high pT values, (	 1) the drop becomes much smoother.
10Anecdotal quote contributed by a participant of an NPD-focused executive seminar at Georgia
Tech.
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members acquire the new information through different channels, and the latter ones
add varying levels of distortion in the information signal11.
The existence of interpretive diversity raises the following question: Ceteris paribus,
is a diverse team more likely to terminate a project earlier or later than a homoge-
neous one? Thus, for the same project characteristics (i.e., same initial beliefs, stages
to completion, and development costs), we compare the average number of stages
that the project went through before a termination decision is made. To ensure an
unbiased and meaningful comparison of the termination times, we set the informa-
tion fidelity assigned by the homogeneous team to be equal to the true fidelity of
the progress information, say qR. In that light, the termination time of the homoge-
neous team is the optimal stopping time for the given level of project uncertainty12.
Hence, for a homogeneous team that assigns fidelity qR to the progress information,
the corresponding diverse team consists of members with differing fidelities that are
uniformly distributed around qR. Formally, for each member i, qi ∼ U(qR−ε, qR+ε).
We refer to ε as the diversity factor since it captures the degree of diversity within the
team. Thus, we can claim that in our setting, any deviations in the stopping times
observed under a diverse team reflect the effect of diversity. We conduct our analysis
through a carefully crafted design of experiments, as discussed below.
3.4.2.1 Design of the numerical experiment
We investigate the effects of diversity through a 3 × 3 experimental design that ac-
counts for the two major dimensions introduced in our model: (i) the underlying
project uncertainty, denoted by the true information fidelity (also viewed by the ho-
mogeneous team) qR; and (ii) the structure of the intra-team influence matrix T.
More formally, qR takes three distinct levels qR = {0.65, 0.75, 0.9} that correspond
11One can safely assume that distortion increases in the distance from the actual origin of the
information as the infamous Telephone (or Russian Scandal or Chinese Whisper) kids’ game shows.
12In our setting, the fidelity qR offers a good proxy for the level of project uncertainty.
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to low, medium, and high values, while T undertakes three possible formats: the
independent team structure where T = [wij] = I; the heavyweight project manager
structure where w1j = 1, w
j =1
ij = 0; and the lightweight project manager team struc-
ture where wij =
1
M
. Then, each set {qR,T} defines a distinct numerical experiment,
and each experiment proceeds as follows:
1. We specify the project environment characterized by the parameters pT , V0, c, T
that remain fixed throughout the experiment.
2. For a given diversity factor ε (ε ∈ [0, 0.05] discretized in increments of 0.0005),
we initialize a vector consisting of the elements qi ∼ U(qR − ε, qR + ε) with
i = 1, 2, ..,M ; it represents the interpretive schemes of the team members and
it remains fixed throughout the experiment.
3. At each project stage t, a signal ξt is generated, which represents the project
progress news. Each team member updates her belief based on the signal real-
ization, her current belief, and her specific fidelity qi.
4. Each team member enters the milestone meeting and contributes her updated
belief into the discussion. During the discussion, the members are influenced
by peer beliefs. Those interactions are captured through iterative calculations
of ptT until there is convergence to a fixed point (i.e. there is a vector of beliefs
p such that Tp = p). Note also that since this convergence occurs during
the meeting, the length of the interactions (i.e., the number of iterations until
convergence is reached) does not affect the overall project duration.
5. Once each member forms a post-discussion belief, she compares it to the cor-
responding threshold, calculated through the dynamic program assessment de-
scribed in equation (2). Then, each member advocates continuation(i.e., Di,t =
1) or termination (i.e., Di,t = 0).
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6. The overall team decision depends on the majority, i.e. if Dt > 0.5 the team
moves to stage t− 1, otherwise the project is terminated and the total duration
(i.e. number of completed stages) is recorded. We denote the project duration
for the homogenous and the diverse team, TH and TD, respectively.
We replicate each experiment 500 times to provide a reliable estimator of the
difference in the the stopping times between the homogenous and the diverse team.
We report the difference as the percentage of times (out of this 500 replications)
that each team terminated after the other. Across all simulations, we set the project
environment parameters as follows: pT = 0.2, V0 = 100, 000, c = 1, and T = 20. Our
results are qualitatively insensitive to the precise choice of those parameters as long
as obvious degenerate cases are avoided (e.g., the team immediately terminates or
always continues due to very low or very high V0 values, respectively). Finally, while
we report all results for a team of M=5 team members, we discuss the implications
of higher team sizes at the end of Section 4.2.1.
3.4.2.2 Independent team members
In our first set of numerical experiments, we consider a team with completely inde-
pendent decision-makers. That is, each team member shapes her belief without any
peer influence. Mathematically, this setting corresponds to T = I. Although the
above setting is more suitable for a decision committee than a team that manages
NPD projects, its analysis offers some key insights that build our intuition for the
more complex team structures that follow. Figure 9 illustrates our main result.
Figure 9 reveals an important managerial insight. There is no uniform answer
as to whether a diverse team terminates a project before or after the corresponding
homogeneous one. Rather, the answer critically depends on the underlying project
uncertainty, as the latter is approximated by the information fidelity qR. For low qR
values (i.e., high project uncertainty), the diverse team terminates the project before
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Figure 9: Percentage of times that each team stopped second
the homogenous one (Figure 9a). What drives this rather conservative behavior
of the diverse team? The answer lies in the left part of the S-curve observed in
Figure 8. In that region, the homogeneous team continues for a large set of stages
as qR lies at the flat part of the curve. When the majority of the diverse team
members are such that qi < qR termination does not change, due to the flat part
of the curve. But, when the majority of the members place more emphasis on the
negative progress information, (i.e. qi > qR), the diverse team stops earlier than the
homogenous one. Note that the implications of this result are not necessarily positive.
In contrast, the diverse team might terminate some projects “too early”, compared to
the homogeneous one that represents the optimal decision, and would probably pursue
those projects until completion. Thus, interpretive diversity may hinder innovation by
abandoning projects which could eventually turn out to be successful. Interestingly,
56
prior research has argued that in highly uncertain environments, NPD teams may get
trapped and terminate a project permanently (Bonabeau et al. 2008, p.99). The same
literature advocates that homogeneous teams are the only way to break the so-called
corporate conservatism. We should carefully place the following disclaimer here: the
magnitude of the difference between the two team configurations is relatively small
(a maximum of 10%). This is driven by the smooth updating effects for such small qi
values. Despite the variance ε, the information is on average unreliable and it does
not alter dramatically the team members’ beliefs. Hence, the behavior of the diverse
team lies close to that of the homogeneous team.
For medium qR values, there is no clear dominance regarding the termination deci-
sions. Figure 9b illustrates that as ε increases, the likelihood of both teams terminat-
ing together decreases. Nonetheless, we cannot infer which team is more likely to delay
project termination. This result happens due to the (almost) linearly decreasing part
of the S-curve (see Figure 8). The linearity implies that Eq[T (q)] = T (E[q]) = T (qR)
where T (q) represents the stopping time as a function of the information fidelity (see
Figure 8).
Finally, for high qR values (Figure 9c), we observe a systematic escalation behavior
of the diverse team, driven by the right part of the S-curve (Figure 8). As the diversity
factor ε increases, the diverse team exhibits a persistence to pursue projects that
would be terminated under the respective homogenous setting. The result is striking
given that a high qR value represents accurate information (low project uncertainty).
Before discussing the effect of intra-team influences, it is worth mentioning the
team size effect on the above results. Figure 10 plots the percentage of times that
each team terminated second for different team sizes (M). The graphs show that
our main result remains qualitatively robust. Still, as the team size increases, the
two team structures appear to converge to similar termination behaviors. In fact,
the termination decision of the homogenous team is independent of the team size.
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It is the diverse team behavior that changes. The result stems from a standard
sampling convergence argument: as the team size increases, the qi values become
more uniformly distributed around the mean, and there are diminishing effects on
the team decision from “extremists” (i.e., team members close to q±ε values). Thus,
the diverse team aligns more with the homogeneous one. Yet, in the high qR region,
there is visibly less alignment due to the higher impact of the qi values on the updated
beliefs. Hence, small deviations from the qR still lead to different individual decisions
(Di,t) despite the larger team sizes.
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Figure 10: Percentage of times that each team stopped second for ε = 0.05
A disclaimer is necessary for Figure 10. The downward trends in the graphs seem
to suggest that larger teams are more beneficial, since they diminish the escalation
phenomena. Yet, such a conclusion presents only one side of the story, as it ignores
the effects of coordinating costs among the team members. In reality, large teams
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experience severe coordination challenges that outweigh the benefits (Mihm et al.
2003). Therefore, the results reported in Figure 10 do not aim to advise the formation
of larger NPD teams, but to demonstrate the robustness of our earlier conclusions
with respect to the size of the team.
3.4.2.3 Heavyweight project manager
Our next set of experiments investigates the impact of a dominant team member,
i.e., a heavyweight project manager (PM), on the termination decisions of the diverse
team. We approximate the heavyweight PM team structure (hereafter heavyweight
team) as follows: the intra-team influence matrix (T) is such that w1j = 1 for every
j, while wij = 0 for all other interactions. Thus, during the discussion, one member
(without loss of generality, the one with i = 1) shapes the beliefs of the rest of team.
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Figure 11: Percentage of times that each team stopped second (heavyweight team)
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Figure 11 illustrates the key result for a heavyweight team: the effect of diversity
is magnified across the qR values. For example, the percentage of realization where
the diverse team stops earlier (low qR values) doubles compared to the no-interaction
case. A similar argument holds for the medium qR values. Two additional effects
arise in the high qR region. First, escalation occurs even for small deviations from the
qR (e.g., for ε = 0.005). Second, as ε grows higher, the diverse team may increasingly
terminate before the homogeneous one, reflecting the high level of outcome variation
in this setting. These results stem from the fact that the heavyweight team ends up
being a “one-man-show”, and the stopping behavior of the diverse team is determined
by the perception of a single person. The latter may drive extreme decisions, as there
is some likelihood that the person in charge may have a severely skewed interpretation
of reality.
3.4.2.4 Lightweight project manager
This set of experiments explores the effect of an influence structure that lies in direct
contrast to the heavyweight PM setting. Each team member is influenced equally by
all other team members. We term such a team as the lightweight project manager
team structure (hereafter lightweight team) to reflect this mild, but nonetheless im-
portant form of interaction. Formally, T is such that wij =
1
M
for all i, j values13.
Figure 12 reveals that under symmetric intra-team influences, the interpretive diver-
sity effect are smoother than the no-interaction case. Thus, for a given level of ε, the
percentage of times that the diverse team stopped “too early” or “too late” is lower.
However, it is important to note that the effect due to interaction is stronger in the
“too early” cases, and rather negligible in the “too late” ones (contrast empty circle
points and filled circle points in Figures 11 and 12). In other words, team members
13Although this structure might seem unrealistic because of the perfect symmetricity of the in-
teractions, it captures the effects of a team without a significant dominance from any of the team
members. Our results are qualitatively insensitive to small deviations in the influence matrix struc-
ture, e.g., wij = 1M ± δ, with δ small.
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with low beliefs (i.e., the pessimists) are influenced significantly by their peers with
high beliefs (i.e., the optimists), but not vice versa.
To understand what drives this unidirectional relationship, one should note that
lower beliefs indicate members that assign higher fidelity to the progress information.
This higher assigned fidelity has two effects. First, according to Proposition 3, the
pessimists have, in general, lower termination thresholds, and a slight modification in
their beliefs during the meeting may lead them to “switch” sides. Second, a higher
fidelity amplifies the impact of the current belief, pi,t, on the optimism of a mem-
ber (i.e., the probability that the next signal will be positive14) and therefore on the
likelihood that the member proposes continuation. Combining these effects, we ex-
plain how a symmetric influence matrix has an asymmetric impact among the diverse
team members. Our observation bears significance as it highlights the limitations of
extensive intra-team communication. Communication may hinder understanding of
the project status: the optimists use the communication channels to drive the team
expectations higher, resulting in more escalation phenomena.
3.4.3 Social conformity
A vast literature in psychology, sociology and economics has established that in-
dividual decisions are not only driven by personal considerations (e.g., interpretive
schemes), but also by “social” forces, such as the desire for social acceptance. One
that has been widely discussed, as it plays an important role in team decision-making,
is the issue of social conformity. Social conformity represents the act of changing per-
spective and behavior to match the beliefs of others (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004). Al-
though social conformity was formally demonstrated for the first time in Asch (1951)
and Deutsch and Gerard (1955), it has arguably been shaping decision-making for a
long time15. Of particular interest for our model is the effect of majority on shaping
14Mathematically, the probability Pr(ξt = s) is supermodular in pi,t and qi.
15“To do exactly as your neighbors do is the only sensible rule...” (Emily Post, 1922 Ch. 33)
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Figure 12: Percentage of times that each team stopped second (lightweight team)
the beliefs of the team members (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Hung and Plott 2001).
We do not aim to contribute to this extensive literature. Instead, we adopt its basic
mechanisms to explore the implications of social conformity on project termination
decisions under different information perception structures.
Within the context of our study, conformity manifests as follows: after the tth
stage decision has taken place, each member contemplates whether to stick to her
belief or to conform with the majority. How does the conformity happen? In the
event that the majority of beliefs advocate termination, conforming does not have an
effect since the project is abandoned. However, if most of the members’ beliefs lie
above their respective thresholds, then the project continues, and the team members
with beliefs below their thresholds may choose to conform to the majority16 and
16In some organizational contexts, executives that persist on their termination opinions are called
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to switch their beliefs to the lowest optimistic belief, that is, pi,t+1 = pj,t where
pj,t = mink =i{pk,t : Dk,t = 1}.
We choose this mild rule because it is the most conservative form of conformism.
The members that switch beliefs adopt the belief that lies the closest to their past be-
liefs (saving face, or inherent difficulty to drastically change). Slight modifications of
the proposed mechanism, e.g. the pessimistic members do not conform with certainty
but only with an exogenous probability α, do not change our results qualitatively.
We compare a diverse team without intra-team influences (T = I) and without
social conformity with one where social conformity is present17. Figure 13 confirms
that conformity is an additional driver of escalation. Both for medium and high qR,
conformity delays further the termination decision. Interestingly, the impact of con-
formity for low qR values is negligible, reflecting the fact that, in such settings, the
team members do not hold radically different opinions (e.g., left part of Figure 8).
Note that the delay due to conformity comes in addition to the delay already observed
due to the interpretive diversity. The combination of these two effects renders project
termination highly challenging, and it offers additional explanatory power to scholars
that study escalation phenomena. Our result also highlights the detrimental effects
that social conformity contexts impose, since they diminish the “heretic” voices that
may challenge common wisdom. Finally, it is interesting to note that, despite the
seemingly opposing nature of social conformity and diversity (i.e., conformity sup-
presses diversity as it pushes everybody towards a common perspective), the former
reinforces the effect of the latter, leading to further delays in the project termination
decision.
blockers, a nickname that carries a negative connotation. We would like to thank an NPD manager
for pointing us to this jargon.
17It is noteworthy to highlight the difference between intra-team influences and social conformity.
The former represents adjustments in one’s beliefs due to input and rational argumentation from
another peer. The latter relates more to a behavioral reaction that emerges from the inherent
individual need to be aligned with their peers
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Figure 13: Percentage of times that each team stopped second
3.5 Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper, we examine the challenges associated with project termination decisions
(Schmidt and Calantone 1998). The extant literature from a variety of research fields,
spanning from psychology to operations management reveals that NPD project ter-
mination is anything but a simple decision, even for the most capable organizations.
Several detailed case studies confirm the often cited claim that “projects get a life of
their own,” and they illustrate the detrimental effects of escalation of commitment sit-
uations. In the majority of these studies, escalation is attributed to either psychologi-
cal or organizational issues. We undertake a different approach, and we try to explain
whether such phenomena arise even among perfectly rational decision-makers. We an-
alyze the decision patterns of project teams whose members propose continuation or
termination based on their perception of project progress and a dynamic assessment
of the likelihood of project success. We depart from the extensive prior literature on
optimal stopping problems that implicitly assumes a single decision-maker. On the
contrary, we account for the potentially different “interpretive schemes” (Dougherty
1992) that characterize modern cross-functional NPD teams. We approximate such
interpretive diversity through individual-specific fidelity assigned to new information.
In order to determine the effects of interpretive diversity, we need to isolate its
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impact. To that end, we first study the optimal termination policy of a bench-
mark homogeneous team. In that setting, the termination decision is governed by
a threshold policy, and continuation is advocated only if the belief about the suc-
cessful commercialization is above a given value. These threshold values decrease in
the information fidelity. Put differently, as the information becomes less reliable, the
team raises the threshold values, leading to a more conservative continuation policy.
Yet, the above result says nothing about the actual termination time, which is the
relevant managerial metric, as it denotes how long it takes before “pulling the plug”
of a deteriorating project. Given the path dependency of the phenomenon, we re-
side on extensive numerical experimentation and we estimate the average number of
stages that the project continues. The results reveal an inverse S-shaped relationship
between the information fidelity and the project duration. In other words, low em-
phasis on outside information delays project termination, since evidence is deemed
uninformative. For higher levels of fidelity, the impact of information increases, and
thus, the project stops faster. Interestingly, for low levels of fidelity, the impact of
information is less drastic, only moderately affecting the overall project duration. As
we discuss below, this concave-convex relationship has significant implications for the
impact of interpretive diversity on termination decisions.
We build intuition gradually and we consider a team structure where members as-
sign different degrees of fidelity to the project progress information. Our main result
indicates that the impact of diversity critically depends on the underlying project
uncertainty, with the latter being proxied by the average information fidelity. For
low levels of information fidelity, the diverse team rushes to stop projects earlier than
necessary, a conservative behavior that runs the risk of terminating potentially suc-
cessful projects. In contrast, for high levels of information fidelity, diversity becomes
a systematic source of escalation, and the diverse team continues projects that a
homogeneous one would have terminated.
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We also incorporate the effects of the intra-team communication web, i.e. the
influences that team members exert on their peers. While our results do not change
qualitatively across different team structures, two systematic effects emerge. First,
the presence of a heavyweight project manager intensifies the escalation effects, and,
surprisingly, the results persist even under lightweight team structures. Finally, we
account for social conformity effects, i.e. the adaptation of member beliefs to the
majority. We illustrate how social conformity leads to additional delays.
Our results develop managerial intuition along three dimensions. First, we high-
light the perils of interpretive diversity. Our study draws a cautious message regarding
the (often implied) beneficial nature of cross-functional NPD teams. The organiza-
tional theory literature has long debated the mixed effects of diversity on team per-
formance (Cavarretta 2007). We show that, regarding a specific performance metric
(project termination decisions), a specific type of diversity (project progress infor-
mation interpretation) bears different outcomes depending on the underlying project
uncertainty. Thus, we admit the limitation of context specificity, but at the benefit of
richer and focused operational conclusions. Second, we outline the involved dynamic
interplay between the team structure, the interpretive diversity, and the project un-
certainty. We show that one needs to pay attention to all three factors together when
assessing NPD decisions. Finally, we show that seemingly opposing managerial ac-
tions, namely the diversification of the team composition and the pressure to conform
to a target, may lead to the same negative outcome regarding termination decisions.
Thus, we call for a deeper understanding of the origins and magnitude of each of these
factors, a task that senior management must accomplish to meaningfully address the
particularly challenging task of terminating (“killing”) NPD projects.
Our model is a normative effort to analyze and further examine the admittedly
complex phenomenon of escalation of commitment in NPD projects. As a normative
effort, it is bound to the limitations that theoretical abstractions exhibit. Thus,
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we do not provide a decision support system, but rather we establish directional
results that build managerial intuition. At a finer level, we have assumed away any
strategic considerations from the team members. Recently, the economics literature
has placed emphasis on such gaming aspects (Caillaud and Tirole 2007, Bond and
Eraslan 2007). We focus on projects where all team members are equally benefiting
from a successful completion, a context with less strategizing. In addition, we assume
that team members have no information about their peers’ interpretive schemes.
Future research should extend our setting to account for more-informed decision-
makers.
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CHAPTER IV
RELICENSING AS A SECONDARY MARKET
STRATEGY
4.1 Introduction
Today, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in the Information Technology
(IT) industry often face difficult decisions when forming strategies involving sec-
ondary markets for their products. In the years before the dot-com bubble of the
late 1990s, there was a limited secondary IT market. Some reasons for this lack of
demand for refurbished IT equipment included: 1) IT OEMs focused on their primary
sales channels and discouraged customers from considering refurbished equipment; 2)
buyers of IT equipment were leery of the quality level of a refurbished product; and
3) there was a lack of independent secondary market firms to refurbish, resell, and
support IT equipment. Shortages of higher-end IT equipment such as servers and
routers during the late 1990s however, led to unmet demand that was often satis-
fied by a new market of third-party IT equipment brokers and refurbishers1. In the
years following, the dot-com bust resulted in a large surplus of barely used IT equip-
ment for sale from companies who failed when the bubble burst. The availability of
so much inexpensive used IT equipment led to significant price discounts compared
to the price of new equipment and even more brokers and refurbishers entering the
1Third-party refurbishers do not manufacture their own products, but instead rebuild and re-
configure used OEM products that they buy from IT users who upgrade or no longer need those
products. Unlike other markets such as the automotive market, potential customers in the used
IT equipment market typically expect the equipment to be refurbished before purchasing; thus the
vast majority of the sales in the IT secondary market are between refurbishers and the end-users
rather than between the end-users themselves. Following industry usage, we will use the terms
“refurbished” and “remanufactured” interchangeably in this paper; for a detailed definition of these
terms, see Thierry et al. (1995).
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secondary market (Berinato 2002).
One of the lasting effects from the dot-com era is that major customers of IT
equipment have started accepting refurbished IT equipment as a viable alternative
to new equipment and a new body of IT refurbishers has entered the market to meet
this demand. According to a 2002 survey of 187 IT executives in CIO magazine,
77 percent said they were purchasing secondary market equipment and 46 percent
expected to increase their spending on refurbished equipment in the next year by an
average of 15 percent (Berinato 2002). In another article, Computer Business Review
highlights that “third-party companies have built $100+ million per year businesses
in buying used computer equipment, refurbishing it, and selling or leasing it out to
someone else” (CBRonline.com 2005). Given the size and growth of the secondary
market, the days of ignoring it and only focusing on the sale of new products are over
for all major IT OEMs. OEMs may either embrace the secondary market or try to
eliminate it, but one thing is now evident, they must form strategies to respond to it.
Some of the major OEMs in the IT industry have not only embraced the existence
of a secondary market, but also deploy it to obtain competitive advantage over their
rivals. IBM and Hewlett Packard, for instance, create high resale values for their used
equipment by facilitating the resale process and secondary use (e.g. charging small
relicensing fees, offering maintenance and inspection) so that the original customers
gain a higher net benefit from their new product purchases. Such a proactive, and in
a sense cooperative, relationship with third-party brokers and refurbishers, however,
is not a standard policy among all IT OEMs. An alternative strategy is to institute
policies and fees that attempt to eliminate the secondary market. For example, Sun
Microsystems (Sun), one of the leading firms in the IT server business, was “under
fire for deliberately attempting to eliminate the secondary market for its machines
worldwide through their new pricing and licensing schemes” (Marion 2004). Cisco is
another company that requires each buyer of its refurbished equipment to pay high
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relicensing fees for the proprietary software that makes the equipment run.
The following excerpts, typical of the IT industry, shed some light on how the
relicensing mechanism works. “Cisco adopts a policy of non-transferability of its
software to protect its intellectual property rights.” What this means is that owners
of Cisco products are only allowed to transfer, resell, or re-lease used Cisco hardware
and not the embedded software that runs on it. This practice, in effect, eliminates
the secondary market and creates customer dissatisfaction. Cisco’s response to this
criticism was to institute relicensing fees, albeit significant: “As Cisco’s installed base
of equipment has grown to such large numbers over the years, our customers have
become more interested in selling and leasing used Cisco equipment on the secondary
market. In order to provide our valued customers and partners with this capability,
Cisco is now setting up a program where companies who are interested in buying used
equipment, may now purchase a new software license to do so” (Cisco.com 2007).
Despite such statements that a relicensing fee mechanism allows reselling refur-
bished equipment on the secondary market, many industry observers argue that some
OEMs use unreasonably high relicensing fees as a means of limiting the secondary
market. In the case of Sun, Marion (2004) highlights the fact that the relicensing fee
is deliberately set so high that the overall cost of a unit of refurbished equipment,
including hardware and software, reaches that of a new one: “In the end, the poten-
tial buyer for the refurbished equipment may have no choice but to return to Sun for
a new product.” He concludes by stressing another interesting facet of the problem:
“End users need to know this and take action to adjust the Sun hardware values
reflected on their respective balance sheets to account for the impact that Sun’s ac-
tions, described above, will have on resale and residual values.” In other words, users
should be aware that Sun’s practices result in very low resale values of used equip-
ment and this information should be factored into their original purchase decision.
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In fact, many IT consulting companies (e.g. www.computereconomics.com) offer de-
tailed forecasts regarding future resale values of used IT equipment, underlining the
critical role of the resale value in the initial IT purchase decision.
From a research perspective, the discussion above raises the fundamental question
addressed in this paper. Given the OEM’s ability to interfere with the IT secondary
market through pricing and relicensing schemes, is limiting this market or, conversely,
encouraging its existence, a more profitable strategy? If one strategy is dominant over
the other, the winner is currently not clear based on anecdotal evidence alone. Our
goal is to understand how the OEM’s incentives and optimal strategies are shaped
contingent on costs, product characteristics, consumer preferences and the intensity
of remanufacturing competition. Motivated by the industry articles concerning Sun,
a company that has historically been considered the premium brand in the server
market (Sun.com 2007), we also examine whether such a brand premium could justify
an aggressive strategy vis-a`-vis the secondary market.
We begin our analysis by studying the optimal strategy of an OEM that has a
monopoly on the new product market, but faces future competition from a third-party
entrant who purchases the used products from the OEM’s customers, refurbishes
them, and resells them in competition with the OEM’s new products. The OEM
collects a relicensing fee on every product sold by the entrant; and can effectively “shut
down” the secondary market by charging a high enough fee. Our key finding is that it
is suboptimal for the OEM to shut down the secondary market when the refurbishing
cost is low, even though this means the entrant is more competitive. This seemingly
counter-intuitive strategy is driven by the fact that in this cost range, not only can the
OEM charge a higher relicensing fee, but she can also benefit from a stronger resale
value effect. If customers are not strategic (no resale value effect) or the OEM’s
second-generation product is technologically superior to the first, however, then the
OEM adopts a more aggressive strategy against the secondary market, and may even
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charge a high enough fee to shut it down completely for any level of refurbishing cost.
Similarly, if the OEM decides to enter the secondary market herself (in conjunction
with imposing a relicensing fee), she will do so more aggressively when the refurbishing
cost is low, exiting the secondary market and benefiting indirectly from its existence
at higher values of the refurbishing cost.
We also examine how the OEM’s strategy changes as the number of the inde-
pendent entrants increases, i.e. the secondary market becomes more competitive.
We find that both the OEM’s profits as well as the size of the secondary market
grow with an increase in the number of entrants. Interestingly, the OEM decreases
her relicensing fee even as the sales volume of refurbished equipment grows, and the
cannibalization of new products increases. This is because an increasing network of
resellers strengthens the marginal impact of the relicensing fee on the resale value
effect relative to the corresponding impact on the cannibalization effect. As a result,
the OEM chooses to lower the relicensing fee, further stimulating the procurement
competition among the entrants, and benefits from the higher resale value of her used
product.
We conclude by analyzing OEM strategies in a differentiated new product duopoly
setting. Our numerical results show the high-end OEM always charges a higher reli-
censing fee than the low-end OEM, and the difference between relicensing fees can be
significant. Thus, a high relicensing fee need not be indicative of an attempt to shut
down the secondary market, but rather reflect the brand premium the high-end OEM
commands. This result may help explain the significantly different relicensing fees
observed in practice. Overall, our research highlights the strategic importance of sup-
porting an active secondary market under a wide range of circumstances, particularly
in the presence of strategic consumers and low refurbishing costs.
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4.2 Literature Review
A rapidly growing stream of literature on remanufacturing has focused on the compe-
tition between the OEM and independent refurbishers/remanufacturers (Majumder
and Groenevelt 2001, Debo et al. 2005, Ferguson and Toktay 2006, Ferrer and Swami-
nathan 2006), or the role of remanufacturing in primary market competition between
OEMs (Heese et al. 2005, Atasu et al. 2007). We contribute to this literature in the
following ways.
First, although these papers provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the
competition between the OEM and potential entrants that refurbish and sell the
OEM’s product, they do not incorporate the effect of the resale value on the con-
sumers’ net utility from purchasing a new product. As a result, they focus only on
the cannibalization effect, and therefore, the existence of independent remanufactur-
ers is always detrimental for the OEM’s profit. Two exceptions that account for
the resale value effect are Heese et al. (2005) and Debo et al. (2005). Heese et al.
(2005) examine the profitability of product take-back strategies incorporating the re-
sale value effect into consumer strategies. The resale value, though, is set exogenously
while in our paper is determined by the competitive dynamics of the secondary mar-
ket. Moreover, the relicensing fee mechanism, introduced in our paper, reverses some
of the results presented in Debo et al. (2005). We contribute to this literature by
endogenizing the resale value, and more importantly, by linking it to the consumers’
willingness to pay for a new product. Thus, competition from an independent refur-
bisher has both a positive (resale value effect) and a negative (cannibalization of new
product sales) impact on the OEM’s profit. We show that the resale value effect can
dominate and the OEM can benefit from the existence of an entrant.
Second, in their extension capturing the resale value effect, Debo et al. (2005)
find that as the number of remanufacturers increases (cannibalization increases), the
OEM’s profit decreases despite the positive resale value effect. With the relicensing
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fee mechanism, we show that a higher competitive intensity in the secondary mar-
ket can benefit the OEM. This happens because the relicensing fee allows the OEM
to directly impact the secondary market: The OEM increases her profits by reduc-
ing the relicensing fee and increasing the product’s resale value as remanufacturing
competition increases.
Third, we show that if the OEM decides to refurbish her own products in con-
junction with a relicensing fee mechanism, she will dominate the secondary market
at low refurbishing costs, while leaving the secondary market to the entrant at higher
levels of refurbishing cost. This is consistent with Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006),
who show that a higher remanufacturing cost savings means higher participation by
the OEM in the secondary market, and Ferguson and Toktay (2006), who find that as
the entrant becomes more competitive and the cannibalization threat increases, the
OEM should increase her efforts to deter the secondary market. If the OEM makes
a strategic determination not to participate in the refurbished product market, how-
ever, then she should pursue the diametrically opposed strategy of supporting the
secondary market at low levels of the refurbishing cost to exploit the strong resale
value effect in this cost range.
While the idea that a secondary market can benefit the OEM is relatively new in
the remanufacturing literature, it is well established in the durable goods literature,
a thorough review of which can be found in Waldman (2003). Until the early 1970s,
the main conclusion regarding the impact of secondary markets on a monopolist’s
profitability was due to the cannibalization effect between new and used products.
In the words of Gaskins (1974), “conventional economic wisdom. . . contends that the
existence of a competitive secondhand market constitutes a major long-run restraint
on monopoly power in a primary market.” Motivated by the market for diamonds,
however, Miller (1974) argues that “the buyer of a newly produced diamond pays a
price consistent with what the diamond can be sold for to others including members
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of later generations” and thus “the initial price captures the present value of all sub-
sequent transactions.” In essence, he points out the “resale value effect,” arguing that
a secondary market might increase the value derived by the consumer, and in turn,
the price that the monopolist can charge for it. This argument is also stressed by
Benjamin and Kormendi (1974), Liebowitz (1982), Rust (1986), and Levinthal and
Purohit (1989), who all argue that whether or not a monopolist has the incentive to
eliminate the secondary market is not clear-cut. A limitation of these papers is the
assumption that the demand side is modeled by a representative consumer (homo-
geneous consumer preferences). Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994) argue that in those
models, the size of the second-hand market is indeterminate since the representative
consumer buys both new goods and used goods each period and essentially sells the
used good to herself. By introducing a model in which consumers have heterogeneous
tastes, they show that the existence of a secondary market enables the monopolist to
achieve price discrimination between high and low valuation consumers who buy new
and used products, respectively.
Models allowing consumers to have heterogeneous tastes are refined in further
research by Waldman (1996, 1997), Desai and Purohit (1998), Hendel and Lizzeri
(1999) and Desai et al. (2004, 2007). Waldman (1996) employs the seminal Mussa
and Rosen (1978) analysis of market segmentation and product-line pricing to allow
consumers to vary in their valuations of quality. His main result is that because of the
substitution effect between new and used products, the price at which old units trade
on the secondary market constrains the price that the monopolist can charge for the
new units. Therefore, he demonstrates that the monopolist may have an incentive
to “shut down” the market by reducing durability to “sufficiently low” values. In
a follow-up paper, Waldman (1997) demonstrates that leasing versus selling can be
used to eliminate the secondary market, and argues that this motivation might have
been the primary reason for many prominent anti-trust leasing cases (United Shoe,
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IBM, Xerox). Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) study leasing and selling strategies under
secondary markets when durability is endogenous and the OEM can either allow a
fully functioning secondary market (perfectly competitive with no restrictions) or
shut down the secondary market completely. They show conditions where the OEM
would not want to shut down the secondary market but prefers reducing the durability
instead. Finally, Desai and Purohit (1998) and Desai et al. (2004, 2007) include the
discounted resale price (resulting from perfect competition in the second period) in
the consumer’s first-period valuation of the new product, but their primary focus is on
evaluating leasing versus selling, solving the time-consistency problem, or evaluating
the impact of demand uncertainty, respectively.
We contribute to the literature on interfering with the secondary market along
the following dimensions. First, we introduce one more mechanism to this literature
– imposing a relicensing fee – and are the first to capture the strategic implications of
this widespread mechanism. Unlike previously explored mechanisms that require the
OEM to make modifications to her product or market strategies, the relicensing fee
mechanism is “costless” in that the OEM can set the fee as high as needed to deter
the entrants without any direct repercussions. We show that nevertheless, the OEM
should not shut down the secondary market under a wide range of conditions. By
treating the relicensing fee as a continuous decision variable, we avoid restricting the
OEM to either fully supporting or completely shutting down the secondary market
(e.g. as in Hendel and Lizzeri 1999).
Second, we analyze the relicensing fee strategy in depth, by modeling operational
elements such as production cost and refurbishing cost, by making a distinction be-
tween the inherent durability of the product and the value to the customer after
refurbishing, by varying the level of competitive intensity on the secondary market,
and by allowing competition in the primary market. We highlight some of these
elements below:
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We relax the common assumption of perfect competition in the secondary market
and allow for a profit-maximizing entrant to collect and refurbish the used products
(in the durable goods literature, consumers are allowed to sell the used product to each
other, creating a perfectly competitive secondary market, and refurbishing cost is not
modeled). The value offered to the consumers for the used product by the entrant is
determined as his optimal response to the OEM’s decisions. Thus, the purchase price
for used units and the prices charged to consumers for new and refurbished products
arise as the Nash equilibrium of the game between the OEM and the entrant. This
allows us to examine the impact of the production and refurbishing costs on the
OEM’s strategy. We also study how the relicensing fee strategy changes with respect
to the number of entrants.
We also relax the assumption of a monopolist OEM by allowing vertically differ-
entiated new products to compete in the primary market. To our knowledge, we are
the first to model differentiated new and refurbished products competing in both the
primary and secondary markets. We find that the high-end OEM always charges a
higher relicensing fee than the low-end OEM and that the difference between relicens-
ing fees can be significant. Yet, whether a high-end or a low-end OEM has a greater
secondary market depends on the market conditions and the relative brand differen-
tial between the two OEMs. Our results indicate that even with competition in the
primary market, it remains rare for either OEM to eliminate the secondary market,
although the total size of the secondary market decreases as the brand premium of
the high-end OEM decreases.
We conclude by highlighting a contribution at the intersection of the remanufac-
turing and durable goods literatures. Prior work on durable goods theory assumes
consumers trade among each other, selling the (depreciated) used product as is. In
contrast, prior work on remanufacturing assumes that a used product provides no
utility unless it is refurbished. Our model captures both aspects, where the product
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depreciates with use, but it can be refurbished by an entrant to offer a higher util-
ity than if used as is. We are thus able to separate the effect of inherent product
durability from the effect of the remanufacturing process. As our analysis reveals,
although both effects reduce the demand for new products in the second period, their
role on the relicensing strategy is diametrically opposite. In particular, the optimal
relicensing fee decreases in the durability of the product, but increases in the value
that the customer obtains from the refurbished product. As explained in detail later,
the difference stems from the way in which these two features affect the resale value
of the product.
4.3 Key Assumptions and Notation
Our baseline analysis assumes the OEM holds a monopoly in the new product market.
We develop a two-period model. In the first period, the OEM sells new products.
In the second period, the OEM may again sell new products, and there is a third-
party entrant who may refurbish and resell used products bought from the OEM’s
first-period customers. Thus, in the second period, the OEM’s new product sales face
competition from the refurbished products offered by the entrant. At the same time,
the OEM generates relicensing fee revenues from the refurbished products. Our goal
is to examine the OEM’s relicensing fee strategy in the face of future competition
from refurbished products. We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. Consumer willingness-to-pay is heterogeneous and uniformly dis-
tributed in the interval [0, 1].
We assume that consumer types are distributed uniformly in the interval [0, 1],
where a consumer of type θ ∈ [0, 1] has a willingness-to-pay of θ for a new product.
In any period, each consumer uses at most one unit. The market size is normalized
to 1. With this representation, in a single-period problem with only the new product,
consumer θ’s utility function would be U1(θ) = θ− p1, where U1 represents consumer
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utility and p1 is the price paid for the new product. This would lead to the familiar
inverse demand function p1 = 1 − q1, where q1 is the quantity of new product sold
in the first period. Demand functions for our two-period model are developed in the
Analysis section.
Assumption 2. The product depreciates with use.
The rate of depreciation of a product depends on its durability, which we parametrize
by δo. Thus, if the consumer type θ who bought a new product in the first period con-
tinues to use that product in the second period, the utility he obtains in that period
is δoθ. If δo = 0, consumers obtain no utility from their used product in the second
period. In this case, the product’s useful life (in the absence of being refurbished
by the entrant) is effectively only one period. Therefore, all first-period customers
re-enter the market in the second period, and can buy another new product or a
refurbished product. The majority of remanufacturing papers make this one-period
useful product life assumption (Majumder and Groenevelt 2001, Ray et al. 2005,
Ferrer and Swaminathan 2006, Ferguson and Toktay 2006, and Atasu et al. 2007).
Assumption 3. Consumers do not sell their used products directly to each other.
Used IT equipment, before it can be reused by another party, typically requires
some costly refurbishing effort (e.g., updating software, replacing hardware compo-
nents, testing the equipment). Thus, we assume that consumers cannot sell their
used products directly to each other. Instead, a third-party refurbisher buys used
products from first-period consumers (return volume depends on the price offered by
the entrant), and enters the market in the second period by refurbishing and reselling
these products. This assumption reflects the current practice in the used IT mar-
ket where most used equipment, before it can be resold, requires software updates
and the replacement of wearable parts that the consumers do not have the technical
capability to perform.
Assumption 4. Each consumer’s willingness-to-pay for the refurbished product is a
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fraction δ of their willingness-to pay for the new product, where δo < δ < 1.
Under this assumption, a consumer with a willingness-to-pay θ for the new product
has a willingness-to-pay δθ for the refurbished one. The nature of competition between
new and refurbished units is thus one of vertical differentiation. That is, for the same
price, consumers prefer a new product to a refurbished one. This assumption is driven
by the evidence that consumers are concerned about the quality of a refurbished
product and this is reflected in their willingness to pay for it. Empirical evidence for
lower valuation of remanufactured products is offered in Guide and Li (2007), and
Subramanian and Subramanyam (2007). This perspective is also reflected in a number
of articles in the practitioner and academic literature (Lund and Skeels 1983, Hauser
and Lund 2003, Kandra 2002, Debo et al. 2005, Vorasayan and Ryan 2006, Jin et
al. 2007). Since refurbishing involves software updates, the replacement of wearable
parts, cleaning and testing, the relative utility that a customer would obtain from
using a refurbished product is higher than if he just kept using his now-used product
that he had purchased in the first period. We capture this by assuming δo < δ.
Assumption 5. The disutility to a consumer of reselling a used product is a fraction
of his original willingness-to-pay for the new product.
The entrant offers a resale value (denoted by s) to first-period customers to pur-
chase their used products at the end of the first period. We assume that a consumer
with a willingness-to-pay θ for a new product will incur a perceived transactional
disutility (hereafter disutility) of γθ (where 0 < γ < δ) to sell his used product to
the entrant (e.g. perceived disutility of searching for IT resellers, removing sensitive
data, etc.). Hence, a higher incentive is needed to induce a higher willingness-to-pay
consumer to resell his used product. This is consistent with consumer search theory
which states that consumers are diversified with respect to how much disutility they
perceive from such searching, with wealthy consumers experiencing the greatest loss
(Phlips 1983, Mehta et al. 2003). This behavioral characteristic also forms the basis
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behind the common use of product rebates that allow price discrimination between
consumers who will take the time to send in the rebate and those who will not. For
example, Gerstner and Hess (1991) argue that “there is a positive association be-
tween willingness-to-pay and redemption costs” (Gerstner and Hess 1991, p. 875)
since “high-end customers have higher time costs for the activities required to take
advantage of the discount” (Gerstner et al. 1994, p. 1438). Obviously, the higher
the rebate, the higher the percentage of customers that claim it. Similarly, with this
assumption, the higher the price offered by the entrant, the higher the percentage
of customers who will sell their used product to the entrant. In line with previous
research on reverse logistics and remanufacturing, this assumption ensures that the
average cost of acquisition increases in the quantity of the products collected (Guide
2000, Guide and Van Wassenhove 2001, Galbreth and Blackburn 2006, Ferguson and
Toktay 2006).
Assumption 6. Consumers are strategic.
There is empirical evidence that IT consumers are strategic in their purchasing
behavior (Song and Chintagunta 2003, Nair 2004, Plambeck and Wang 2006). Ac-
cordingly, we assume that consumers take into account the future resale value s of
the product in making their purchase decisions. This is facilitated in practice by the
existence of IT consulting companies that offer resale value forecasts.
Assumption 7. The OEM charges a relicensing fee h in the second period to any
consumer who purchases a refurbished product.
The establishment of a relicensing fee, typically called a Digital License Agreement
(DLA), has been widely employed by OEMs as a means of protecting their intellectual
property rights. A DLA allows a consumer to re-install the necessary software for
the equipment to operate and thus, a refurbished product is of no use without it.
OEMs publish list prices for new equipment (that implicitly includes both hardware
and software cost) and most publish a separate list where their relicensing policies
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are explicitly laid out. The relicensing fee, declared in the first period, constitutes an
important element of our model, since it affects the resale value offered by the entrant,
which is taken into account by strategic consumers of new products. In particular,
the utility that each consumer derives from purchasing a refurbished product is given
by the difference of their willingness-to-pay and the price plus the relicensing fee.
Assumption 8. In the second period, the OEM introduces new products technologi-
cally equivalent or superior to the ones introduced in the first period.
The IT industry is characterized by rapid technological change. It is typical for
an OEM to introduce an improved version of her existing product not long after the
original product introduction. For instance, an upgraded version might have a faster
Central Process Unit (CPU) or bigger memory. To capture the increased consumer
willingness-to-pay due to this technology improvement, we assume that a consumer
with a willingness-to-pay θ for the new product in the first-period has a willingness-
to-pay αθ, where α ≥ 1, for a new second-period product.
4.4 Analysis: Monopoly in the New Product Market
In this section, we analyze the model with a single OEM who sells a new product in
both periods and charges a relicensing fee for refurbished products that are acquired,
refurbished and resold by entrants in the second period.
In this competitive setting, the OEM has a significant advantage over the entrants:
She controls the relicensing fee that consumers of refurbished products need to pay on
top of the purchase price charged by the entrants. As the relicensing fee increases, the
cost to consumers of the refurbished product increases, which in turn reduces demand
and shifts consumers to the new product. At first sight, a high value for the relicensing
fee may seem like a good idea for the OEM, since it eliminates the competition
from the refurbished product. Eliminating the secondary market, however, has an
important impact on first-period profits. Since consumers can no longer sell their used
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products to an entrant, the net utility they obtain from the new product decreases.
Consequently, the price charged by the monopolist OEM, along with her first-period
profits, is lower than it would have been had the consumers foreseen a positive resale
value for their used products. Hence, the OEM needs to balance the impact of two
opposite forces: A lower relicensing fee leads to competition in the second period, but
allows the OEM to charge a premium in the first period that reflects the consumer’s
ability to resell the product in the second period.
To analyze this trade-off systematically and delineate the impact of various drivers,
we start with a baseline model where δo = 0 and there is a single entrant. Then we
explore the following extensions that shed light on the role of the resale value effect,
competition and durability: non-strategic consumers, N entrants, OEM participation
in the secondary market and δo > 0.
4.4.1 Analysis of the Baseline Model
With the baseline model assumption that the used product offers no utility in the sec-
ond period (δo = 0), two-period consumer strategies decompose into two independent
single-period decisions: In period 1, the consumer choices are to buy new or to not
buy, and in period 2, the consumer choices are to buy new or refurbished or nothing,
regardless of their first-period decision. In addition, first-period buyers decide to sell
their product to the entrant or not (depending on the value of s relative to their
disutility γθ), which impacts their net first-period utility, but has no impact on their
second-period choices.
Derivation of Demand Functions. As discussed above, the two periods decouple
in the consumer strategy space. Let us start with the first-period decision of the
consumer, to buy a new product or not. The resale value of the product, since
it is a consequence of selling the product bought in the first period, needs to be
included in the net utility obtained from that product’s purchase. Consumer θ will
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sell the used product to the entrant for a price s only if this value is greater than
his disutility γθ. Therefore, a strategic consumer of type θ derives a net utility of
U1(θ) = θ − p1 + (s − γθ)I(s≥γθ) from purchasing a new product in period 1, where
I(s≥γθ) = 1 when s ≥ γθ and 0 otherwise.
Figure 14: Consumer state space and corresponding utilities from selling versus not
selling the used product.
As shown in Figure 14, contingent on their type, first-period consumers fall in one
of three segments. If θ ≤ p1−s
1−γ , consumers do not purchase the new product, while for
p1−s
1−γ < θ ≤ sγ , consumers purchase the new product and subsequently resell it. Finally,
for s
γ
< θ ≤ 1, consumers purchase the new product and do not resell it. Therefore,
the total sales quantity in period 1 is q1 = 1− p1−s1−γ , or, p1 = (1− γ)(1− q1) + s, and
the total number of units acquired by the entrant is given by qu =
s
γ
− p1−s
1−γ . Note
that the entrant would never set s > γ, as s = γ is sufficient to ensure all consumers
sell their used products (qu = q1).
We now turn to the second period. Let p2 and pr denote the second-period prices
of new and refurbished products, respectively. Following our previous discussion,
the corresponding consumer utilities obtained by consumer type θ from purchasing
each type of product in the second-period are U2(θ) = αθ − p2 for the new product
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and Ur(θ) = δθ − pr − h for the refurbished product. From these utility functions,
and letting q2 and qr represent the second-period quantities of new and refurbished
product respectively, the inverse demand functions are
p2 = α(1− q2)− δqr
pr = δ(1− qr − q2)− h.
Analysis of the Second-Period OEM-Entrant Competition. We solve the problem
by backward induction, starting with the second period. Let Π2 and Πe denote the
OEM’s and the entrant’s second-period profit, respectively. At this stage, the OEM
decides the quantity of new products that she will sell in the market, while the entrant
decides the price s that he will offer to the consumers to obtain their used products,
as well as the quantity of refurbished products that he will make available in the
market, denoted by qr. We assume that the unit production cost is c < 1, and the
unit refurbishing cost is cr < c.
The OEM’s second-period objective given the entrant’s choice of qr is
Maxq2 Π2(q2|qr) = (p2− c)q2+hqr = (α− αq2 − δqr − c) q2+hqr s.t. q2 ≥ 0. (5)
The first part of (5) captures the profit obtained from selling q2 units of new products
while the second part represents the profit from the relicensing fee (h), obtained from
the qr customers who purchase the refurbished units from the entrant. The quantity
of new products to sell is the only decision variable for the OEM in the second period
as the relicensing fee is set in the first period.
The entrant’s corresponding objective given the OEM’s choice of q2 is
Maxqr,s Πe(qr, s|q2)=(pr − cr)qr − squ s.t. 0 ≤ qr ≤ qu (6)
where qu =
s
γ
− p1 − s
1− γ .
The constraint in (6) ensures the quantity of refurbished product is no greater than
the number of units collected from the consumers at a resale price of s, given by
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qu =
s
γ
− p1−s
1−γ (see Figure 14). In practice, the amount collected falls far short of
the volume of existing used products, so we do not explicitly model the constraint
qu ≤ q1 and limit the analysis to parameters where q∗u < q∗1 in equilibrium. Where
appropriate, the potential effect of this constraint is discussed. The following lemmas
characterize the price the entrant will pay for the used units.
Lemma 1 At optimality, the entrant has no incentive to collect more units than the
ones he intends to sell in the market. That is, the constraint qr ≤ qu is binding and
the optimal resale price offered by the entrant satisfies
s∗(qr) = γ(1− γ)qr + γp1. (7)
All proofs are provided in the Appendix C.
Lemma 2 For equilibria where both new and refurbished products co-exist, the equi-
librium resale value is given by s∗(q1, h) = γ
[2γα(γ−1)+δ(δ−4α)]q1+[5δ+2γ(1−γ)−2(h+cr)]α+δc−δ2
2γα(2−γ)+δ(4α−δ)
while the corresponding second-period quantities are
q∗2(q1, h) =
δh−γδq1−δ(δ−γ)+δcr−(α−c)[γ(γ−2)−2δ]
2γα(2−γ)+δ(4α−δ) and q
∗
r(q1, h) =
2α(γq1−h−γ−cr)+δ(α+c)
2γα(2−γ)+δ(4α−δ) .
The second lemma reveals two interesting properties of the equilibrium resale
value. First, s∗ decreases in the quantity of new products sold in the first period.
This observation is consistent with the resale values we observe in practice: Whenever
a large supply of a specific used model becomes available, its resale value drops
dramatically. Second, s∗ increases as the relicensing fee h decreases: A low value of h
means a higher profit potential from the secondary market, thus the entrant is willing
to offer a higher resale price to first-period consumers. In addition, the entrant’s
decision of whether to enter the market or not is directly related to the relicensing
fee h, since the latter affects the profitability of refurbished products. Therefore,
the OEM acts as a Stackelberg leader who decides between allowing the existence
of a secondary market or not by her choice of h. To characterize the optimal OEM
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strategy, we need to examine the total profit across both periods. Thus, we now move
to the OEM’s first-period decisions.
Analysis of the OEM’s First-Period Strategy. In the first period, the OEM’s
decisions include the quantity of new units to sell as well as the relicensing fee. More
specifically, the OEM’s problem is
Maxq1,h Π(q1, h) = Π1(q1, h) + Π
∗
2(q1, h) s.t. q1 ≥ 0, h ≥ 0, (8)
where Π1(q1, h) denotes the profit from the sales of new products in the first period.
Thus,
Π1(q1, h)= [p1(q1, h)− c] q1 = [(1− γ)(1− q1) + s∗(q1, h)− c] q1,
where s∗(q1, h) is characterized in Lemma 2. Although we ignore discounting in our
formulation, the addition of a discount factor to the second-period profit does not
fundamentally change our results, but reinforces the resale value effect, as the OEM
cares more about first-period profits.
We are now ready to state our main result for the baseline model. The following
proposition states that as long as the refurbishing cost is below a threshold value, the
OEM is always better off by maintaining a secondary market for her products.
Proposition 1 For cr < c
(δ−αγ)
α
, it is not optimal for the OEM to eliminate the
secondary market (q∗r > 0). The OEM charges a positive relicensing fee h
∗ > 0, which
is decreasing in c and cr but increasing in α. For c
(δ−αγ)
α
≤ cr < 12 [δ(1+ cα)−γ(1+c)],
the OEM charges a positive relicensing fee so as to eliminate the secondary market
(q∗r = 0). For cr ≥ 12 [δ(1 + cα)− γ(1 + c)], h∗ = 0 and q∗r = 0.
Proposition 1 may appear counter-intuitive at first glance: As the entrant becomes
more competitive in relation to the OEM (cr decreases in relation to c), the OEM
chooses not to eliminate the secondary market. The result is driven by the double
benefit that the OEM obtains from the secondary market: the resale value effect and
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relicensing fee revenues. At low values of refurbishing cost, these benefits outweigh
the negative impact of cannibalization even though this is where the entrant poses the
most competition to the OEM. But it is precisely because entry is more desirable for
the third-party refurbisher that he offers a high resale value to first-period customers,
which benefits the OEM. When consumers have a higher willingness-to-pay for the
refurbished product or when their transactional disutility is lower, this makes entering
the secondary market more attractive, captured in an increasing threshold value below
which the OEM allows the secondary market to exist. These results warn against the
common perception of many OEMs that competition from an outside firm through
the secondary market is always detrimental to their profits. It is possible for the
OEM to co-opt the third party into her business strategy by using the relicensing fee
strategically.
As the technology improvement parameter α increases, the threshold value c (δ−αγ)
α
decreases. For radical technology improvements (α ≥ δ
γ
), the OEM shuts down the
secondary market regardless of the refurbishing cost. Intuitively, a higher technology
improvement leads to a higher profit margin from the new product in the second
period, and thus, the OEM adopts a more aggressive strategy against the secondary
market. For this reason, we also observe that the optimal relicensing fee increases in
α. On the other hand, when the refurbishing cost cr increases, the OEM lowers the
relicensing fee. Note that both higher α and higher cr make the new product more
competitive against a refurbished product, yet they have the opposite effect on the
relicensing fee. A higher α gives the OEM an incentive to change the balance between
the primary and secondary market to exploit the additional profit margins from the
new products. In contrast, a higher cr limits the ability of the entrant to maintain a
secondary market and distorts the balance the OEM considers optimal. As a result,
the OEM attempts to strengthen the secondary market by lowering the relicensing
fee. Finally, when the production cost c increases, the OEM lowers the relicensing
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fee and the quantity of refurbished units increases. In this case, the OEM prefers to
produce fewer new units in the second period and exploit the resulting increase in the
resale value by charging a higher price for the new product in the first period.
In the range c (δ−αγ)
α
≤ cr ≤ 12 [δ(1 + cα)− γ(1 + c)], the OEM sets h∗ > 0 so as to
eliminate the secondary market (q∗r = 0) since the high refurbishing cost prevents the
entrant from offering a high enough resale price. Hence, the resale value benefit from
maintaining an active secondary market does not outweigh the detrimental effect of
cannibalization. For even higher values of the refurbishing cost, cr >
1
2
[δ(1 + c
α
) −
γ(1 + c)], the secondary market is not viable: q∗r = 0 even if the relicensing fee were
set to zero. Thus, h∗ = 0 and q∗r = 0.
4.4.2 The Role of the Resale Value Effect
We attributed the OEM’s choice to “live and let live” for low enough refurbishing cost
to the resale value effect and the relicensing fee. To separate out the impact of these
two factors, we can analyze the same problem, but with non-strategic consumers who
do not take the resale value into account when they purchase a new product. In this
case, there is no resale value effect by definition. It can be shown that Proposition
1 holds in this setting, with the first threshold changing to
cδ− 1
2
αγ(1+c)
α
< c (δ−αγ)
α
(see Oraiopoulos et al. 2007 for the derivation of this result when α = 1). Thus,
when consumers are non-strategic, and the OEM only benefits from the relicensing
fee revenue, it is optimal for the OEM to eliminate the secondary market under a
much wider range of conditions. For example, the OEM may prefer to eliminate the
secondary market even when the refurbishing cost is zero and there is no technology
improvement (this happens when the threshold cδ − 1
2
γ(1 + c) is negative).
This finding demonstrates that a forward-looking consumer base can influence the
OEM’s secondary market strategy. The common perception in the IT industry is that
historically, consumers of IT products did not take into account the future resale value
89
in their initial purchases. This could explain why some IT OEMs have historically
deployed policies to deter the secondary market for their products. As mentioned
in the introduction however, there are indications that consumers of IT equipment
are becoming increasingly concerned about resale values during their initial purchase
decisions. Our results suggest that this is not necessarily a bad trend for the OEM,
but her secondary market strategies need to evolve with the market.
4.4.3 The Role of Competition
As discussed above, Proposition 1 reveals a somewhat counterintuitive finding about
the role of third-party competition. To explore the impact of competition on the
OEM’s strategy further, we take a two-pronged approach: i) We analyze the effect of
the competitive intensity of the secondary market on the OEM strategy and profit,
and ii) We allow the OEM to interfere with the secondary market directly by refur-
bishing herself.
Competitive Intensity of the Secondary Market. The significant profit opportu-
nity in the secondary market has given rise to a number of firms founded with the
sole purpose of buying and refurbishing used IT equipment (CBRonline.com 2005).
According to the United Network Equipment Dealer Association (uneda.com), there
are over 300 certified refurbishers today and many more who are not yet certified. To
capture this phenomenon, we increase the competitive intensity within the secondary
market by allowing N symmetric third-party entrants to compete in acquiring, refur-
bishing and reselling the used products (this model is similar to Debo et al. 2005).
One may expect that as the number of entrants increases, the OEM employs
a more aggressive strategy vis-a`-vis the secondary market and her profit decreases.
Interestingly, however, we show the OEM’s relicensing fee is decreasing and her profit
is concave increasing in the number of entrants. (The analysis for the case α = 1
can be found in Oraiopoulos et al. 2007.) Consistent with standard economic theory,
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as the number of entrants increases, internal competition drives the prices of the
refurbished units down and the secondary market attracts more consumers (the overall
quantity of refurbished products increases). This leads to higher cannibalization of
new units in the second period, but also to a higher resale value. In fact, adding an
additional entrant increases the marginal impact of the relicensing fee on the resale
value more than it increases the detrimental cannibalization effect. As a result, the
OEM charges a lower relicensing fee, providing greater support to the secondary
market. This result differs from Debo et al. (2005) who find that an increase in the
competitive intensity of the secondary market reduces both the OEM’s incentive to
invest in remanufacturability and her profit. This difference can be explained through
the strategic as well as the economic role of the relicensing fee: The OEM not only
has a more powerful mechanism of controlling the demand for refurbished products,
she also derives revenues from the relicensed equipment.
The OEM Participates in the Secondary Market. At first sight, our conclusion
that the OEM welcomes competition in the secondary market seems counter to the
previous results in the remanufacturing literature. For example, Ferrer and Swami-
nathan (2006) show a higher remanufacturing cost savings means higher participation
by the OEM in the secondary market. Ferguson and Toktay (2006) find that as the
entrant becomes more competitive (cr becomes lower) and the cannibalization threat
increases, the OEM should increase her efforts to deter the secondary market.
The difference in these findings is driven by how the OEM interferes with the sec-
ondary market. Remanufacturing is a direct approach, while imposing a relicensing
fee is an indirect approach. In practice, some OEMs adopt a strategy of not par-
ticipating in the secondary market, while others enter the refurbishing business. To
investigate the impact of the latter approach, we extend our baseline model to allow
refurbishing by the OEM. Our analysis yields the following results:
At low levels of the refurbishing cost, the OEM charges a high relicensing fee
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and places a much larger volume of refurbished product on the market compared
to the entrant. This is because the OEM’s margin on the refurbished product is
h+ pr − cr − s, while the entrant’s margin is only pr − cr − s. In addition, the OEM
benefits from the resale value effect. As the refurbishing cost increases, the margins
from refurbished products drop, and the capacity to charge a high relicensing fee
decreases, so the quantity refurbished by the OEM drops significantly. This allows
the entrant to increase his quantity, but not enough to compensate the decrease in the
OEM’s quantity. Thus, similar to our baseline model, the overall size of the secondary
market decreases in the refurbishing cost. As the refurbishing cost increases further,
the OEM completely exits the secondary market, and in this range, the results are
qualitatively the same as in the model where the OEM is not allowed to refurbish.
In summary, the OEM exploits the market for refurbished products herself when
the profit margin is high, but leaves the entrant to do so when the margin is low,
capturing value only via the relicensing fee and the resale value effect.
This analysis enriches our understanding of the role of competition: At low levels
of refurbishing cost, it is optimal for the OEM to remanufacture in conjunction with
imposing relicensing fees, a result consistent with previous models (Debo et al. 2005,
Ferrer and Swaminathan 2006, Ferguson and Toktay 2006, etc.). This strategy limits
the participation of third-party entrants in the market. If the OEM makes a strategic
determination not to participate in the refurbished product market (e.g. Sun) for
other reasons (brand equity worries, resistance from sales department, etc.), however,
then she should pursue the diametrically opposed strategy of supporting the secondary
market at low refurbishing cost to exploit the strong resale value effect in this cost
range.
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4.4.4 The Role of Durability
A key assumption in our baseline model is the one-period product lifetime assumption
(δo = 0). That is, a product bought in the first period provides no utility in the second
period, unless it is refurbished by the entrant. This assumption reflects the fact that
for IT equipment where relicensing fees are common such as servers and networking
equipment, most users upgrade to the newest generation when it is introduced because
of performance requirements and software compatibility issues. There is however, a
portion of the IT market where these issues are of lower concern, such as mainframes
and workstations. For these products, consumers may decide to “hold on to” their
used products despite the reduced functionality they provide, and abstain from the
market in the second period. We explore the implications of such a consumer segment
by letting δo > 0; the higher the δo, the more “durable” the product. To maintain
tractability, we focus on the special case of α = 1 (i.e., no technological improvement)
and γ = 0 (no transactional disutility). With the assumption γ = 0, the consumer’s
decision about whether to return or keep a product boils down to a comparison of
the utility the used product affords versus the sum of the resale value and the net
utility from buying a new product. Since the utility of keeping the product is δoθ,
consumers are heterogeneous in their utility from replacing the product, and the
volume returned increases in s as in the baseline model even though γ = 0. The
derivation of the demand functions based on two-period consumer strategies, and the
supporting analysis leading up to the main result in Proposition 2 below are presented
in Appendix B.
Proposition 2 There exists c˜r such that for cr < c˜r, it is not optimal for the OEM to
eliminate the secondary market: q∗r > 0. Moreover, for cr < c˜′r < c˜r, the OEM charges
a positive relicensing fee h∗ which decreases in cr, but increases in c. For c˜′r < cr < c˜r,
the OEM sets the relicensing fee to zero (h∗ = 0).
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Proposition 2 states that the OEM allows for a secondary market to exist when
the refurbishing cost in low enough. In addition, the optimal relicensing fee decreases
in the refurbishing cost cr. These results are structurally the same as our findings
in Proposition 1. Thus, the fundamental conclusions about when the OEM should
allow the secondary market to exist and how she should deploy the relicensing fee do
not depend on the level of durability of the product. A set of numerical experiments
(available from the authors) show that the impact of α and γ in this model is also
consistent with their impact described in the baseline model.
There is one difference however, in the role the production cost c plays: The
relicensing fee h∗ increases in the production cost c, whereas it decreases in the pro-
duction cost when δo = 0. This difference stems from how production cost impacts
the resale value effect. When δo > 0, as the production cost increases, fewer new
products are sold in the second period, and thus, fewer first-period consumers de-
cide to replace their used product with a new one. In other words, fewer first-period
consumers benefit from the resale value effect. Consequently, the resale value effect
is weakened as the production cost increases, and the OEM increases the relicensing
fee. In contrast, when δo = 0, the number of customers who decide to return their
products is independent of the production cost. In fact, a higher production cost has
only the direct effect of reducing the OEM’s margin. As a result, the entrant is more
competitive, and willing to pay a higher resale value to a larger number of customers.
Hence, the resale value effect is strengthened as the production cost increases and the
OEM lowers the relicensing fee.
Corollary 1 The relicensing fee h∗ decreases in δo, but increases in δ.
The fact that h∗ decreases in δo is particularly interesting if we contrast it with the
impact of the production cost c. Higher durability expands the market segment that
chooses to keep using the product, and shrinks the segment of consumers who decide
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to sell their used products and buy a new one in the second-period. This is similar
to the effect of a higher production cost. However, higher durability generates higher
consumer utility, and therefore, higher demand for new products in the first period.
The increased volume amplifies the value captured from the resale value effect, since
more consumers can be charged the price premium stemming from it. Consequently,
the OEM finds it profitable to drop the relicensing fee as durability increases.
Corollary 1 allows us to disentangle the effect of inherent product durability from
the effect of the remanufacturing operation. Prior work on durable goods theory
assumes that consumers trade among each other, selling the (depreciated) used prod-
uct, which offers relative utility δ0, as is. In contrast, prior work on remanufacturing
assumes that a product is of no value (δ0 = 0) unless it is refurbished, in which case it
offers relative utility δ(> δ0). One might expect δ and δo to have the same impact on
h∗, since as they increase, they both reduce the demand for the new product in the
second period. Interestingly, Corollary 1 shows that they have opposite effects on the
OEM’s relicensing fee. A higher δo means that consumers obtain more utility from
the product over its life-cycle and the size of the new product market increases. As
discussed above, this results in the OEM decreasing h∗ as the durability δo increases.
In contrast, a higher δ generates a higher willingness-to-pay for a refurbished product
that the entrant exploits and increases the threat of cannibalization. Consequently,
as δ increases, the OEM increases the relicensing fee, both to exploit the additional
value that consumers place on the refurbished product and to keep cannibalization
in check. This is similar to the effect of decreasing cr on the relicensing fee.
4.5 Analysis: Differentiated Duopoly in the Primary Mar-
ket
Thus far, we have assumed a monopolist setting in the primary market with the com-
petition being restricted to the secondary market. In practice, the IT primary mar-
ket is characterized by competition. Industry experts stress performance, efficiency,
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flexibility, longevity, reliability, and maintenance as factors of primary importance
(ServerWatch 2008, SearchServerVirtualization 2008). According to a recent market
research report regarding the selection criteria for IT servers, quality and reliability
were found to be the most important ones (IDC 2006). These are dimensions of ver-
tical differentiation: For the same price, higher reliability, efficiency etc. are preferred
to lower reliability, efficiency, etc. To capture this characteristic of the IT market, we
relax the monopolistic primary market assumption and develop a vertically differen-
tiated duopoly model where consumers place a higher value on firm A’s product than
on firm B’s product. This assumption allows us to address two critical questions:
What are the pricing and relicensing strategies of each OEM and how do they differ?
What is the impact of the quality (performance, reliability, etc.) differential on those
strategies?
We capture the difference in the perceived quality between firms as follows: A
consumer who derives utility θ from a new product by firm A derives utility (1− β)θ
from a new product by firm B. Without loss of generality, we assume that β > 0
so that firm B represents the low-end firm. The relative difference in consumers’
valuations, β, is called the brand differential or the brand premium of the high-end
OEM. We also assume an equal rate of perceived utility depreciation for both firms.
That is, a consumer derives utility δθ from firm A’s refurbished product, while he
derives utility (1 − β)δθ from firm B’s. This assumption allows us to maintain the
same relative brand differential between OEMs on the secondary market. We assume
that δ < 1−β so that a given consumer values the low-end firm’s new product strictly
more than the high-end firm’s refurbished product. This is a reasonable assumption
based on observations of the current state of the IT industry and eliminates the
trivial case where one firm dominates both the primary and secondary markets. In
addition, we normalize the cost of refurbishing to zero for both products. This rules
out refurbishing cost disparity from explaining the differences in the OEMs’ strategies
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and corresponds to the more interesting cases in Proposition 1 where the existence
of a secondary market is beneficial for the OEM. Finally, we assume a perfectly
competitive secondary markets for each type of refurbished product. This implies
that for any given used product purchase prices, sA and sB, pA2,r = s
A and pB2,r = s
B.
While we do this for tractability, the analysis of the competitive secondary market
case suggests that the structure of the optimal policy is essentially the same for any
level of competitive intensity on the secondary market.
Similar to our baseline model, we solve the problem by backward induction, start-
ing with the second period (Appendix C). Unlike our previous analysis, however,
deriving the Nash equilibrium (q∗1A,h
∗
A, q
∗
1B,h
∗
B) for any arbitrary set of parameters is
much more complex because the profit expressions are long and do not allow easy
algebraic handling. Rather, our approach is to solve the unconstrained game and
subsequently identify the range of parameter values in which the results are mean-
ingful (e.g. Desai 2001). Therefore, hereafter, we focus on those parameter values for
which all non-negativity constraints are satisfied, namely, all market segments have
positive quantities in equilibrium. For those parameters, we conduct an extensive
numerical investigation and explore how the optimal OEM strategies (relicensing fee
and quantity decisions) change as a function of the brand premium. In the numerical
study, we calculate the equilibrium quantity and relicensing fee decisions for every
combination of the parameter values δ ∈ [0.3, 0.8], γ ∈ [0.01, 0.15], and c ∈ [0.01, 0.5]
(discretized in increments of 0.1, 0.03, and 0.05, respectively). We find that as long
as all non-negativity constraints are satisfied, the insights remain the same across all
the parameter combinations. These insights are described in Observations 1-3 below.
Figure 15 provides an illustrative example while Table 1 summarizes the impact of δ,
γ, c on the equilibrium decisions.
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Figure 15: Relicensing Fees (left) and Equilibrium Quantities in Second Period
(right) as a function of β for δ=0.5, γ=0.05, and c=0.15,
h∗A h
∗
B q
∗
2A q
∗
2B q
∗
UA q
∗
UB
δ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘ ↗ ↗
γ ↗ ↘ ↘ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘
c↗ ↘ ↘ ↘ ↘ ↗ ↗
Table 1: Comparative Statics when all Market Segments Exist.
Observation 1: The high-end OEM always charges a higher relicensing fee than
the low-end OEM and the difference between the relicensing fees can be large.
This is because the high-end OEM’s relative brand premium exists in the sec-
ondary market as well, which she capitalizes on by charging a higher relicensing fee.
Note that despite the higher relicensing fee h∗A, the high-end OEM maintains an active
secondary market. Thus, a high relicensing fee need not be indicative of an attempt
to shut down the secondary market, but rather reflect the brand premium a particular
OEM commands. As reported in Table 1, our comparative statics analysis suggests
that for a fixed brand premium between the two OEMs, both relicensing fees increase
in δ, and decrease in γ and c.
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Observation 2: The high-end OEM’s relicensing fee increases in the brand pre-
mium (β). For the low-end OEM, there is a non-monotonic relationship between the
relicensing fee and the brand premium: h∗B first increases and then decreases in β.
To understand this relationship, we must look at how a marginal change in the
brand premium affects the equilibrium decisions of each OEM. A marginal increase
in β increases both the primary and the secondary markets for the high-end OEM’s
products. An increase in the brand premium β is translated to a higher relicensing
fee at any β value since consumers have higher willingness-to-pay for her refurbished
products. In contrast, the low-end OEM increases h∗B only at low values of β. For
low values of β, the low-end OEM has a considerable presence in both the primary
and secondary markets. An increase in the brand premium hurts both the primary
and secondary markets, the former to a larger extent. The low-end OEM attempts to
maintain her primary market presence by increasing her relicensing fee and limiting
the cannibalization effect. On the contrary, for high values of β where the high-end
OEM dominates, the low-end OEM’s primary market has significantly shrunk, and
the impact of a marginal increase in β on cannibalization is much less significant. As
a result, we observe a decrease in the relicensing fee as an attempt to strengthen the
resale value effect.
The effect of δ, γ and c on the equilibrium quantities can be observed in Table
1. A higher δ makes the secondary market more profitable, so the secondary market
grows at the expense of the primary. A higher γ makes the secondary market less
profitable, so the opposite effect is seen. Finally, a higher c lowers the profitability of
new products, so the primary market shrinks and the secondary market grows.
Observation 3: There is a threshold value for the brand premium β below which
the low-end OEM’s product makes up a larger share of the secondary market. This
threshold increases as δ decreases, γ increases, or c decreases.
Observation 3 suggests that although a positive brand premium always translates
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to a larger market share in the primary market (under symmetric production costs),
the same is not true for the corresponding secondary markets. This result could
explain the strategy of some high-end OEMs who choose not to have large secondary
markets for their refurbished products despite the brand premium they command.
Note also that a lower c makes the primary market more profitable, while a lower δ or
a higher γ reduces the margins of the secondary market. Thus, the above conditions
make the primary market more attractive to the high-end OEM, who has a leadership
advantage, leaving the low-end OEM to focus on the secondary market (via relicensing
fees).
In our analysis, we assume an equal unit production cost for both the high-end
and low-end OEM; thus the differentiation is along the brand premium dimension.
This is a reasonable assumption for many IT products since they can be characterized
as development-intensive-products, i.e. products whose fixed costs of development far
outweigh the unit variable costs (Krishnan and Zhu 2006). Because our focus is on a
firm’s decisions for a given product line, we do not consider these initial fixed costs.
If the assumption of equal production costs is relaxed and the high-end OEM has a
higher production cost, we expect her to decrease her relicensing fee to increase the
resale value of her primary product.
4.6 Conclusions
Secondary markets in the IT industry have grown steadily, forcing OEMs to form
strategies to respond to them. For products such as servers and storage devices,
OEMs have a powerful mechanism at their disposal: instituting a software relicensing
fee charged to secondary users. A high relicensing fee can virtually shut down the
secondary market, while a low relicensing fee can allow it to thrive. The optimal
strategy is not obvious: An active secondary market not only generates relicensing
revenues for the OEM but also has an indirect positive benefit by increasing the
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OEM’s new product’s resale value, which in turn, increases the price that can be
charged for the new product (resale value effect). At the same time, it also has a
direct detrimental effect as the refurbished product competes with the OEM’s new
product (cannibalization effect) in future periods. In practice, comparable OEMs have
surprisingly different relicensing fee strategies. The existing literature on secondary
markets does not provide guidance concerning this widespread mechanism. Our paper
fills this gap by contributing to the theory of secondary markets and by providing
managerial guidelines on the use of relicensing fees.
Our research makes several theoretical contributions to the literature on how
OEMs should balance their primary and secondary markets. First, we explicitly
model the role of the relicensing fee. Though widespread, the relicensing fee mecha-
nism has not been studied in the literature to date. Our paper is the first to examine
both the economic (i.e., direct revenues) and the strategic (i.e., interference mech-
anism) implications of this mechanism. Second, unlike prior research that assumes
that used products are traded among consumers in a perfectly competitive market, we
model the incentive of independent entrants to purchase, refurbish, and resell those
used products. By doing so, we account for the operational realities of maintaining a
secondary market, that is, the refurbishing process. In practice, reselling an IT prod-
uct worth several thousand dollars requires a number of procedures (e.g., replacing
hardware components, testing performance, etc.) that are not costless. As our analy-
sis reveals, the effect of such procedures, proxied by the magnitude of the refurbishing
cost, is a key determinant of the OEM’s strategy vis-a`-vis the secondary market. In
addition, by explicitly modeling the independent entrants, we are able to examine how
an increase in the competitive intensity in the secondary market (i.e., higher number
of entrants) affects the OEM’s strategy. Third, current theoretical frameworks that
consider a monopolist OEM have limited power in explaining the adoption of different
secondary market strategies by competing OEMs. In our duopoly model, we capture
101
the equilibrium relicensing fee strategies of competing OEMs and compare how they
evolve as the brand premium between them increases. To our knowledge, our paper
is the first to study differentiated new and refurbished products competing in both
the primary and secondary markets.
In parallel, we complement the rapidly growing literature on remanufacturing by
linking the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a new product to the potential resale
value of the product at the end of use. By doing so, we show that a market for
refurbished products can benefit the OEM even if it is operated by independent
entrants. Finally, our comprehensive model allows us to disentangle the effect of
inherent product durability from the effect of the remanufacturing process. Prior
work on remanufacturing assumes that after one period of use, the product has zero
utility for the consumer unless it is refurbished, in which case it offers a fraction
of the utility offered by a new product. In contrast, the literature on durable goods
assumes that a product can be used in subsequent periods as is, offering the consumer
a fraction of its original utility. Our model is the first to integrate these two effects,
namely, the inherent durability of the product and the value added by the refurbishing
process. We show that although they both imply that the used or refurbished product
is a closer substitute to the new product, their effect on the OEM’s relicensing fee
strategy is diametrically opposite.
Our results help IT OEMs to identify critical tradeoffs involving the relicensing fee
along the dimensions of technology improvement, refurbishing cost, and competitive
dynamics. We find that in the presence of radical technology improvements, the OEM
should increase the relicensing fee to make the refurbished product less affordable and
to increase the market share of her second-generation new product. A second critical
factor in the OEM’s decision is the refurbishing cost. If the OEM chooses to enter the
refurbishing business herself, then she should do so aggressively at low refurbishing
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cost. Interestingly, if the OEM chooses not to undertake refurbishing, a low refurbish-
ing cost should make the OEM willing to support a secondary market, even though
this market is operated by third-party entrants who are becoming more competitive
as the refurbishing cost decreases. This happens because the OEM can then exploit
the secondary market through the resale value effect and the relicensing fee revenues.
This is especially important for an OEM with high production costs: The right com-
bination of price and relicensing fee allows the OEM to mitigate the low margin of her
new product by producing fewer units but charging a price premium for them due to
the resale value effect. Our experience is that OEMs are very concerned with canni-
balization and tend to overlook the resale value effect. When using the relicensing fee
mechanism only, it is precisely in cases where cannibalization is a strong threat that
the OEMs should embrace the secondary market. This requires a strategic shift in
the OEM’s approach relative to the case where she refurbishes her own products. The
above results hold even when the OEM faces competition from multiple third-party
entrants. In fact, the strategic and economic value of an active secondary market
for the OEM are amplified as the number of entrants increases. Therefore, the OEM
should actually lower the relicensing fee to strengthen the resale value effect as the
competitive intensity increases, despite the stronger threat of cannibalization.
Finally, our differentiated duopoly model offers insights regarding the different
relicensing fee strategies observed in practice. As we would expect, the high-end
OEM always charges a higher relicensing fee since her brand premium is maintained in
the secondary market. In fact, the high-end OEM should monotonically increase her
relicensing fee as her brand premium is strengthened. Interestingly, however, although
a brand premium always translates to a larger market share in the primary market,
the same is not true for the corresponding secondary market. This result could
explain the strategy of some high-end OEMs who choose not to have large secondary
markets for their refurbished units despite the brand premium they command. Thus,
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it is possible that certain conditions make the primary market more attractive to the
high-end OEM, who has a leadership advantage, leaving the low-end OEM to focus
on the secondary market (via her relicensing fees).
To conclude, our paper highlights the strategic importance of supporting an active
secondary market under a wide range of circumstances, particularly in the presence of
strategic consumers and a low refurbishing cost. These conditions are valid in the IT
industry today: There exist a large number of industry analyst firms who specialize in
forecasting the resale value of IT equipment and who offer comprehensive cost/benefit
analysis over the life-cycle of the IT equipment while the modularity of IT solutions
makes refurbishment a cost-effective proposition for many products. Thus, charging
very high relicensing fees with the purpose of shutting down the secondary market, a
strategy attributed to some IT OEMs, appears to be myopic and suboptimal in the
presence of strategic consumers. At the same time, we demonstrate that charging
higher relicensing fees than lower end competitors need not mean an OEM is doing
so with the sole purpose of eliminating the secondary market, but rather that she is
capitalizing on her brand premium.
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Appendix A
Lemma 1 The posterior distribution for the technological potential of the explored
domain is normal N(μ′1, σ
′2
1 ) with μ
′
1 = ktA + (1− k)μ1 and σ′1 =
√
σ21σ
2
σ21+σ
2 where
k =
σ21
σ21+σ
2 .
Proof : From Bayes’ rule we derive the updated distribution:
f(T1 | tA) = f(tA|T1)f(T1)f(tA) =
1
σ
√
2π
e
(− (T1−tA)
2
2σ2
) 1
σ1
√
2π
e
(− (T1−μ1)
2
2σ21
)
1√
σ21+σ
2
√
2π
e
(− (tA−μ1)
2
2(σ21+σ
2)
)
which after some algebraic manipulation gives :
f(T1 | tA) = 1σ′1√2πe
(− (T1−μ
′
1)
2
2σ′21
)
where μ′1 = ktA + (1− k)μ1 with k = σ
2
1
σ21+σ
2and σ
′
1 =
√
σ21σ
2
σ21+σ
2
Lemma 2 The posterior distribution for the technological potential of the unexplored
domain is normal N(μ2, σ2) with μ2 = θtA + (1− θ)μ1 and σ2 = σ1
√
1− θ2 where
θ = θoσ1√
σ21+σ
2
Proof By definition, ρ(tA, T2) =
E[tAT2]−E[tA]E[T2]√
V ar(tA)
√
V ar(T2)
= E[(T1T2+εT2]−E[T1+ε]E[T2]√
σ21+σ
2σ1
=
= E[T1T2]−E[T1]E[T2]√
σ21+σ
2σ1
since E[ε] = 0. But, E[T1T2]−E[T1]E[T2]
σ21
= θo. So, θ = ρ(tA, T2) =
θo
σ1√
σ21+σ
2
. Thus, from the properties of the bivariate normal distribution (Rencher
2002), we know that the updated distribution for the second scientific is normal
N(μ2, σ
2
2) with μ2 = θtA +
σ1√
σ21+σ
2
(1− θ)μ1 and σ2 = σ1
√
1− θ2 where θ = θoσ1√
σ21+σ
2
Second Period Analysis
Solving for the Nash equilibrium in the second period, we can easily derive the leader’s
profit function as Π2A( tB | tA) = 1(e2−4)2 [(2−e)(A−c)+2btA−ebtB]2 and the follower’s
as
Π2B ( tB | tA) = 1(e2−4)2 [(2− e)(A− c)− ebtA + 2btB]2
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In order to choose the scientific domain, the follower perceives tB as a random
variable which follows the normal distribution t˜B ∼ N(μB, σB). Therefore, the explo-
ration target domain (new versus already explored) stems from the comparison of the
expected profits in each case. Note that the profit functions are second degree poly-
nomials in tB, and therefore we can derive the expected profits for each firm by using
the following property: E[t˜B
2
] = E[t˜B]
2 + σ2B = μ
2
B + σ
2
B. Thus, the second-period
expected profits can be written as:
E[Π2B(μB, σB)] =
1
(e2−4)2{[(2−e)(A−c)−ebtA]2+2[(2−e)(A−c)−ebtA](2bμB)+
4b2(μ2B + σ
2
B)}
At this point, the follower can either draw from the explored domain (that the leader
has drawn), draw from the unexplored one, or forego investment in technology im-
provements.
According to Lemma 1, if the follower draws from the explored domain μB = μ
′
1 =
ktA + (1− k)μ1 and σB =
√
σ′21 + σ2 =
√
σ21σ
2
σ21+σ
2 + σ2 where k =
σ21
σ21+σ
2 On the
other hand, if the follower draws from the explored domain (Lemma 2) μB = μ2 =
μ1 +
σ1√
σ21+σ
2
θ(tA−μ1) and σB =
√
σ22 + σ
2 =
√
σ21(1− θ2) + σ2 where θ = θoσ1√σ21+σ2 .
Let ΠE2B(tA) and Π
U
2B(tA) denote the follower’s second-period expected profits
when investing in the explored and unexplored scientific domain, respectively. That
is, ΠE2B(tA) = E[Π2B(μ
′
1, σ
′
1 | tA)] and ΠU2B(tA) = E[Π2B(μ2, σ2 | tA)]. Also let ΠN2B(tA)
denote the second-period profits if no investment is undertaken. Essentially, this
corresponds to setting tB = 0. Investment in a scientific domain comes at a cost
K, and therefore the follower’s search problem can be described as max{ΠE2B(tA) −
K,ΠU2B(tA)−K,ΠN2B(tA)}
Lemma 3 ΠE2B(tA) increases in tA.
Proof :
∂2ΠE2B(tA)
∂t2A
=
2b2(−2σ21+e((σ21+σ2))2
(σ21+σ
2)2(e2−4)2 > 0 so Π
E
2B(tA) is convex.
Moreover,
∂ΠE2B(tA)
∂tA
∣∣∣
tA=0
=
2b(2σ21−e((σ21+σ2))
(σ21+σ
2)2(e2−4)2 [(2 − e)(A − c) + 2bμ1σ2] > 0 for σ < σ1.
Thus,
∂ΠE2B(tA)
∂tA
> 0 for every tA > 0.
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Lemma 4 There is a unique θ˜o > 0 such that for θo > θ˜o, Π
U
2B(tA) increases in tA,
while for θo < θ˜o, it decreases in tA.
Proof :
First note that for θo < 0,
∂μ2
∂tA
= θoσ1√
σ21+σ
2
< 0 when θo < 0,
∂σ2
∂tA
= 0, and
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂tA
< 0. Thus,
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂tA
=
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂tA
=
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂μ2
∂μ2
∂tA
+
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂σ2
∂σ2
∂tA
+
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂tA
< 0 and
ΠU2B(tA) is always decreasing in tA. Also note that for θo = 1, Π
U
2B(tA) = Π
E
2B(tA)
for every tA and therefore, according to Lemma 3,
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂tA
> 0. Thus, there is at
least one θ˜o ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂Π
E
2B(tA)
∂tA
∣∣∣
θo=θ˜o
= 0. For θo < θ˜o,
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂tA
< 0 while for
θo > θ˜o
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂tA
> 0. To see that θ˜o is unique notice that if
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂tA
had another root,
say θ˜o
′ ∈ (θ˜o, 1) then it would have a third one since at ∂Π
E
2B(tA)
∂tA
∣∣∣
θo=1
> 0. The latter
is impossible since
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂tA
is quadratic in θo and therefore it can have at most two
roots.
Lemma 5 Let G(tA) = Π
E
2B(tA)−ΠU2B(tA) denote the difference of the expected profits
between drawing from the explored versus drawing from the unexplored one. Then
G(tA) always increases in tA.
Proof : First note that, for tA = μ1, G(μ1)=
4b2σ41
(σ21+σ
2)(e2−4)2 (θ
2
o−1) < 0 for −1 < θo < 1.
Also note that for tA < μ1, μ
′
1−μ2 = σ
2
1(1−θo)(tA−μ1)
σ21+σ
2 < 0 and this difference is increasing
in tA. Since σ
′
1 and σ2 do not depend on tA, G(tA) will also be increasing in tA. We
will now show that G(tA) is also increasing in tA for tA > μ1. For tA > μ1, note
that ∂
3G(tA,θo)
∂tA∂θ2o
= − 16b2σ41(tA−μ1)
(σ21+σ
2)2(e2−4)2 < 0. Moreover, the maximum of
∂G(tA,θo)
∂tA
occurs for
θo = − (σ
2
1+σ
2)[(2−e)(A−c)−2ebtA+(e+2)bμ1]
4bσ21(tA−μ1) < 0. Also,
∂G(tA,θo)
∂tA
∣∣∣
θo=1
= 0. Since ∂G(tA,θo)
∂tA
is
quadratic(concave) in θo, it will be symmetric with respect to the unique maximum
θo. Therefore,
∂G(tA,θo)
∂tA
> 0 for −1 + 2θo < θo < 1 and since θo < 0, ∂G(tA,θo)∂tA > 0 for
−1 < θo < 1.
Lemma 6 For θo < 0, Π
U
2B(tA) is decreasing in tA faster than what Π
N
2B(tA) does
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(
dΠU2B(tA)
dtA
<
dΠN2B(tA)
dtA
). On the contrary, for 0 < θo < θ˜o : Π
U
2B(tA) is decreasing in tA
slower than what ΠN2B(tA) does (
dΠU2B(tA)
dtA
>
dΠN2B(tA)
dtA
).
Proof : By definition
dΠU2B(tA)
dtA
=
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂μ2
∂μ2
∂tA
+
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂tA
(since ∂σ2
∂tA
= 0) and
dΠN2B(tA)
dtA
=
∂ΠN2B(tA)
∂tA
. Also for θo = 0,
dΠU2B(tA)
dtA
=
dΠN2B(tA)
dtA
. Finally, note that when θo < 0,
∂μ2
∂tA
< 0
while for 0 < θo < θ˜o,
∂μ2
∂tA
> 0. Thus, for θo < 0,
dΠU2B(tA)
dtA
<
dΠN2B(tA)
dtA
while for
0 < θo < θ˜o,
dΠU2B(tA)
dtA
>
dΠN2B(tA)
dtA
.
Theorem 1 When the domains are negatively correlated with each other (i.e., θo <
0), for every tuplet (tA, K) there exist values t˜U(K) and t˜E(K) such that the optimal
R&D search strategy is:
• to search the explored scientific domain when tA ∈ (t˜E(K),∞)
• to search the unexplored scientific domain when tA ∈ (0, t˜U(K))
• to perform no search in all other cases.
The values t˜U(K) and t˜E(K) are monotonic in K and there exist KE such that
for K ≤ KE , t˜U(K) = t˜E(K).
Figure 16: Follower’s second-period expected profits for A = 400, c = 0.7, b =
0.8, μ1 = 120, σ1 = 50, σ = 30, e = 0.9, θ0 = −0.5
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Proof : Note that according to Lemma 3 and 4, when θo < 0, Π
E
2B(tA) is increasing
in tA while Π
U
2B(tA) is decreasing in tA. Also note that Π
N
2B(tA) is decreasing in tA but
at a faster rate compared to ΠU2B(tA). Let H(tA) = Π
N
2B(tA) + K.
Let t˜0 be the unique intersection point of Π
E
2B(tA) and Π
U
2B(tA) and KE
.
=
ΠE2B(t˜0) − ΠN2B(t˜0). Now note that if H(t˜0) < ΠE2B(t˜0) = ΠU2B(t˜0) ⇔ ΠN2B(t˜0) <
ΠE2B(t˜0)−K = ΠU2B(t˜0)−K ⇔ K < ΠE2B(t˜0)−ΠN2B(t˜0) then the follower always invests
since for tA > t˜0, Π
N
2B(tA) < Π
E
2B(t˜0) −K and for tA < t˜0 , ΠN2B(tA) < ΠU2B(t˜0) −K
(Lemma 6). Thus, there is a unique threshold t˜E
.
= t˜0 such that for tA < t˜E the
follower searches in the unexplored domain, while for tA > t˜E the follower invests in
the explored one.
Now consider the case where H(t˜0) > Π
E
2B(t˜0) ⇔ K > KE .Since ΠE2B(tA) is in-
creasing in tA and H(tA) is decreasing in tA there is unique threshold t˜E(K) such that
ΠE2B(t˜E) = H(t˜E). Thus, for tA > t˜E(K) the follower searches in the explored domain.
Similarly, since ΠU2B(tA) is decreasing in tA faster than H(tA), there is unique threshold
t˜U(K) such that Π
U
2B(t˜U(K)) = H(t˜U(K)). Thus, for tA < t˜U(K) the follower searches
in the unexplored domain. Finally, when t˜U(K) < tA < t˜E(K), Π
U
2B(tA) < H(tA) and
ΠE2B(tA) < H(tA) and the follower does not invest.
Theorem 2 When the domains are positively correlated with each other (i.e., θo >
0), for every tuplet (tA, K) there exist values t˜U(K) and t˜E(K) such that the optimal
R&D search strategy is:
• to search the explored scientific domain when tA ∈ (t˜E(K),∞)
• to search the unexplored scientific domain when tA ∈ (t˜U(K), t˜E(K))
• to perform no search in all other cases.
The values t˜U(K) and t˜E(K) are defined such that i) t˜U(K) = 0 for K ≤ KU , ii)
t˜U(K) = t˜E(K) = t˜ for K ≥ KE
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Figure 17: Follower’s second-period expected profits for A = 400, c = 0.7, b =
0.8, μ1 = 120, σ1 = 50, σ = 30, e = 0.9, θ0 = 0.5
Proof : First consider the case where θo > θ˜o. Note that according to Lemma 3 and 4,
when θ˜o < θo, both Π
E
2B(tA) and Π
U
2B(tA) are increasing in tA. Let H(tA) = Π
N
2B(tA)+
K. The optimal policy for the follower is max{ΠE2B(tA)−K,ΠU2B(tA)−K,ΠN2B(tA)} =
max{ΠE2B(tA),ΠE2B(tA), H(tA)}. Let t˜0 be the unique intersection point of ΠE2B(tA) and
ΠU2B(tA).
Note that if H(t˜0) > Π
U
2B(t˜0) then the option of not investing in either domain
dominates the option of investing in the unexplored domain for tA < t˜0. We also
know that ΠE2B(tA) is increasing faster than Π
U
2B(tA) (Lemma 5) so for tA > t˜0 the
option of investing the explored domain always dominates the option of investing in
the unexplored one. Also note that although H(t˜0) > Π
E
2B(t˜0), Π
E
2B(tA) is increasing
in tA while H(tA) is decreasing in tA and therefore, there will be a unique threshold
t˜E(K) such that for tA < t˜E(K) the follower does not invest in any domain while for
tA > t˜E(K) the follower invests in the explored one.
Now consider the case where H(t˜0) < Π
U
2B(t˜0). Since H(tA) is decreasing in tA
and ΠU2B(tA) increasing in tA there will be an area (t˜U(K), t˜0) such that for tA ∈
(t˜U(K), t˜0), Π
U
2B(tA) > H(tA), that is, the option of investing in the unexplored
domain dominates the option of not investing. Moreover, for sufficiently low K values,
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K < KU
.
= ΠU2B(0) − ΠN2B(0) the option of investing in the unexplored domain will
always dominate the option of not investing. Finally, for tA > t˜0 the follower will
always invests in the explored domain.
To summarize, when θo > θ˜o, there are three subcases: i) when K > KE a unique
threshold t˜E such that for tA < t˜E(K) the follower does not invest in any domain while
for tA > t˜E(K) the follower invests in the explored one; ii) when KU < K < KE, there
are two threshold values t˜U(K) and t˜E such that: for tA < t˜U(K) the follower does not
invest in either domain, for t˜U(K) < tA < t˜E the follower invests in the unexplored
domain, while for tA > t˜E the follower invests in the explored domain; iii) when
K < KU there is a unique threshold t˜E such that for tA < t˜E the follower searches in
the unexplored domain while for tA > t˜E the follower invests in the explored one.
Now consider the case where 0 < θo < θ˜o. Note that according to Lemmas 3 and
4, when θo < 0, Π
E
2B(tA) is increasing in tA while Π
U
2B(tA) is decreasing in tA. Also
note that according to Lemma 6, ΠN2B(tA) is decreasing in tA but at a slower rate
compared to ΠU2B(tA). Let H(tA) = Π
N
2B(tA) +K. The optimal policy for the follower
is max{ΠE2B(tA)−K,ΠU2B(tA)−K,ΠN2B(tA)} = max{ΠE2B(tA),ΠE2B(tA), H(tA)}.
Let t˜0 be the unique intersection point of Π
E
2B(tA) and Π
U
2B(tA).
Note that if H(t˜0) > Π
U
2B(t˜0) then the option of not investing in either domain
dominates the option of investing in the unexplored domain for tA < t˜0 while for
tA > t˜0 the option of investing in the explored domain dominates the other two. Also
the condition H(t˜0) > Π
U
2B(t˜0) can be equivalently written as Π
N
2B(t˜0) > Π
E
2B(t˜0)−K =
ΠU2B(t˜0) −K ⇔ K > ΠE2B(t˜0) − ΠN2B(t˜0). Let KE .= ΠE2B(t˜0) − ΠN2B(t˜0). Then, when
K > KE , the follower either draws from the explored domain with profits Π
E
2B(tA)−K
or does not draw at all and receives profits ΠN2B(tA). But since Π
E
2B(tA) is increasing
in tA there must be a unique threshold t˜E(K) such that for tA < t˜E(K) the follower
does not invest in any domain while for tA > t˜E the follower invests in the explored
one.
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Now consider the case where H(t˜0) < Π
U
2B(t˜0). Since H(t˜0) is decreasing faster than
ΠU2B(t˜0) then there will be an area (t˜U(K), t˜0) such that for tA ∈ (t˜U(K), t˜0), ΠU2B(tA) >
H(tA), that is, the option of investing in the unexplored domain dominates the option
of not investing. Moreover, for sufficiently low K values, K < KU
.
= ΠU2B(0)−ΠN2B(0)
the option of investing in the unexplored domain will always dominate the option of
not investing. Finally, for tA > t˜0 the follower will always invests in the explored
domain.
In short, when 0 < θo < θ˜o, there are three subcases: i) when K > KE a unique
threshold t˜E(K) such that for tA < t˜E(K) the follower does not invest in any domain
while for tA > t˜E(K) the follower invests in the explored one; ii) when KU < K < KE,
there are two threshold values t˜U(K) and t˜E such that: for tA < t˜U(K) the follower
does not invest in either domain, for t˜U(K) < tA < t˜E the follower invests in the
unexplored domain, while for tA > t˜E the follower invests in the explored domain;
iii) when K < KU there is a unique threshold t˜E such that for tA < t˜E the follower
searches in the unexplored domain while for tA > t˜E the follower invests in the
explored one.
Note that the structure of the optimal strategy is identical with the structure for
the case of θo > θ˜o.
Finally, to see why both threshold values t˜U(K) and t˜E(K) are concave increasing
in K, consider the a generic profit function Π(tA) = R(tA) − K . The threshold
values t˜U(K) and t˜E(K) are defined as the tA values that solve the above equation
for R(tA) = Π
U
2B(tA) and R(tA) = Π
E
2B(tA), respectively. But R(tA) is convex in tA
and K is linear, thus the thresholds will be concave increasing.
Proposition 1 The threshold value t˜E is strictly higher than the prior expected value
μ1.
Proof : Recall that t˜E is the unique root of G(tA), the difference between the ex-
pected profits from searching in the explored and the unexplored domain. Since
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G(μ1)=
4b2σ41
(σ21+σ
2)(e2−4)2 (θ
2
o− 1) < 0 and G(tA) is increasing in tA (Lemma 5), the unique
threshold for which the follower invests in the explored domain always lies above the
prior mean of the distribution: t˜E > μ1.
Lemma 7 For every θo,
∂G(t˜E ,θo)
∂θo
< 0.
Proof : For −1 < θo < 0, ∂μ2∂θo =
σ21(tA−μ1)
σ21+σ
2 > 0 and
∂σ2
∂θo
= − σ31θo√
σ21+σ
2
√
(1−θ2o)σ21+σ2
> 0
for tA > μ1.
Also, ∂E[Π2B(μ2,σ2|tA)]
∂μ2
= 4b[(2 − e)(A − c) + 2bμ2 − ebtA] > 0 and ∂E[Π2B(μ2,σ2|tA)]∂σ2 =
8b2σ2
(e2−4)2 > 0.
Therefore,
∂ΠU2B
∂θo
=
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂θo
=
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂μ2
∂μ2
∂θo
+
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂σ2
∂σ2
∂θo
> 0. Also, ∂G(tA,θo)
∂θo
=
∂ΠE2B(tA)
∂θo
−
∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂θo
= −∂ΠU2B(tA)
∂θo
< 0 for −1 < θo < 0. For a given tA, G(tA, θo) is quadratic in θo.
To see that, note that ΠE2B(tA) does not depend on θo while
ΠU2B(tA) =
1
(e2−4)2{[(2−e)(A−c)−ebtA]2+2[(2−e)(A−c)−ebtA](2bμB)+4b2(μ2B+
σ2B)} with μB being linear in θo and σ2B being quadratic in θo.
We proceed by the method of proof by contradiction. Assume there are t˜E and
θ˜o > 0 such that G(t˜E, θ˜o) = 0 and
∂G(t˜E ,θo)
∂θo
∣∣∣
θo=θ˜o
> 0. Note that for a fixed t˜E,
G(t˜E, θo) is either concave or convex in θo.
If G(t˜E, θo) is concave, then since
∂G(t˜E ,θo)
∂θo
< 0 for −1 < θo < 0, ∂G(t˜E ,θo)∂θo < 0 also
for 0 < θo < 1 and therefore
∂G(t˜E ,θo)
∂θo
∣∣∣
θo=θ˜o
> 0 cannot be true.
If G(t˜E, θo) is convex, then it has two roots at θ˜o and 1. Therefore, in a neigh-
borhood near θ˜o, G(t˜E, θo) changes sign, from positive to negative and therefore,
∂G(t˜E ,θo)
∂θo
∣∣∣
θo=θ˜o
< 0. Since we cannot have t˜E and θ˜o such that G(t˜E, θ˜o) = 0 and
∂G(t˜E ,θo)
∂θo
∣∣∣
θo=θ˜o
> 0, we conclude that ∂G(t˜E ,θo)
∂θo
< 0 for every θo ∈ (−1, 1).
Proposition 2 The threshold t˜E increases in θo.
Proof : Applying the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) at the threshold t˜E we get
: dt˜E(θo)
dθo
= −
∂G(t˜E,θo)
∂θo
∂G(t˜E,θo)
∂tA
. From Lemma 5 we know that ∂G(t˜E ,θo)
∂tA
> 0 and from Lemma
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7 we get ∂G(t˜E ,θo)
∂θo
< 0. Therefore dt˜E(θo)
dθo
> 0. Intuitively, a higher θo makes Π
U
2B(tA)
to increase faster in tA (or decrease slower when it is decreasing) and therefore the
threshold in Figure 16 (Figure 17) shifts to higher values.
Lemma 8 The profit functions ΠE2B(tA) are Π
U
2B(tA) are decreasing in e.
Proof : Consider the generic profit function for the follower’s second-period profits
(e.g., the function valid for both scientific domains) Π2B ( tB | tA) = 1(e2−4)2 [(2−e)(A−
c)−ebtA+2btB]2 and note that dΠ2B (e)de = −2 [(2−e)(A−c)−ebtA+2btB ][(e
2−4)2(A−c)−4ebtB+btAe2+4btA]
(e2−4)3
< 0. Since, the distribution from which tB is drawn does not depend on e, both
ΠE2B(tA) are Π
U
2B(tA) are decreasing in e.
Proposition 3 The threshold t˜E increases in e
Proof :
Applying the IFT : dt˜E(e)
de
= −
∂G(t˜E,e)
∂e
∂G(t˜E,e)
∂tA
. According to proposition 1,∂G(t˜E ,e)
∂tA
> 0.
We will also prove that ∂G(t˜E ,e)
∂e
< 0 and therefore dt˜E(e)
de
> 0. First we will show that
∂G(tA,e)
∂e
< 0 when e→ 0+.
∂2G(tA,e)
∂e∂tA
∣∣∣
e→0+
=
lime→0+ 1(e2−4)3{ σ
2
1
σ21+σ
2 [(3e
2 − 8e+ 4)(A− c)(1 + 4btA + 3be2tA)(1− θo)− 8eb(μ′1 −
θoμ2)] + 4b
2(4+ 3e2)(μ′1−μ2)} = − 164 [4(A− c)(1+ 4btA)(1− θo)+ 16b2(μ′1−μ2)] < 0.
So, ∂
2G(tA,e)
∂e∂tA
∣∣∣
e→0+
< 0 and ∂G(tA,e)
∂e
is decreasing in tA when e → 0+. Also,
∂G(tA,e)
∂e
∣∣∣
tA=μ1
< 0.
Thus, when e→ 0+, for tA > μ1, ∂G(tA,e)∂e
∣∣∣
tA
< ∂G(tA,e)
∂e
∣∣∣
tA=μ1
< 0.
We can rewrite G(tA, e) as G(tA, e) =
1
(σ21+σ
2)3(e2−4)2 (B1(tA)e + B2(tA)) (1)
with G′(tA, e) = 1(σ21+σ2)3(e2−4)4 [B1(tA)(e
2 − 4)2 − 4e(e2 − 4)(B1(tA)e + B2(tA))]
so that when G′(tA, e→ 0+) = 116(σ21+σ2)3B1(tA)
We proved before that G′(tA, e → 0+) < 0, and therefore from (1), B1(tA) < 0
(2).
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Thus, from (1) and (2) lime→2− G(tA, e) = −∞.
Assume that there is t˜E and eo such that G(t˜E, eo) = 0 and
∂G(t˜E ,e)
∂e
∣∣∣
e=eo
> 0.
Since, lime→2− G(tA, e) = −∞, there must be e′o ∈ (eo, 2) such that G(t˜E, e′o) = 0.
This, however, is impossible since according to (1) G(tA, e) has at most one real
root.
Therefore, ∂G(t˜E ,e)
∂e
∣∣∣
e=eo
< 0 at every threshold such that G(t˜E, eo) = 0.
Thus, ∂G(t˜E ,e)
∂e
< 0, and dt˜E(e)
de
> 0.
Proposition 4 The threshold t˜E increases in σ.
Proof : Applying the IFT at the threshold value we get : dt˜E(σ)
dσ
= −
∂G(t˜E,σ)
∂σ
∂G(t˜E,σ)
∂tA
According to proposition 1,∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂tA
> 0. We will also prove that ∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
< 0 and
therefore dt˜E(σ)
dσ
> 0.
We can rewrite ∂G(tA,σ)
∂σ
as follows: ∂G(tA,σ)
∂σ
=
8bσ21σ
(σ21+σ
2)3(e2−4)2 (Γ1(tA)σ
2 + Γ2(tA))
(3)
We will prove that ∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
< 0 by the method of contradiction.
Assume there are t˜E and σo such that G(t˜E, σo) = 0 and
∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
∣∣∣
σ=σo
> 0.
For the latter to be true, and given (3), the are three possible cases:
CASE I: Γ1(t˜E) > 0 and Γ2(t˜E) > 0
Under this case, however, ∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
> 0 for every σ which is not possible given that
limσ→∞G(tA, σ) = 0. To see why the latter is true, note that for σ → ∞, μ′1 = μ2
and σ′1 = σ2, and therefore G(tA, σ) = 0.
CASE II: Γ1(t˜E) > 0 and Γ2(t˜E) < 0
Note that ∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
∣∣∣
σ=σo
> 0 and since limσ→∞G(t˜E, σ) = 0 there must be at least
one σ′o > σo such that
∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
∣∣∣
σ=σ′o
= 0 otherwise G(tA, σ) would be increasing in σ.
Also, from (3) note that ∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
∣∣∣
σ→0+
< 0 since Γ2(t˜E) < 0. Since,
∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
∣∣∣
σ=σo
> 0
there must be at least one σ′′o with 0 < σ
′′
o < σo such that
∂G(t˜E ,σo)
∂σ
∣∣∣
σ=σ′′o
= 0. We
showed that if there were t˜E and σo such that G(t˜E, σo) = 0 and
∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
∣∣∣
σ=σo
> 0,
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then ∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
would have at least two positive roots. The latter though, is impos-
sible according to (3). Therefore, ∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
∣∣∣
σ=σo
< 0 at every threshold such that
G(t˜E, σo) = 0.
CASE III: Γ1(t˜E) < 0 and Γ2(t˜E) > 0.
Integrating (3), we get that G(t˜E, σ) =
8bσ21
(e2−4)2 [−12 Γ1(t˜E)(σ21+σ2)−
1
4
−σ21Γ1(t˜E)+Γ2(t˜E)
(σ21+σ
2)2
+co] =
=
8bσ21
(e2−4)2 [−14 σ
2
1Γ1(t˜E)+Γ2(t˜E)+2σ
2Γ1(t˜E)−4coσ41−8coσ21σ2−4coσ4
(σ21+σ
2)2
]. However, from the full ex-
pression of G(t˜E, σ) (omitted for brevity) we see that there is no σ
4 term, thus, co = 0,
and G(t˜E, σ) =
8bσ21
(e2−4)2 [−14 (σ
2
1+2σ
2)Γ1(t˜E)+Γ2(t˜E)
(σ21+σ
2)2
]. The only positive root of G(t˜E, σ) is
σ∗ = −1
2
√
−2Γ1(t˜E)[σ21Γ1(t˜E)+Γ2(t˜E)]
Γ1(t˜E)
. If σ21Γ1(t˜E) + Γ2(t˜E) < 0 then G(t˜E, σ) has no
positive root. This is impossible since we assumed that are t˜E and σo such that
G(t˜E, σo) = 0. If σ
2
1Γ1(t˜E) + Γ2(t˜E) > 0 then σ
∗ is the only positive root and
since G(t˜E, σ) is increasing-decreasing for σ > σ
∗, the unique root of ∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
has
to be greater than σ∗. Let , σ∗∗ be the root of ∂G(tA,σ)
∂σ
, then σ∗∗ = −
√
−Γ1(t˜E)Γ2(t˜E)
Γ1(t˜E)
.
We need σ∗∗ > σ∗ , or equivalently, −
√
−Γ1(t˜E)Γ2(t˜E)
Γ1(t˜E)
> −1
2
√
−2Γ1(t˜E)[σ21Γ1(t˜E)+Γ2(t˜E)]
Γ1(t˜E)
, or
2Γ1(t˜E)Γ2(t˜E) > −Γ1(t˜E)[σ21Γ1(t˜E)+Γ2(t˜E)] which is impossible since Γ1(t˜E)Γ2(t˜E) <
0 and −Γ1(t˜E)[σ21Γ1(t˜E) + Γ2(t˜E)] > 0. Thus the case Γ1(t˜E) < 0 and Γ2(t˜E) > 0 is
not possible.
Since none of the cases I,II, and III is possible, there cannot be t˜E and σo such
that G(t˜E, σo) = 0 and
∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
∣∣∣
σ=σo
> 0. Thus, ∂G(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
∣∣∣
σ=σo
< 0.
Proposition 5 When θo < 0, there are tσ and tσ such that for tσ < tA < tσ the
follower’s second-period expected profits increase in σ and decrease elsewhere. When
θo > 0, there is tσ such that for tA < tσ the follower’s second-period expected profits
increase in σ while for tA > tσ they decrease in σ.
Proof:
First consider the case where tA < t˜E and note that
∂ΠU2B(tA,σ)
∂σ
∣∣∣
tA=μ1
=
8b2σσ41θ
2
o
(e2−4)2(σ21+σ2)2 > 0.
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∂2ΠU2B(tA,σ)
∂σ∂tA
= − 8θobσσ21
(e2−4)2(σ21+σ2)3{σ
2[(2−e)(A−c)−2ebtA+(2−e)bμ1]+σ21[(2−e)(A−
c) + 2(2θo− e)btA + (2+ e− 4θo)bμ1]}. For θo < 0, ∂
2ΠU2B(tA,σ)
∂σ∂tA
> 0,
∂ΠU2B(tA,σ)
∂σ
increases
in tA and therefore there will be a unique threshold (tσ < μ1) below which it will
become negative. On the contrary, for θo > 0,
∂2ΠU2B(tA,σ)
∂σ∂tA
< 0,
∂ΠU2B(tA,σ)
∂σ
decreases in
tA and therefore there will be a unique threshold (μ1 < tσ) above which it will become
negative. When tA > t˜E, and the follower invests in the explored domain
∂ΠE2B(tA,σ)
∂σ
is decreasing in tA since
∂2ΠE2B(tA,σ)
∂σ∂tA
=
−8b2σσ21
(e2−4)2(σ21+σ2)3{σ
2[(2− e)(A− c)+2ebtA− (2+ e)bμ1]+σ21[(2− e)(A−
c) + 2(e− 2)btA + (2− e)bμ1]} < 0
For θo < 0 and for a fixed t˜E,
∂ΠE2B(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
=
∂ΠU2B(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
> 0. But since
∂ΠE2B(tA,σ)
∂σ
is
decreasing in tA there will be unique threshold (tσ > μ1) below which it will become
negative. For θo > 0 and t˜E < tσ,
∂ΠE2B(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
=
∂ΠU2B(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
> 0, and since
∂ΠE2B(tA,σ)
∂σ
is
decreasing in tA there will be unique threshold (tσ > μ1) below which it will become
negative. For θo > 0 and t˜E > tσ,
∂ΠE2B(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
=
∂ΠU2B(t˜E ,σ)
∂σ
< 0, and since
∂ΠE2B(tA,σ)
∂σ
is
decreasing in tA,
∂ΠE2B(tA,σ)
∂σ
< 0 for tA > t˜E. In the latter case, tσ = t˜E.
Proposition 6 The potential of a rival firm investing in technology improvements
reduces the incentives of the leader to invest in a scientific domain. In particular,
the set of search cost values for which the leader initiates investment becomes nar-
rower: KL ≤ KML . Yet, competition intensity (e) has a non-monotonic impact on the
threshold KL.
Proof: In a duopoly setting, KL = E[Π1A]+E[Π2A]. Note here that E[Π2A] depends
on the follower’s strategy while E[Π1A] does not. Also, K
M
L = 2E[Π1A] and therefore,
KL − KML = E[Π2A] − E[Π1A] ≤ 0. The latter inequality is true since the leader’s
second-period profits are decreasing in tB : Π2A( tB | tA) = 1(e2−4)2 [(2 − e)(A − c) +
2btA − ebtB]2 and the first-period profits E[Π1A] correspond to tB = 0.
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Appendix B
Proposition 1 : The value function Vt(pt) is non-decreasing in pt.
Proof: For t = 1 , V1(p1) = max{p1V0 − c, 0} which is apparently non-decreasing
in p1. Let p
s
t denote the updated belief upon arrival of a successful indication (s)
starting with an initial belief pt+1. Then p
s
t
.
= pt(pt+1|ξt = s) = qpt+1qpt+1+(1−q)(1−pt+1) .
Similarly, we can define pft as the updated belief upon arrival of an indication for
failure (f). Then pft
.
= p1(pt+1|ξt = f) = (1−q)pt+1(1−q)pt+1+q(1−pt+1 ) .
We will proceed by induction. For t = 2, V2(p2) = max{V1(ps1)P (ξ1 = s) +
V1(p
f
1)P (ξ1 = f)− c, 0}.
Taking the first derivative, ∂V2(p2)
∂p2
= ∂P (ξ1=s)
∂p2
V1(p
s
1)
P (ξ1 = s)
∂V1(ps1)
∂p2
+ ∂P (ξ1=f)
∂p2
V1(p
f
1) + P (ξ1 = f)
∂V1(p
f
1 )
∂p2
=(2q − 1)V1(ps1) + P (ξ1 =
s)
∂V1(ps1)
∂(ps1)
∂(ps1)
∂p2
+ (1− 2q)V1(pf1) + P (ξ1 = f)∂V1(p
f
1 )
∂(pf1 )
∂(pf1 )
∂p2
which through some algebraic manipulation results in ∂V2(p2,q)
∂p2
= (2q− 1)[V1(ps1)−
V1(p
f
1)] +
q(1−q)
P (ξ1=s)
∂V1(ps1)
∂(ps1)
+ q(1−q)
P (ξ1=f)
∂V1(p
f
1 )
∂(pf1 )
All three terms are non-negative for q > 1
2
and V2(p2) is non-decreasing in p2.
Assume that Vt(pt) = max{Vt(pst−1)P (ξt−1 = s) + Vt(pft−1)P (ξt−1 = f)− c, 0} is non-
decreasing in pt. We will show that Vt+1(pt+1) = max{Vt(pst)P (ξt = s)+Vt(pft )P (ξt =
f)− c, 0} is also non-decreasing in pt+1.
∂Vt+1 (pt+1 ,q)
∂pt+1
= ∂P (ξt=s)
∂pt+1
Vt(p
s
t)+P (ξt = s)
∂Vt(pst )
∂pt+1
+
∂P (ξt=f)
∂pt+1
Vt(p
f
t )+P (ξt = f)
∂Vt(p
f
t )
∂pt+1
=.
But = (2q− 1)[Vt(pst)− Vt(pft )] + q(1−q)P (ξt=s)
∂Vt(pst )
∂(pst )
+ q(1−q)
P (ξt=f)
∂Vt(p
f
t )
∂(pft )
> 0 since Vt(pt) is non-
decreasing in pt.
Hence, the function Vt(pt) non-decreasing in pt.
Region-Based Analysis
We proceed through an approach that we tag ”region-based analysis”. Essentially,
for each stage t, we define two values pt and pt such that: for pt ≤ pt you decide to
terminate and for pt ≥ pt you continue, regardless of the outcome of the next test.
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Mathematically, pt is defined as the highest belief such that even under a successful
test in the next stage you would be indifferent between terminating or continuing
the project (Vt−1(pst−1) = 0 where p
s
t−1 =
qpt
qpt+(1−q)(1−pt)). Similarly, pt is defined as
the lowest belief such that even if the next test indicates a failure, you would be
indifferent between continuing and terminating the project.(Vt−1(p
f
t−1) = 0 where
pft−1 =
(1−q)pt
(1−q)pt+q(1−pt)). Our region based approach essentially means that to derive
the unique threshold (Proposition 1) for each stage it is sufficient to focus on the
middle region in which pt ≤ pt ≤ pt since for pt < pt you always terminate, while for
pt > pt you always continue to the next stage.
Lemma 1: For pt ≤ pt ≤ pt, Vt(pt) = max{Vt−1(pst−1)P (ξt = s)− c, 0}
Proof: It is sufficient to prove that Vt−1(p
f
t−1) = 0. Since, pt ≤ pt , pft−1 =
(1−q)pt
(1−q)pt+q(1−pt ) ≤
(1−q)pt
(1−q)pt+q(1−pt) = p
f
t−1 and from Proposition 1, we get Vt−1(p
f
t−1) ≤
Vt−1(p
f
t−1) = 0. Therefore, Vt−1(p
f
t−1) = 0 for pt ≤ pt.
Lemma 2: The value function Vt(pt) of every threshold region (pt ≤ pt ≤ pt)
can be written as follows: Vt(pt) = At,qpt − Ct,q where the functions At,q and Ct,q
are defined by the following recursive relationships: At+1,q = qAt,q + (1− 2q)Ct,q and
Ct+1,q = (1− q)Ct,q + c
Proof : We proceed by induction. First, we prove that it holds for t = 2. In
particular, V2(p2) = P (ξ2 = s)V1(p1|ξ1 = s)− c = (since V1(p1|ξ1 = f) = 0)
=[qp2 + (1− q)(1− p2)][ qp2qp2+(1−q)(1−p2)V0 − c]− c = [qV0 + (1− 2q)c]p2 − (2− q)c
We assume that it holds for t = k so that : Vk(pk) = Ak,qpk − Ck,q.
We will prove that it holds for t = k + 1.
Vk+1(pk+1) = P (ξk = s)Vk(pk|ξk = s)− c =
= [qpk+1 + (1− q)(1− pk+1)][Ak,q qpk+1qpk+1+(1−q)(1−pk+1) − Ck,q]− c
= qAk,qpk+1 − [qpk+1 + (1− q)(1− pk+1)]Ck,q − c =
= [qAk,q + (1− 2q)Ck,q]pk+1 − (1− q)Ck,q − c = Ak+1,qpk+1 − Ck+1,q
Therefore, Vt(pt) = At,qpt − Ct,q ∀ t = 1, 2, ..., N
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Proposition 2: The optimal threshold values p˜t,q are increasing in t
Proof: From Lemma 2 we know that p˜t,q =
Ct,q
At,q
and p˜t+1,q =
Ct+1,q
At+1,q
= (1−q)Ct,q+c
qAt,q+(1−2q)Ct,q
We need to show that p˜t+1,q > p˜t,q, or equivalently,
(1−q)Ct,q+c
qAt,q+(1−2q)Ct,q >
Ct,q
At,q
, or,
(1− 2q)[At,q − Ct,q]Ct,q + cAt,q > 0.
Since Ct,q ≥ c, it is sufficient to show that (1 − 2q)[At,q − Ct,q] + At,q > 0, or,
At,q
Ct,q
> 1−2q
2(1−q) . But
At,q
Ct,q
> 1 (otherwise p˜t,q > 1 and the project would have been
terminated at the previous stage) and 1−2q
2(1−q) < 1 since 1− 2q < 2(1− q). Therefore,
At,q
Ct,q
> 1−2q
2(1−q) and p˜t+1,q > p˜t,q.
Lemma 3: The function Ct(q) is decreasing in q.
Proof: We will prove it by induction. For t = 2 : C ′2(q) = −c < 0. Since
Ct+1,q = (1− q)Ct,q + c, C ′t+1,q = (1− q)C ′t,q −Ct,q. Assuming that it holds for t = k,
that is, C ′k,q < 0. It is easy to see that it also holds for t = k+1. So Ct,q is decreasing
in q ∀ t = 1, 2, ..., N
Proposition 3: The threshold values p˜t,q are decreasing in q.
Proof : The optimal threshold will satisfy the equation At,qp˜t,q = Ct,q.
Differentiating with respect to q : At,qp˜
′
t,q + A
′
t,qp˜t,q = C
′
t,q ⇔ p˜t,q = C
′
t,q−At,q p˜′t,q
A′t,q
since A′t,q = 0 (if there is q0 such that A′t,q0 = 0, then At,q0) p˜′t,q0 = C ′t,q0 < 0 and
p˜′t,q0 < 0 since At,q0 > 0). Also, 0 ≤ p˜t,q ≤ 1 ⇔ 0 ≤ C ′t,q − At,qp˜′t,q.However C ′t,q < 0
(Lemma 3) and At,q > 0, so p˜
′
t,q < 0.
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Appendix C
Proof of Lemma 1. The entrant’s optimization problem given the OEM’s choice of
q2 is
Maxqr,sΠe(qr, s|q2)= [δ(1− qr − q2)− h− cr] qr − s(
s
γ
− p1 − s
1− γ )
s.t. 0 ≤ qr ≤ s
γ
− p1 − s
1− γ . (1)
The Lagrangian for the entrant’s problem is L(qr, s, λ1, λ2) = [δ(1− qr − q2)− h− cr] qr−
s( s
γ
− p1−s
1−γ ) + λ1(
s
γ
− p1−s
1−γ − qr) + μ1qr.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality are ∂L
∂qr
= 0, ∂L
∂s
= 0, λ1(
s
γ
− p1−s
1−γ −qr) =
0 and μ1qr = 0, with 0 ≤ qr ≤ sγ − p1−s1−γ , λ1 ≥ 0, μ1 ≥ 0.
Assume s
γ
− p1−s
1−γ − qr > 0. Then, at optimality, λ1 = 0. Solving ∂L∂s = 0, we get
s∗ = γp1
2
, which gives s
∗
γ
− p1−s∗
1−γ = − p12(1−γ) < 0, which violates the original condition
s
γ
− p1−s
1−γ − qr > 0.
Since this case cannot meet the KT conditions, we hereafter assume that the right
constraint in (1) is binding. Intuitively, the entrant would not be willing to acquire
more used units than the quantity she would sell in the secondary market. Rewriting
this equality, we obtain s∗(qr) = γ(1− γ)qr + γp1, where we suppress dependence on
p1 determined in period 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. Based on Lemma 1 we can reduce the entrant’s problem to a
single decision variable optimization problem in qr:
MaxqrΠe= [pr − s∗(qr)− cr] qr = [pr − γ(1− γ)qr − γp1 − cr] qr s.t. qr ≥ 0. (2)
We also know the profit function of the OEM
Maxq2Π2(q2|qr) = (p2− c)q2 +hqr = (α− αq2 − δqr − c) q2 +hqr s.t. q2 ≥ 0. (3)
Here, Πe and Π2 are concave in qr and q2, respectively. By solving the first-order
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conditions simultaneously, we can obtain the following Nash equilibrium:
q∗2(p1, h) =
2(δ + γ − γ2)(α− c)− δ2 + δh + δγp1 + δcr
4γα(1− γ) + δ(4α− δ) (4)
q∗r(p1, h) =
α(δ − 2cr − 2h− 2γp1) + δc
4γα(1− γ) + δ(4α− δ) . (5)
Substituting q∗r from (5) into the expression derived in Lemma 1 gives
s∗(p1, h) =
γ[(2α γ(1− γ)p1 + δ (4α− δ)p1 − 2α(1− γ)(h− cr) + δ(1− γ)c]
4γα(1− γ) + δ(4α− δ) . (6)
Recall that the quantity of new units sold in the first period by the OEM can be
expressed as
q1 = 1− p1 − s
1− γ , or, p1 = (1− γ)(1− q1) + s. (7)
Substituting p1 from (7) into (6), we obtain the equilibrium price s
∗ that the entrant
pays the first-period consumers to collect used products as a function of q1 and h:
s∗(q1, h) = γ
[2γα(γ − 1) + δ(δ − 4α)]q1 + [5δ + 2γ(1− γ)− 2(h + cr)]α + δc− δ2
2γα(2− γ) + δ(4α− δ) .
(8)
Moreover, from (6) and (7) we can rewrite (4) and (5) in terms of q1 and h:
q∗2(q1, h) =
δh− γδq1 − δ(δ − γ) + δcr − (α− c)[γ(γ − 2)− 2δ]
2γα(2− γ) + δ(4α− δ) (9)
q∗r(q1, h) =
2α(γq1 − h− γ − cr) + δ(α + c)
2γα(2− γ) + δ(4α− δ) . (10)
This Nash equilibrium is valid as long as the right-hand sides of (9) and (10) are
non-negative, respectively, which can be written as h − γq1 ≥ A and h − γq1 ≤ B,
where A
.
= (δ − γ)− cr + (α−c)γ(γ−2)δ − 2(α− c) and B
.
= 1
2α
δ(α + c)− (γ + cr).
Proof of Proposition 1. In period 1, the OEM chooses q1 ≥ 0 and h ≥ 0 so as to
maximize the sum of first- and second-period profits. The OEM’s second-period profit
can be obtained using (9 - 10) as long as q1 and h satisfy h−γq1 ≥ A and h−γq1 ≤ B.
For completeness, we need to characterize the OEM’s second-period profit outside this
range, or argue that the optimal solution will satisfy the two conditions. For a given
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q1, it is in fact sufficient to restrict the domain of h to values yielding a non-negative
quantity in (10), h− γq1 ≤ B, since once the secondary market has been eliminated,
increasing h does not improve the OEM’s profits. The same need not be true however
for (9); even when the OEM abstains from the primary market in the second period,
he can improve his profits by decreasing h and increasing first-period resale value,
and we cannot use the expressions in Lemma 2 to calculate second-period profits in
this range (h− γq1 < A). We proceed by enforcing h− γq1 ≤ B, but determining the
optimal OEM strategy for those values of q1 and h yielding h − γq1 ≥ A (Case A)
and h− γq1 ≤ A (Case B), separately, and then combining the results.
Case A (h− γq1 ≥ A). The OEM’s optimization problem is
Maxq1,h Π(q1, h) = Π1(q1, h)+ Π
∗
2(q1, h)
s.t. A ≤ h− γq1 ≤ B
q1 ≥ 0, h ≥ 0,
where Π1(q1, h) = (p1(q1, h)−c)q1 denotes the profit from the sales of new products in
the first period and Π∗2(q1, h) is calculated using (9) and (10). The determinant of the
Hessian of the objective function Π(q1, h) is
4α(8δα−3δ2+8γα(1−γ)
[2γα(γ−2)+δ(δ−4α)]2 > 0 with
∂2Π(q1,h)
∂q21
< 0.
Thus, the Hessian is negative definite and the profit function is concave in (q1, h).
Define the Lagrangian L(q1, h, λ1, λ2) =Π(q1, h)+λ1(h−γq1−A)+λ2(B−h+γq1)+μ1h.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality are:
∂L
∂q1
= 0 (11)
∂L
∂h
= 0 (12)
λ1(h− γq1 − A) = 0 (13)
λ2(B − h + γq1) = 0 (14)
μ1h = 0 (15)
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and λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, μ1 ≥ 0. The constraint q1 ≥ 0 will be checked separately. Note
that λ1λ2 = 0, since otherwise both constraints (13) and (14) would be binding,
which is not possible.
Case A.I : λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0, μ1 = 0.
λ2 = 0 implies B − h∗ + γq∗1 = 0. Solving the KT conditions, we obtain h∗ =
1
2
[δ(1 + c
α
) − γ(1 + c)] − cr, q∗1 = 12 (1 − c) > 0, q∗2 = 12 (1 − cα) > 0 and λ2 =
2 c(δ−αγ)−αcr
2 γα(γ−2)+δ(δ−4α) with corresponding profit
(1−c)2
2
. Case I is valid for λ2 > 0 and
h∗ ≥ 0, or, c(δ−αγ)
α
< cr ≤ 12 [δ(1+ cα)− γ(1+ c)] and represents the case of having no
refurbished products in the second period due to the high remanufacturing cost and
the positive relicensing fee.
Case A.II : λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0, μ1 = 0.
λ2 = 0 implies B − h∗ + γq∗1 = 0. Moreover, μ1 = 0 implies h∗ = 0. Solving the
KT conditions, we obtain q∗1 =
1
2
2(αγ+cr)− δ(α+c)
αγ
and μ1 =
(1+c)αγ−δ(α+c)+2αcr
αγ2
.
We need μ1 > 0, which is true for cr > cr,μ1
.
= 1
2
[δ(1 + c
α
) − γ(1 + c)]. We also
need λ2 > 0. From the expression for λ2 (omitted for brevity), we have
∂λ2
∂cr
=
2(δ2−4αδ+3αγ2−4αγ)
(2αγ2−4αγ−4αδ+δ2)γ2 > 0, so λ2 is increasing in cr. Therefore it is sufficient to show
that λ2(cr = cr,μ1) > 0. But λ2(cr = cr,μ1) = − (αγ−δ)c+(δ−γ)α(2αγ2−4αγ−4αδ+δ2) > 0, so λ2 > 0.
Therefore, this case is valid for cr >
1
2
[δ(1+ c
α
)−γ(1+c)] and represents the case of
having no refurbished products in the second period due to the high remanufacturing
cost even if the OEM sets the relicensing fee to zero. This condition also ensures that
q∗1 > 0.
Case A.III : λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0, μ1 = 0.
λ1 = 0 implies h∗ − γq∗1 = A. Solving the KT conditions, we obtain q∗1 =
1
2
(1−c)(δ+2αγ)
δ
> 0, h∗ = 1
2
[4γ(1− γ)+δ (4−γ]c+4γα(γ−1)+2 δ(δ−cr)−δ(4α+γ)
δ
, and
λ1 =
[δ (δ−8α+2αγ)+8γα(γ−1)]c+δ(8α2−3δα+2αcr)+8γ(1−γ)α2
δ(2αγ2−4αγ−4αδ+δ2) . Case III is valid for λ1 > 0
and h∗ ≥ 0 or, c ≥ max{cλ1 , ch∗}, where cλ1 = α[δ(8α−3δ+2cr)+8γα(1−γ)]δ (8α−δ−2γα)+8αγ(1−γ) and ch∗ =
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4αγ(γ−1)+2 δ(δ−cr)−δ(4α+γ)
4 γ(γ−1)+δ (γ−4] are the values of c that satisfy λ1(c) = 0 and h
∗(c) = 0, re-
spectively. Let c
.
= cλ1−ch∗ . Note that dcdα = δ
3[(8γ2−8γ−8δ+2δγ)cr−8γ2δ+8γδ+8δ2−3δ2γ
(8αγ2−8αγ−8αδ+2δγα+δ2)2(−2γ2+4 γ+4 δ−δ2) > 0
because the denominator is always positive, while the numerator is decreasing in cr
and is positive for cr = δ−γ > (δ−αγ)α > c(δ−αγ)α . Thus dcdα > 0 for cr < δ−γ. Also
c(α = 1) = − 2δ(4γ2−4γ+δ γ−4 δ+δ2)(δ−γ−cr)
(8 γ2−8 γ+2δ γ−8 δ+δ2)(4 γ2−4 γ−4 δ+δγ) > 0 because c(δ − γ) > cr (for if we
assume that c(δ − γ) ≤ cr, λ1 < 0 and this case becomes impossible) and c < 1.
Therefore, max{cλ1 , ch∗} = cλ1 and h∗ > 0.
Case III represents the case of having no new products in the second period due
to the high unit production cost, but charging a positive relicensing fee, and is valid
for c > α[δ(8α−3δ+2cr)+8γα(1−γ)]
δ (8α−δ−2γα)+8αγ(1−γ) .
Case A.IV : λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0, μ1 = 0.
λ1 = 0 implies h∗ − γq∗1 = A. Case IV is valid for λ1 > 0, μ1 > 0 and q∗r > 0. The
latter is positive when cr < δ − 12γ(1 + α). However, μ1 is linearly decreasing in c,
λ1 is linearly increasing in c, and cμ1 < cλ1because λ1(cμ1) < 0. To prove the latter
note that
∂λ1(cμ1)
∂cr
= δ (−8α+2δ+2γα)−8αγ(1−γ)
δ(4 γ2−4 γ−4 δ+δγ) > 0 and also that for cr = δ− 12γ(1+α),
λ1(cμ1) =
αγ(1−α)
δ
≤ 0 since α ≥ 1. Therefore, λ1 and μ1 can never be positive at the
same time, and this case is impossible.
Case A.V : λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0, μ1 = 0. Solving the KT conditions we obtain
h∗ = 1
2
(−8δγ2+8δ2+8γ3−8γ2−8γcr+8γ2cr−8δcr)α2+(3γδ2−3δ3+γδ2c+4crδ2)α−δ3c
α[8 γ(1−γ)α+8δα−3δ2] ,
q∗1 =
1
2
(8γ+4cγ2−8γ2−8δc−4γcr−8cγ+8δ2)α−3δ2(1+c)+4γδc
8 γ(1−γ)α+8δα−3δ2 ,
q∗2 =
1
2
(8γ2−8γ−8δ)α2+(8cγ+3δ2−8cγ2−2δcr−2γδc+8δc)α−δ2c
α[8 γ(γ−1)α+3 δ2−8δα] , and q
∗
r =
2(αcr−c(δ−αγ))
8 γ(γ−1)α+3 δ2−8δα .
We can see that q∗2 ≥ 0 for c ≤ cq∗2 = α[δ(8α−3δ+2cr)+8γα(1−γ)]δ (8α−δ−2γα)+8αγ(1−γ) , while q∗r ≥ 0 for
cr ≤ c(δ−αγ)α .
Moreover, h∗ ≥ 0 for c ≤ ch∗ .= − (3γδ2−8δαγ2+8δ2α+8γ3α−8γ2α−8crδα−3δ3−8crγα+8crγ2α+4crδ2)αδ2(−δ+γα) .
But ch∗ − cq∗2 > 0 and therefore this case is valid for c ≤ α[δ(8α−3δ+2cr)+8γα(1−γ)]δ (8α−δ−2γα)+8αγ(1−γ) .
Case V represents the case where both new and refurbished products exist in the
second period with a positive relicensing fee.
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Case A.VI : λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0, μ1 = 0.
Here q∗2 > 0 and h
∗ = 0. This case was also found to be impossible because
q∗2μ1 < 0. Another of way of seeing this is to note that both q
∗
2 and h
∗ decrease in c,
but as c increases, it is always q∗2 that becomes zero first (ch∗ > cq∗2 ). Therefore the
case of q∗2 > 0 and h
∗ = 0 is not possible.
Case B (h− γq1 ≤ A). Solving for the Nash equilibrium in the second period under
this condition, we obtain q∗2(q1, h) = 0 and q
∗
r(q1, h) =
γq1−h+δ−γ−cr
2(δ+γ)−γ2 . The OEM’s
optimization problem is:
Maxq1,h Π(q1, h) = Π1(q1, h) + hq
∗
r(q1, h) = (p1(q1, h)− c)q1 + h
γq1 − h+δ − γ − cr
2(δ + γ)− γ2
(16)
s.t. h− γq1 ≤ A (17)
h− γq1 ≤ B (18)
q1 ≥ 0, h ≥ 0.
Note that since A < B, constraint (18) will never be binding at the optimal
solution, and therefore can be eliminated. Solving the constrained maximization
problem, we have the following cases:
Case B.I : For c ≥ α[δ(8α−3δ+2cr)+8γα(1−γ)]
δ (8α−δ−2γα)+8αγ(1−γ) , constraint (17) is non-binding and the
optimal values are q∗1 =
1
4
δ(2+γ)+2γ(1−γ)−γcr−(2γ+2δ−γ2)c
δ+γ−γ2 and h
∗ = 1
2
(δ−γ−cr), yielding
q∗r =
1
4
δ−γc−cr
δ+γ−γ2 . In this parameter range, cr < c(δ−γ), which is in turn less than δ−γ,
so h∗ > 0, q∗r > 0 and q
∗
1 > 0.
Case B.II : For c ≤ α[δ(8α−3δ+2cr)+8γα(1−γ)]
δ (8α−δ−2γα)+8αγ(1−γ) , constraint (17) is binding and the optimal
values are q∗1 =
1
2
(1−c)(δ+2αγ)
δ
> 0, h∗ = 1
2
[4γ(1− γ)+δ (4−γ]c+4γα(γ−1)+2 δ(δ−cr)−δ(4α+γ)
δ
,
yielding q∗r =
α−c
δ
. Note that this case yields the same optimal solution and objective
function value with Case A.III.
We illustrate the structure of the optimal solution subject to the conditions of
Cases A and B in Figure 18, where we use the observation that c ≥ c˜(δ, γ, cr) implies
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c ≥ αcr
δ−αγ , or, cr ≤ c(δ−αγ)α .
Figure 18: Structure of Optimal Solution subject to constraints h − γq1 ≥ A (left
panel) and h− γq1 ≤ A (right panel).
We now compare the optimal constrained solutions of cases A and B to find the
global optimal solution structure.
For c ≥ c˜(δ, γ, cr) .= α[δ(8α−3δ+2cr)+8γα(1−γ)]δ (8α−δ−2γα)+8αγ(1−γ) , Cases A.III and Case B.I need to be
compared to find q∗1 and h
∗ in this parameter range. Since both cases A and B include
the boundary h− γq1 = A, but the optimal solution in case B satisfies h∗− γq∗1 < A,
while that in case A.III satisfies h∗ − γq∗1 = A, we conclude that case B.I gives the
global optimum in this range.
For c < c˜(δ, γ, cr), Case B.II needs to be compared with Cases A.I, A.II and A.V to
find q∗1 and h
∗ in their respective parameter ranges. Since both cases A and B include
the boundary h− γq1 = A, but the optimal solutions in case A satisfy h∗ − γq∗1 > A,
while that in case B.II satisfies h∗ − γq∗1 = A, we conclude that cases A.I, A.II and
A.V give the global optimum in their respective parameter ranges. The structure of
the optimal solution is summarized in the following table.
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Condition Equilibrium Outcome in the Second Period
c > c˜(δ, γ, cr)
.
=
α[δ(8α−3δ+2cr)+8γα(1−γ)]
δ (8α−δ−2γα)+8αγ(1−γ) Only refurbished products
c ≤ c˜(δ, γ, cr) and cr ≤ c(δ−αγ)α Both new and refurbished products
c ≤ c˜(δ, γ, cr) and c(δ−αγ)α < cr ≤ 12 [δ(1 + cα )− γ(1 + c)] Only new products. (q∗r = 0 due to h∗ > 0)
c ≤ c˜(δ, γ, cr) and cr > 12 [δ(1 + cα )− γ(1 + c)] Only new products. (q∗r = 0 even if h∗ = 0)
We now examine the impact of c, cr, and α on h
∗ for the more interesting case where
both new and refurbished products exist in the second period (Case V). The expres-
sion for h∗ is given by h∗ = 1
2
(−8 γ2−8γcr−8δcr+8γ3−8δγ2+8δ2+8γ2cr)α2+(4 δ2cr−3 δ3+3δ2γ+δ2γc)α−δ3c
α(8αδ−3δ2+8α(1−γ)) .
First note that
∂h∗
∂c
= −1
2
δ2(δ−αγ)
α(8αδ−3δ2+8α(1−γ)) < 0 and also that
∂h∗
∂cr
= −2 (2αγ+2αδ−2αγ2−δ2)
(8αδ−3δ2+8α(1−γ)) <
0. We will now show that
∂h∗
∂α
> 0.
∂h∗
∂α
= 1
2
Π(α)
α2(8αδ−3δ2+8α(1−γ))2 where Π(α) =
(−8γδc−8cγ2+8γ2cr−8crγ+8cγ3−8δcr)α2+(16δ2c−16δ2γ2c+16γδc)α2−3δ2c but
∂Π(α)
∂cr
= 8(γ2− γ− δ)α2 < 0 and Π(α, cr = c(δ−αγ)α ) = δc(8αδ−3δ2 +8α(1− γ)) > 0,
thus Π(α) > 0 and
∂h∗
∂α
> 0.
Two-period useful lifetime model.
We assume that a consumer who bought a new product in the first period will
either return the product to get a new one or hold onto it. In other words, a consumer
will not return a used product to get a refurbished one. This assumption is valid in
situations where the willingness-to-pay for a refurbished product is not significantly
higher from the utility offered by a used product, and therefore consumers are not
willing to engage into the reselling process and pay the additional relicensing fee
associated with it. To maintain tractability, we focus on the special case of α = 1
(i.e., no technological improvement) and γ = 0 (no transactional disutility).
Under the above assumptions, the consumer state space is divided into the fol-
lowing segments illustrated in Fig. 19. Consumers who buy a new product in the
first period, resell it, and again buy a new one in the second period, with total utility
UNSN(θ) = θ− p1 + s+ θ− p2. Consumers who buy a new product in the first period
and continue using it in the second period, with total utility UNK(θ) = θ − p1 + δoθ.
Consumers who do not buy in the first period, but buy a new product in the second
period, with total utility UON(θ) = θ− p2. And finally, consumers who do not buy in
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the first period, but buy a refurbished product in the second one, with total utility
UOR(θ) = δθ − pr − h. We focus our analysis on those sets of parameters for which
all four segments exist in equilibrium. Although this analysis does not address the
optimal strategy for the entire range of parameter values, it does capture the effect of
product durability on the OEM’s relicensing policy and it identifies the region where
a secondary market exists.
Figure 19: Consumer state space over the two-period horizon.
Solving for the indifferent consumers we get θ1 =
p2−s
1−δo , θ2 =
p1−p2
δo
, θ3 =
p2−pr−h
1−δ ,
θ4 =
pr+h
δ
, and the corresponding demand for each segment, qnsn = 1−θ1, qnk = θ1−θ2,
qon = θ2 − θ3, qr = θ3 − θ4. Moreover, q1 = qnsn + qnk and q2 = qnsn + qon, while the
number of units returned to the entrant will be qu = 1 − θ1. To find the prices that
correspond to the market sizes q2 and qr we solve the following system:
q2 = qnsn + qon = 1− θ1 + θ2 − θ3
qr = θ3 − θ4,
from which we get
p2 =
(1−qrδ−q2)δo2+(qr δ−s−1+q2+p1)δo−p1
−1−δo+δ2o
pr = − (−δ+q2δ+qrδ+h)δ2o+[δ(1+s−p1−q2−qr)−h]δo+δ(δqr−qr+p1)−h−1−δ+δ2 .
As in the baseline model, in the second-period the OEM sets the quantity q2, while the
entrant sets the quantity qr and the resale price s offered to first-period consumers.
The OEM’s second-period objective given the entrant’s choice of qr is
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Maxq2 Π2(q2|qr) = (p2 − c)q2 + hqr s.t. q2 ≥ 0
while the entrant’s objective function is given by
Maxqr,s Πe(qr, s|q2)=(pr − cr)qr − squ
s.t. qr ≤ qu
qr ≥ 0, s ≥ 0.
Let q∗2(q1, h), q
∗
r(q1, h), and s
∗(q1, h) denote the equilibrium of the above game.
Then, the first-period OEM’s problem is:
Maxq1,h Π1(q1, h) + Π2(q
∗
2(q1, h)) s.t. q1 ≥ 0, h ≥ 0.
Lemma 9 At optimality, the entrant has no incentive to collect more units than the
ones he intends to sell in the market. That is, the constraint qr ≤ qu is binding and the
optimal resale price offered by the entrant satisfies s∗(qr) = (2−δ−δo)qr +δ−q1−q2.
Moreover, the equilibrium resale value is decreasing in q1 and h.
Proof of Lemma 9 We will show that for a given q2, the entrant will always set qr
and s such that q∗r = qu(s
∗). Assume that there exist q∗r and s
∗ such that q∗r < qu(s
∗).
The FOC with respect to qr and s give
∂Πe
∂qr
= 0 and∂Πe
∂s
= 0, or equivalently, s∗ =
1
2
(δo − q1 − q2) and q∗r = 12 (q1+q2−2)(δo−1)δ+(h+cr)(δo−2)δ(δ−2+δo) . After substituting s∗, we get
qu(s
∗) = 1
2
(q1+q2−1)δ+(h+cr)+δo−q1−q2
δ−2+δo and the inequality q
∗
r < qu(s
∗) can be rewritten as
1
2
(q1+q2−1)δ+(h+cr)
δ
> 0. However, if qu(s
∗) > 0, then (q1 + q2 − 1)δ + (h + cr) + δo −
q1 − q2 < 0, and since 12 (q1+q2−1)δ+(h+cr)δ > 0, we need δo − q1 − q2 < 0. Recall that
s∗ = 1
2
(δo − q1 − q2), and therefore, that would lead to s∗ < 0 which cannot be true.
Therefore, we cannot have non-binding solutions, and therefore, q∗r = qu(s
∗).
Proof of Proposition 2.
The entrant’s first-period problem is
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Maxq1,h Π1(q1, h) + Π
∗
2(q1, h)
s.t. q1 ≥ 0
h ≥ 0.
Define the Lagrangian L(q1, h, λ1, λ2) =Π(q1, h)+μ1h. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions
for optimality are:
∂L
∂q1
= 0 (19)
∂L
∂h
= 0 (20)
μ1h = 0 (21)
with μ1 ≥ 0.
Case I : μ1 = 0. Solving the KT conditions, we obtain
h∗ = 1
2
(−8δ3o+(−4δ2−8cr+12+6δ)δ2o+(−3δ2c−4δ2cr+δ3c+3δc+3δ2−c−10δ+10cr+2δ3+1)δo−δ2cr+δ3+3cr−3δ
8δ2o+(2δ+3δ
2−11)δo+δ2−3
and q∗or = −12 −4δ
2
o+(4+4δc−4c−4cr−δ)δo+1−c−cr+δc
8δ2o+(2δ+3δ
2−11)δo+δ2−3 . Case I is valid for q
∗
nsn = q
∗
or ≥ 0,
q∗nk ≥ 0, q∗on ≥ 0 and h∗ ≥ 0. The above conditions are satisfied in the area
cIr ≤ cr ≤ c˜′r where cIr = (2−8c−2δ)δ
2
o+(−δ2c−2δc+2δ2+9c−3+3δ)δo+2(1+c)δ−δ2(c−1)−2
1+(2δ+2)δo
and
c˜′r =
(−8δ3o+(6δ+12−4δ2)δ2o+(δ3c+3δc+3δ2−10δ+2δ3−3δ2c+1−c)δo+δ3−3δ)
(4δo+1)(2δo+δ2−3) . This case represents the
setting of having all market segments positive as well as a positive relicensing fee.
To see that h∗ is decreasing in cr and increasing in c, note that ∂h
∗
∂cr
=
−1
2
(4δo+1)(2δo+δ2−3)
8δ2o+(2δ+3δ
2−11)δo+δ2−3 < 0 and
∂h∗
∂c
= 1
2
δo(δ−1)3
8δ2o+(2δ+3δ
2−11)δo+δ2−3 > 0 since 8δ
2
o + (2δ +
3δ2 − 11)δo + δ2 − 3 < 0.
Note that the lower bound cIr corresponds to the cr value such that q
∗
on(cr) = 0.
For lower values of cr, there will exist an even larger secondary market. To see that
this secondary market exists, note that when qon = 0, q2 = qnsn = qor and therefore,
assuming that qor = 0 would mean that neither new nor refurbished products are sold
in the second period. Since qon and qor cannot be simultaneously zero, q
∗
or > 0 for
cr < c
I
r.
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Case II : μ1 = 0. Case II is valid for q∗nsn = q∗or ≥ 0, q∗nk ≥ 0, q∗on ≥ 0 and h∗ = 0. The
above conditions are satisfied in the area c˜′r ≤ cr ≤ c˜r, where c˜′r is defined in Case I and
c˜r =
(−16δ3o+(8δc+36−4δ(1+δ)−8c)δ2o+(−δ+12c+4δ2+2δ2c+δ3−16δc−12+2δ3c)δo+δ3−δ+4(c−1)−6δc+2δ2c
(4δo+1)(4δo−7+δ2+2δ) . This
case represents the setting of having all market segments positive but a relicensing
fee equal to zero.
To summarize, when 0 ≤ cr < c˜′r q∗r > 0 and h∗ > 0, while for c˜′r ≤ cr < c˜r, q∗r > 0
and h∗ = 0.
Proof of Corollary 1.
To show that ∂h
∗
∂δo
< 0, note that ∂h
∗
∂δo
can be written as ∂h
∗
∂δo
= −1
2
Φ1(δ,δo,cr,c)
[Φ2(δ,δo)]2
where
Φ1 and Φ2 are defined as follows: Φ1 .= 3+72δo +3δ+68δ2o−4δ3+2δ2−176δ3o +64δ4o +δ5−δ4−3cr−3c+8δ3cδ2o−
8crδ
2
oδ
2+16crδ
2
oδ−12δoδ−cδ5−48δoδ2−8cδ2o−8crδ2o+32δ3oδ+crδ4−38δ2oδ+6crδ+6δ2oδ3+9cδ−8cδ2+12δ2oδ4−44δ2oδ2−2δ2cr+4δ3δo+
3cδ4−2δ3cr−24cδ2δ2o +24δ2ocδ+8δoδ4+48δ3oδ2 and Φ2
.
= 8δ2o +2δoδ+3δoδ
2−11δo−3+δ2. Therefore,
it is sufficient to show that Φ1(δ, δo, cr, c) > 0. But
∂Φ1
∂cr
= −(δ− 1)2(8δ2o + 3− δ2) < 0
and ∂Φ1
∂c
= (δ−1)3(8δ2o+3−δ2) < 0 and thus, it is sufficient to show that Φ1(δ, δo, cr =
1, c = 1) > 0. The latter is a function of only δ and δo, and by plotting the function
for all possible values 0 < δo < δ < 1, it can be readily seen that it is always positive.
Thus, ∂h
∗
∂δo
< 0.
Similarly, to show that ∂h
∗
∂δ
> 0, we can rewrite ∂h
∗
∂δ
as ∂h
∗
∂δ
= 1
2
Φ3(δ,δo,cr,c)
[Φ2(δ,δo)]2
where
Φ3
.
= 9+δoδ
4c+24δ3oδ
2c−16δ3ocrδ+20cδoδ+8crδoδ−48cδ3oδ+63δo +66δ2o−6δ2−170δ3o +64δ4o +δ4 +4δ3cδ2o−8crδ2oδ2 +28crδ2oδ−
2δ2crδo − 20δoδ− 32δoδ2 − 31cδ2o − 20crδ2o +80δ3oδ− 72δ2oδ +8δ2oδ3 +6δ2oδ4 − 12δ2oδ2 +4δ3δo − 48cδ2δ2o +72cδ2oδ +5δoδ4 +22δ3oδ2 −
12δoδ
2c+3δ2oδ
4c+24cδ3o−16δ4oδ−6crδo−9cδo+16crδ3o and Φ2 is defined above. Therefore, it is sufficient
to show that Φ3(δ, δo, cr, c) > 0. But
∂Φ3
∂cr
= −2δo(δ− 1)(1 + 4δo)(δ− 3 + 2δo) < 0 and
∂Φ3
∂c
= δo(δ−1)2(3δoδ2+δ2+10δoδ+2δ−9−31δo+24δ2o) < 0 (for all 0 < δo < δ < 1), and
thus, it is sufficient to show that Φ1(δ, δo, cr = 1, c = 1) > 0. The latter is a function
of only δ and δo, and by plotting the function for all possible values 0 < δo < δ < 1,
it can be readily seen that it is always positive. Thus, ∂h
∗
∂δ
< 0.
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Competition in both the primary and secondary markets with brand dif-
ferentiation.
Second-Period Analysis
The net utility consumer θ derives from purchasing firm A’s new product is
UA2 (θ) = θ − pA2 , firm B’s new product UB2 (θ) = (1 − β)θ − pB2 , firm A’s refur-
bished product UA2,r(θ) = δθ − pA2,r − hA, and firm B’s refurbished product UB2,r(θ) =
(1− β)δθ − pB2,r − hB. Solving for the marginal consumers, we get
θ1 =
pA2 − pB2
β
, θ2 =
pB2 − pA2,r − hA
1− β − δ , θ3 =
pA2,r − pB2,r + hA − hB
βδ
, θ4 =
pB2,r + h
B
(1− β)δ
with respective demand for each product of qA2 = 1− θ1, qB2 = θ1 − θ2, qA2,r = θ2 − θ3,
and qA2,r = θ3 − θ4. Figure 20 illustrates the four market segments.
Figure 20: Consumer State Space in the Second Period
Under perfect competition in the secondary markets and no refurbishing cost, the
refurbished products are available at a price equal to the resale value of used products
(pA2,r = s
A and pB2,r = s
B) with corresponding inverse demand functions
pA2 = (δ − 1 + β)qB2 + hA − (1− δ)qA2 + 1− δ + sA
pB2 = (δ − 1 + β)qA2 + hA − (1− β − δ)qB2 + 1− β − δ + sA.
Finally, the second-stage optimization problems for firms A and B are
MaxqA2 Π
A
2 (q
A
2 |qB2 ) = (pA2 − c)qA2 + hAqA2,r
MaxqB2 Π
B
2 (q
B
2 |qA2 ) = (pB2 − c)qB2 + hBqB2,r.
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By solving the first-order conditions simultaneously, we derive the N.E. of this game,
qA∗2 (h
A, hB, sA, sB) and qB∗2 (h
A, hB, sA, sB), and subsequently the quantities
qA∗2,r(h
A, hB, sA, sB) and qB∗2,r (h
A, hB, sA, sB), from the demand equations corresponding
to the market segmentation presented in Figure 20.
Figure 21: Consumer State Space in the First Period
First-period analysis
Similar to our analysis for the monopolistic OEM, if sj denotes the resale value
of firm j’s new product (j = A,B) at the end of period 1, then consumers of firms A
and B will derive the corresponding utilities in period 1:
UA1 (θ) = θ − pA1 + (sA − γθ)I(sA≥γθ)
UB1 (θ) = (1− β)θ − pB1 + (sB − (1− β)γθ)I(sB≥(1−β)γθ).
Figure 21 illustrates the total demand in the first period as well as the segment
of consumers who decide to sell their used products.The marginal consumers are
θ′1 =
sA
γ
, θ′2 =
pA1 −pB1 −sA
β−γ , θ
′
3 =
sB
(1−β)γ and θ
′
4 =
pB1 −sB
(1−β)(1−γ) , with respective demand
for new products of qA1 = 1 − θ′2, and qB1 = θ′2 − θ′4, and respective supply of used
products of qA1,r = θ
′
1 − θ′2 and qB1,r = θ′3 − θ′4. By setting these quantities equal
to the equilibrium secondary market sizes of the second period qA∗2,r(h
A, hB, sA, sB)
and qB∗2,r (h
A, hB, sA, sB), we can express the resale values in terms of the prices of
new products and the relicensing fees: sA(hA, hB, pA1 , p
B
1 ) and s
B(hA, hB, pA1 , p
B
1 ). The
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first-period profits are given by ΠA1 (q
A
1 |qB1 ) = (pA1 −c)qA1 and ΠB1 (qB1 |qA1 ) = (pB1 −c)qB1 ,
while the total optimal profits over the two-period horizon are:
MaxqA1 ,hAΠA(q
A
1 , h
A|qB1 , hB) = (p1A − c)qA1 +Π∗2A(qA1 , hA|qB1 , hB)
MaxqB1 ,hBΠB(q
B
1 , h
B|qA1 , hA) = (p1B − c)qB1 +Π∗2B(qB1 , hB|qA1 , hA)
We verify that the conditions for a unique unconstrained Nash Equilibrium are met
(convex strategy set, Hessian negative definite) and solve the first-order conditions
simultaneously for all the decision variables to derive the values qA∗1 , h
A∗, qB∗1 , h
B∗.
The equilibrium is valid only for parameters yielding positive quantities, thus, the
analysis in the paper is reflective of this set. For example, Figure 15 in the paper is
plotted for β ∈ [0.1, 0.4]. The upper threshold β is the highest value of β ∈ (0, 1− δ)
for which the low-end OEM produces new products in the second period. That is, for
values of β above that point, the low-end OEM is priced out of the primary market
in the second period (this constraint is always the first to be violated). On the other
hand, the lower threshold β = γ denotes the lowest value of β for which the ordering
of the consumer state space in Figure 21 is valid (low-end OEM’s new product above
high-end OEM’s refurbished product).
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